David G. Price

The applicant mother sought sole custody of the parties' two-year-old child in an uncontested trial.

The respondent father, who had been deported to Nigeria, did not appear but had previously mailed an Answer requesting custody when the child turns ten and access in the interim.

The court applied the best interests of the child test under the Divorce Act and the Children's Law Reform Act.

Finding that the mother had been the sole caregiver since birth and the father had no involvement, the court granted sole custody to the mother with reasonable access to the father.

The applicant wife sought to set aside a separation agreement after discovering the respondent husband had secretly mortgaged the matrimonial home with his mother, withdrawing most of its equity prior to separation.

The husband failed to participate in the proceedings, resulting in an undefended trial.

The court set aside the separation agreement due to the husband's material misrepresentation of his liabilities.

The court found the husband and his mother held the property on a resulting trust for the parties, and the wife had a constructive trust interest.

The husband's secret mortgage constituted a reckless depletion of family property.

The husband was ordered to pay the wife half the unencumbered value of the home plus full recovery costs.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's pleadings for his repeated failure to comply with multiple court orders requiring financial disclosure.

The parties separated after a 13-year relationship, and the applicant required corporate and personal financial information to establish her claims for spousal support and equalization of net family property.

The court found that the respondent wilfully and deliberately breached previous disclosure orders and failed to answer undertakings from his questioning.

As a result, the court struck the respondent's pleadings, granted the applicant leave to proceed to an uncontested hearing, and ordered the respondent to pay costs on a substantial indemnity scale due to his bad faith conduct.

The respondents brought motions for access to their incapable mother, whose personal care and property were managed by the applicants as joint guardians.

The motions became moot when the mother passed away before an order could be finalized.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding that while the respondents were entitled to some measure of success on the access issue, their unreasonable conduct precipitated the motions.

The court concluded that a no-costs order would best serve the objectives of indemnification, sanctioning unreasonable conduct, and encouraging settlement of remaining estate issues.

The defendant Attorney General of Canada moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence claim arising from a severe assault on the plaintiff inmate by three other inmates at Millhaven Institution.

The court found that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) breached its duty of care by placing the non-violent plaintiff with highly violent offenders, failing to enforce cell door protocols, ignoring the plaintiff's emergency cell alarm, and lacking adequate video surveillance.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability because the evidence overwhelmingly established CSC's negligence and causation.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs on liability, with damages to be determined at a subsequent trial.

The applicant condominium corporation sought a compliance order against a unit owner, alleging breaches of the Condominium Act and the corporation's rules arising from an alleged assault during a board election.

The respondent unit owner raised a preliminary issue of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute concerned the corporation's rules and required mediation or arbitration under s. 134(2) of the Act.

The court found the application was essentially a dispute over the board election and not about conduct likely to cause injury under the Act.

The court dismissed the application because the applicant failed to comply with the mandatory mediation and arbitration preconditions.

The parties separated after a 25-year traditional marriage.

The respondent mother sought interim spousal and child support for their child with cerebral palsy.

The applicant father, a self-employed business owner, failed to provide complete financial disclosure.

Relying on the respondent's expert business valuator, the court imputed an income of $488,000 to the father, grossing up undeclared management fees and discretionary expenses.

The court imputed an income of $40,000 to the mother based on her earning capacity.

The father was ordered to pay $3,764 monthly in child support, $11,374 monthly in spousal support, and 92% of section 7 expenses.

The applicant brought a motion to find the respondent in contempt of two prior court orders requiring financial disclosure, including the production of tax returns, bank statements, and a business valuation of his exotic car rental business.

The court found that the respondent had deliberately and wilfully breached both orders by failing to serve his Answer and Financial Statement on time, failing to produce his actual filed tax returns, failing to produce bank and PayPal statements, and failing to retain a Chartered Business Valuator.

The court found the respondent in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and adjourned the matter for submissions on penalty and costs.

The applicants and respondents are neighbours who disputed ownership of a patch of land behind the respondents' garage.

The applicants sought an injunction to remove a storage container placed by the respondents, claiming ownership of the land through a self-conveyance.

The respondents cross-applied for a declaration of ownership by adverse possession.

The court traced the historical conveyances and determined that neither party owned the land nor held a right of way over it; rather, it belonged to a third-party neighbour.

Both the application for an injunction and the cross-application for adverse possession were dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The plaintiff had sued the defendants for publishing an article in a Chinese language newspaper about her arrest for fraud, which was based on an RCMP press release.

