D. Sid Freeman

The applicant, Leon McIntyre, challenged the constitutionality of two Criminal Code provisions during his sentencing hearing: the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a restricted firearm (s. 344(1)) and the pre-sentence custody credit limit (s. 719(3.1)).

He argued these provisions violated sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed both constitutional challenges, finding that s. 344(1) was not grossly disproportionate to the applicant or reasonable hypothetical offenders, and that s. 719(3.1) was not a "punishment" under s. 12 and did not result in cruel and unusual punishment or arbitrary limitation of liberty.

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery with a restricted firearm, assault causing bodily harm, and related offences after attacking a victim in his driveway and stealing his vehicle.

The Crown sought a 6-year sentence, while the offender sought 2-3 years with enhanced pre-sentence credit for harsh jail conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a violent home invasion.

The court declined to grant enhanced pre-sentence credit beyond the 1.5:1 ratio, noting the offender's multiple institutional misconducts involving violence against other inmates.

The defendant brought a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of threatening a justice system participant (Justice Bruce Young) with intent to provoke fear and impede duties, contrary to s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that the *actus reus* (non-verbal threat of violence) was ambiguous, as the defendant's actions could plausibly be interpreted as an attempt to escape rather than a threat.

Furthermore, the *mens rea* (specific purpose of impeding duties) was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant's actions could have been an expression of anger after a detention order had already been made, and there was no evidence of an intent to impede future duties.

The accused, Joel Coveny, faced charges including intimidation of a judge.

During an interview with police concerning an unrelated robbery, Coveny made statements about the intimidation incident.

The Crown sought to admit these statements.

The defence argued that the police breached Coveny's s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to re-caution him when the investigation shifted to the intimidation charges.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) when Detective Lemaitre specifically questioned Coveny about what "set him off" regarding the court incident, as this inquiry realistically expected a self-incriminating response about his state of mind.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the specific utterance regarding Coveny's state of mind (found on page 16 of the transcript), finding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the inadvertent nature of the breach.

Other spontaneous utterances were not excluded.

The accused, charged with attempting to intimidate a justice participant and escaping custody, brought an application for the jury to take a view of the courtroom at the Old City Hall Courthouse where the alleged offences occurred.

The accused argued that a view was necessary because the Courts of Justice Act prohibited photography of the courtroom.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory prohibition against photography did not apply to the scenes of crime photographs produced by the Crown.

The court concluded that the photographs, drawings, and other evidence would adequately permit the jury to understand the courtroom layout, and there was no real advantage to taking a view.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant obtained under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant relied heavily on information from a confidential informant.

The court found the warrant invalid because the affiant failed to disclose the informant's monetary motivation, provided no details of past reliability, and relied on uncorroborated second-hand information to connect the residence to the drugs.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious and the impact on the accused's rights was significant, warranting the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

A preliminary inquiry into the first-degree murder of Rala Fredrick, who was shot execution-style on George Street in Toronto on July 6, 2014.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on eyewitness testimony from individuals at a men's shelter who were under the influence of drugs and alcohol, combined with CCTV surveillance footage.

No direct evidence linked either defendant to the shooting, no gun was recovered, and no witness identified the shooter.

The judge found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit both defendants to trial, though expressed serious reservations about the weakness of the case, particularly regarding eyewitness reliability and inconsistencies in their descriptions.

Sentencing following convictions for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and multiple breaches of weapons prohibition and probation orders.

The offender, found sitting on a couch above a loaded handgun in a social gathering location, had an extensive criminal record including prior weapons and drug-related offences and was subject to several court orders at the time of the offence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for unlawful possession of loaded firearms in circumstances posing danger to the public.

After reviewing comparable authorities and the offender’s aggravating record, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence for the firearms offence with additional consecutive time for prohibition order breaches.

Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 was granted for lengthy pre-trial custody and injuries sustained while detained.

In a trial for possession of a loaded firearm, the court ruled on several pre-trial motions and a motion for a directed verdict.

The court admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession of the same firearm, finding its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also allowed the Crown to ask an eye-witness for an in-dock identification and admitted crime scene photographs verified by other officers.

A directed verdict of acquittal was granted for an obstructing justice charge because providing a false name did not actually obstruct the arresting officer.

However, the motion for a directed verdict on the firearm possession charges was dismissed, as the circumstantial evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

The accused were charged with conspiracy to murder and commit aggravated assault, counselling to murder and commit aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon.

The charges arose from an overheard conversation where Abou Al-Rashta instructed Pirouzi to attack two individuals.

The court found insufficient evidence of a meeting of minds to support the conspiracy charges against both accused.

However, the court found Abou Al-Rashta guilty of counselling the offences, as he actively induced and encouraged Pirouzi.

Pirouzi was also found guilty of assault with a weapon for a separate incident involving a remote control.