Dennis M. Touesnard

The successful appellant sought costs of the trial and the appeal.

The respondents argued that no trial costs should be awarded because the judgment amount fell within the Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting the Small Claims Court limit was $10,000 when the claim was issued, the defendants had launched a $65,000 counterclaim, and the plaintiff had made a reasonable early offer to settle for $15,000.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the appellant trial costs fixed at $25,000 and appeal costs fixed at $10,000.

The defendant brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of an action for specific performance and damages arising from a failed real estate transaction, and alternatively sought discharge of a certificate of pending litigation.

The purchaser failed to close on the contractual closing date due to a series of unforeseen issues beyond its control, though the vendor refused to close the following day.

The court held that allegations that the vendor acted in bad faith by relying on the “time of the essence” clause to terminate the contract raised genuine issues requiring a trial.

However, the court concluded the property was acquired for investment purposes and the purchaser failed to establish that the property was unique.

The certificate of pending litigation was therefore discharged while the underlying action proceeded.

The appellant contractor appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim for unpaid renovation fees and the respondents' counterclaim for defective work, while ordering the appellant to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by implying a contractual term requiring the appellant to provide warranties, which contradicted the express written terms of the contract.

The court set aside the trial judgment, dismissed the counterclaim, and awarded the appellant his unpaid invoices totaling $22,727.54.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision in favour of the respondent bank regarding a loan default.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence, including an affidavit from a signing officer, to argue the loan was intended for a company rather than him personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence was available prior to the summary judgment hearing and lacked sufficient detail to be meaningful.

The court held the appellant failed to put his best foot forward, and the motion judge made no errors in granting summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank.

The appellant, who was self-represented at the motion, sought to adduce fresh evidence explaining his failure to defend the motion due to personal circumstances and asserting that his employer was responsible for two of the three loans in dispute.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the appellant's self-represented status and personal circumstances justified his failure to adduce the evidence earlier.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the judgment regarding the two disputed loans and remitting the matter back to the Superior Court.

The moving parties brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which refused an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal.

The moving parties had claimed at trial that they intended only to provide a character reference for the main borrowers, but the trial judge rejected their evidence.

Their appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the single judge that there was no basis for granting an extension of time, as the proposed leave motion raised only issues of credibility and had no chance of success.

The motion was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellants co-signed a loan for a third party who subsequently defaulted.

The respondent bank obtained judgment against the appellants at trial.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and made palpable and overriding errors in finding they understood their obligations as co-signers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings that the appellants were informed of their liability.

However, the court granted the appellants' crossclaim against the primary borrower, which the trial judge had overlooked.

The appellants co-signed a bank loan for a third party who subsequently defaulted and declared bankruptcy.

The bank obtained judgment against the appellants at trial.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and failed to properly assess conflicting evidence regarding their understanding of the loan documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the court granted judgment on the appellants' crossclaim against the primary borrower, which the trial judge had overlooked.