The charges were later withdrawn.

The court found that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the publication of the fact of a criminal charge, even after withdrawal, does not support a defamation claim.

Furthermore, the Google translation of the article relied upon by the plaintiff demonstrated that the article accurately stated she faced prison 'if convicted'.

The claim was struck without leave to amend as it was frivolous and vexatious.

The respondent mother brought a motion to find the applicant father in contempt of a 2013 joint custody order that required him to drive their two children to her home for weekend access.

The father unilaterally stopped driving the children, reducing the mother's access from three weekends a month to alternate weekends, and blamed the children's reluctance.

The court found the father in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, noting he failed to exercise parental authority to ensure compliance and deliberately undermined the mother's relationship with the children.

To remedy the contempt and serve the children's best interests, the court varied the order, granting the mother sole custody and primary residence.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary sole custody, retroactive child support, and contribution to special and extraordinary expenses.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion for shared parenting and set-off child support.

The court found that the father's history of controlling behaviour and failure to pay support weighed against joint custody.

The court granted temporary sole custody to the mother, expanded the father's access to 35% of the time, and ordered the father to pay retroactive child support, ongoing table support, and 50% of the children's section 7 expenses.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision and sued her auto insurers under the uninsured automobile coverage.

Her insurers issued a third-party claim against Aviva, alleging that Aviva insured the at-fault vehicle.

Aviva moved for summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle was fraudulently added to its policy after the collision occurred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues for trial regarding whether the named insured owned the vehicle at the time of the collision and whether the policy was validly back-dated, noting that a trial was necessary to resolve the complex factual issues surrounding the alleged fraud.

The defendant in an action for damages arising from an allegedly improper PPSA registration moved to consolidate the action with her ongoing shareholder oppression proceedings against the plaintiff and others.

The defendant argued the PPSA registration was made to prevent a breach of a preservation order in the oppression proceedings.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proceedings arose from the same factual background and shared common issues of fact, particularly regarding the defendant's motivation, which was relevant to the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

The plaintiff sued her siblings, who were the estate trustees of their parents' estates, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conversion of personal property, and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The defendants moved to strike the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action or, alternatively, for summary judgment.

The plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend her claim.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to amend her claim and dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the amended claim raised genuine issues for trial regarding the alleged breaches of trust and mental distress that could not be resolved summarily.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendants to comply with undertakings and answer questions refused during examinations for discovery.

The underlying action involved allegations that the defendants diverted funds owed to the plaintiff for goods delivered to Wal-Mart Mexico.

The defendants argued that producing the requested records would impose a disproportionate burden because the records were located in Mexico and the subsidiary was in receivership.

The court ordered the defendants to answer the undertakings and some of the refused questions, and to re-attend for further examination.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding certain records pending the creation of a Discovery Plan, finding that the plaintiff's failure to create a plan contributed to the necessity of the motion.

No costs were awarded.

The applicants brought a proceeding under the Substitute Decisions Act to remove the respondent as joint Attorney for Property for their father.

The respondent had impeded the applicant's role as Attorney for Personal Care and refused to share authority over property.

Following the father's death, the court had to determine the costs of the proceeding and address the passing of the respondent's accounts as Estate Trustee.

The court found that the respondent's unreasonable conduct caused the litigation and ordered him to personally pay the applicants' costs on a full recovery basis.

The court also found the respondent's estate accounts were not in the proper form and set a timetable for the delivery of revised accounts.

Kamalita Deonath was injured in a parking lot collision involving Javed Iqubal, an employee of RockTenn Display Company.

Deonath's claim for benefits was eventually accepted by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB), leading to a "without costs" dismissal of the main action against Iqubal and Honda Canada Finance Inc. RockTenn, the Third Party, subsequently brought a motion seeking dismissal of the Third Party Claim and recovery of its costs, arguing that the WSIB had exclusive jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the Third Party Claim without costs, but denied RockTenn's request for costs and instead ordered RockTenn to pay costs for the motion, finding its conduct in bringing the motion unreasonable and unnecessary given the prior settlement offers. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision provides a practical application of principles governing costs awards under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

It clarifies that a party is justified in commencing a third-party claim when there is a substantial risk regarding WSIB jurisdiction and limitation periods, especially when the WSIB determination is uncertain or delayed.

