David Zarek

The appellant slipped and fell on ice and snow on the driveway of a rented residential property.

He sued the landlord and later added the tenant as a co-defendant.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against both defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the tenant, finding the claim was statute-barred because the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that he discovered his claim on the date of the accident.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the landlord, finding genuine issues for trial concerning the interplay between the lease terms, the Occupiers' Liability Act, and the landlord's maintenance obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act.

Following earlier motion decisions involving crossclaims between defendants in an action arising from an oil spill at a residence, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $25,000.

The responding defendant argued for a significantly lower award.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding no misconduct warranting a punitive award and emphasizing the governing principle of reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Although the moving party obtained partial summary judgment and a declaration regarding future defence costs, the success was only partial.

The court fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for property damage caused by an oil spill.

The defendant Bluewave brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the co-defendant Daniel Charles Transport for the costs of defending the action, arguing that Daniel Charles Transport breached a contractual obligation to obtain liability insurance naming Bluewave as an additional insured.

Daniel Charles Transport brought a motion to withdraw admissions and a cross-motion to dismiss Bluewave's crossclaim based on a Pierringer Agreement it had reached with the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed Daniel Charles Transport's motions, finding no justification to withdraw the admissions and that the Pierringer Agreement did not extinguish Bluewave's crossclaim for several liability.

The court granted Bluewave's motion for summary judgment, finding that Daniel Charles Transport breached its covenant to insure and that the pleaded allegations triggered a duty to defend.

Applying the principle of equitable contribution, the court ordered Daniel Charles Transport to pay 50% of Bluewave's past and future defence costs.

The representative plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding sought leave to discontinue the action under s. 29(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The claim concerned retiree health benefits allegedly promised to spouses of employees who accepted an early retirement program.

The representative plaintiff ceased to have a personal cause of action after his spouse predeceased him and he was unable to find another class member willing to assume the representative role.

The court held that, given the small class size, lack of interest among potential class members, and the marginal economics of the litigation, discontinuance was appropriate.

Leave to discontinue was granted subject to notice being provided to potential class members.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the claims against a defendant vehicle owner, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs for both the motion and the defence of the action and requested a Sanderson order requiring the co‑defendant insurer to pay those costs.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing Sanderson orders, the court found it reasonable that the defendants had been joined and that the insurer had actively attempted to shift liability onto the successful defendant.

The court held that fairness justified ordering the insurer to pay the successful defendant’s costs.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $24,292.47 for the summary judgment motion and $75,000 for the remainder of the action.

The defendant grandmother moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims of vicarious liability and negligent entrustment after her grandson used her van to run over and kill a pedestrian in a public park following a drug deal.

The court granted the motion, finding that a public park is not a 'highway' under the Highway Traffic Act, precluding vicarious liability.

The court also dismissed the negligent entrustment claim, holding that the grandmother owed no duty of care to a pedestrian in a park and that the grandson's criminal use of the vehicle as a weapon was not reasonably foreseeable.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to reinstate their third party claim after it was dismissed by the registrar.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the fact that the progression of the third party claim was entirely dependent on the main action, which was still pending.

Furthermore, the form of the registrar's dismissal order had misled counsel, and the motion judge's finding of prejudice was overtaken by the appellants' decision to discontinue claims against the minor third parties.

The appellants held mortgages on a property that was destroyed by fire after being vacated by the owners.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claims under the standard mortgage clause, arguing that the vacancy was a material change to the risk under Statutory Condition 4 of which it was not notified.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Statutory Condition 4 conflicts with the standard mortgage clause, which explicitly preserves coverage despite any act or neglect of the mortgagor, including vacancy.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurer was precluded from relying on the statutory condition to void the mortgagees' coverage.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagees coverage under a fire insurance policy after the mortgaged property was destroyed by fire.

The mortgagors had vacated the property, and the mortgagees took control of it but failed to notify the insurer of the vacancy.

The Court of Appeal held that while the vacancy exclusion did not apply to the mortgagees due to the mortgage clause, Statutory Condition 4 did apply.

The mortgagees' actions in taking control of the vacant property constituted a material change in risk within their control and knowledge.

Their failure to notify the insurer voided the policy.

The appeal was allowed and the actions dismissed.