Stayshyn J.

The appellants co-signed a loan for a third party who subsequently defaulted.

The respondent bank obtained judgment against the appellants at trial.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and made palpable and overriding errors in finding they understood their obligations as co-signers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings that the appellants were informed of their liability.

However, the court granted the appellants' crossclaim against the primary borrower, which the trial judge had overlooked.

The appellants co-signed a bank loan for a third party who subsequently defaulted and declared bankruptcy.

The bank obtained judgment against the appellants at trial.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and failed to properly assess conflicting evidence regarding their understanding of the loan documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the court granted judgment on the appellants' crossclaim against the primary borrower, which the trial judge had overlooked.

The defendant in a motor vehicle accident action served a jury notice.

At the commencement of trial, the plaintiffs moved to strike the jury notice, arguing the main plaintiff, a Muslim-Canadian woman of Afghani descent, would not receive a fair trial due to post-9/11 racism and the political climate.

The trial judge struck the jury notice, taking judicial notice of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court allowed the defendant's appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of such bias without evidence, as the facts were not so notorious as to be beyond reasonable debate.

The matter was remitted to a different trial judge.