The court also highlights that bringing a motion solely for costs, particularly when a without-costs resolution was available and the moving party's conduct was uncooperative, constitutes unreasonable litigation behaviour warranting an adverse costs order. final_judgement: > The Third Party Claim was dismissed without costs.

RockTenn Display Company was ordered to pay costs of $1,500.00 plus H.S.T. to Javed Iqubal and Honda Canada Finance Inc. for the motion, payable within 60 days. winning_degree_applicant: 4 winning_degree_respondent: 1 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2017 decision_number: 3672 file_number: "CV-11-1794-AI" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3672/2017onsc3672.html" keywords: - Costs - Third Party Claim - WSIB - Workplace Safety and Insurance Act - Exclusive Jurisdiction - Limitation Period - Rules of Civil Procedure - Proportionality - Unreasonable Conduct areas_of_law: - Civil Procedure - Costs - Workplace Safety and Insurance cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Workplace Safety and Insurance Act" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/97w16" - title: "Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.

C.43, section 131" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90c43" - title: "Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194" case_law: - title: "394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek, 2010 ONSC 7238, para. 10" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2010/2010onsc7238/2010onsc7238.html" - title: "Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii14579/2004canlii14579.html" - title: "Moon v. Sher (2004), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 440 (C.A.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii39005/2004canlii39005.html" - title: "Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. (c.o.b.

Ecoflow Ontario) v. Building Materials Evaluation Commission, 2003 ONSC 8279, [2003] O.J. No. 1658, at para. 17" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2003/2003canlii8279/2003canlii8279.html" - title: "Patene Building v. Niagara Home, 2010 ONSC 468" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2010/2010onsc468/2010onsc468.html" - title: "Maida v. Goodmurphy, 2012 ONSC 222, para. 22" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc222/2012onsc222.html" --- COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-1794-AI DATE: 2017-06-13 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE B E T W E E N: KAMALITA DEONATH No one appearing, for the Plaintiff Plaintiff - and - JAVED IQUBAL, HONDA CANADA FINANCE INC., and THE WAWANESSA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY Defendants A. Martin, for the defendants Javed Iqubal and Honda Canada Finance No one appearing for the Defendant Wawanesa - and - ROCKTENN DISPLAY COMPANY Third Party B. Thomas, for the Third Party HEARD: June 13, 2017, at Brampton, Ontario Price J. Reasons For Order ## OVERVIEW [1] Kamalita Deonath was injured when she was struck by a vehicle in the parking lot of RockTenn Display Company.

The collision occurred after Ms. Deonath exited from the RockTenn building where she had performed services on behalf of the temporary personnel agency that employed her.

Ms. Deonath began the present proceeding against the driver of the vehicle, Javed Iqbal, who was an employee of RockTenn, and Honda Canada, which leased the vehicle to RockTenn.

Mr. Iqbal and Honda issued a Third Party Claim against RockTenn, as Mr. Iqubal was in the course of his employment at the time of the collision and RockTenn was vicariously liable for his negligence. [2] Because both Ms. Deonath’s employer and RockTenn were Schedule 1 employers under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act (“WSIA”), whose employees’ injuries are covered by Workplace Insurance, provided the injury occurs in the course of employment of both the injured employee and the at fault motorist. [3] RockTenn did nothing to assist Ms. Deonath in her claim for benefits, which was initially dismissed by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board on the ground that Ms. Deonath had left RockTenn’s premises before being injured.

It also did nothing to assist in Ms. Deonath’s appeal to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board Appeals Tribunal, which ultimately allowed her appeal, two years and three months after she made it, on the ground that the injury was work-related, having occurred a reasonable period after she finished work, and while she was crossing the parking lot, an activity reasonably incidental to her employment, since she was a temporary worker who had performed services at RockTenn’s building, accessible only from the parking lot. [4] RockTenn did nothing to try to settle the Third Party Claim against it by raising the issue of the WSIB’s exclusive jurisdiction over the claim.

After Ms. Iqbal and Honda settled the main action against them by a dismissal of that action without costs, and although they were similarly prepared to settle their Third Party Claim by a dismissal of it without costs, RockTenn brought the present motion for a dismissal of the Claim, which would have been administratively dismissed in any event, in order to recover its modest costs. [5] RockTenn argues that it should be granted its costs on the ground that Iqbal and Honda should not have issued the Third Party Claim against it because the WSIB had exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the Appeals Resolution Officer of the WSIB did not hold that the WSIB had jurisdiction until May 12, 2015, almost a year after June 4, 2014, when the two year limitation period for issuing a Third Party Claim expired. [6] For the reasons that follow, the Third Party Claim will be dismissed, with no costs of the action, and with costs of the motion to be paid by RockTenn. ## BACKGROUND FACTS [7] On October 13, 2010, Ms. Deonath was employed by Apple One Employment Service, a temporary agency that supplied workers to RockTenn.

While in the parking lot outside the RockTenn premises, she was struck by a car operated by RockTenn’s employee, Javed Iqubal, who was operating a vehicle which RockTenn leased from Honda Canada. [8] The collision took place after the end of the afternoon work shift, which Ms. Deonath and Mr. Iqbal had worked.

Ms. Deonath had just exited the RockTenn facility, which was accessible only by crossing the parking lot. [9] On May 2, 2011, Ms. Deonath began her action against: a) Mr. Iqbal, as driver; b) Honda Canada, as owner; and c) Her own insurance company, Wawanesa, under the unidentified, uninsured, or underinsured coverage of her auto insurance policy, although she later discontinued her action against Wawanesa because Mr. Iqbal had adequate insurance. [10] Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada delivered their Statement of Defence on August 29, 2011.

They began a third Party Claim against RockTenn approximately 7 months later, on March 9, 2012, and served it on RockTenn on May 16, 2012.

RockTenn’s lawyer tried to get a waiver of defence but did not hear back from the lawyer for Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada by the June 4, 2012, deadline for delivering a Defence, so she delivered a Defence that day. [11] Examinations for discovery in the main action proceeded on September 20, 2012, at which time the parties discussed whether Ms. Deonath was entitled to make a claim to the WSIB for benefits.

During a telephone call in February 2013, RockTenn’s lawyer told Ms. Deonath’s lawyer that, in her opinion, the WSIB likely had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim, by reason of s. 28 of the WSIA, as both Ms. Deonath and Mr. Iqbal were in the course of their employment at the time of the collision.

RockTenn’s lawyer urged Ms. Deonath’s lawyer to make a claim for benefits to the WSIB. [12] Soon after the call, Ms. Deonath applied to the WSIB for benefits.

In June 2013, the WSIB denied her claim on the ground that the parking lot was not owned by RockTenn and Ms. Deonath was not in the course of her employment at the time of the collision, having already left RockTenn’s premises.

In December 2013, Ms. Deonath appealed the decision of the WSIB with the assistance of Mr. Iqbal’s counsel.

The appeal was heard in April 2015, and in May 2015, the appeal was allowed and Ms. Deonath’s claim was accepted by WSIB on the ground that Ms. Deonath was a temporary worker who had just left RockTenn’s premises, where she had been dispatched, and had to cross the parking lot to get to and from RockTenn’s premises, with the result that she was engaged in an activity “reasonably incidental” to her employment. [13] As WSIB accepted Ms. Deonath’s claim, she agreed to a “without costs” dismissal of the main action, and signed a full and final release on July 2, 2015.

From July 2015, to February 2017, the lawyer for Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada corresponded with RockTenn’s lawyer to request instructions for a dismissal of the Third party Claim without costs.

On February 2017, RockTenn’s lawyer advised the lawyer for Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada that RockTenn would be bringing a motion for costs of the Third Party Claim. ## ISSUES [14] Who is entitled to their costs of the Third Party Claim and of the present motion and in what amount? ## PARTIES’ POSITIONS [15] RockTenn submits that it is entitled to its costs on the ground that, because the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board Appeals Tribunal held that Ms. Deonath and Mr. Iqbal were in the course of their employment at the time of the collision and the WSIB granted Ms. Deonath benefits, the WSIB had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, pursuant to s. 28 of the WSIA. [16] RockTenn submits that: Mr. Iqbal was not justified in commencing the Third Party Claim herein before exploring whether Ms. Deonath’s claim was statute barred by operation of s. 28 of the WSIA.

Rather, he should have first urged Ms. Deonath’s counsel to have her apply for WSIB benefits, and if she did not, should have brought a “Right to Sue” Application to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board Appeals Tribunal for a determination as to whether her right of action against him was taken away. [17] Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada submit that they had until August 29, 2013, two years after they served their Statement of Defence, to issue their Third Party Claim, with the result that the limitation period would have expired well before April 2015, when Ms. Deonath’s appeal was heard and she was successful in her claim.

They submit that “it was reasonable for Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada to issue their Third Party Claim to protect their claim to contribution and indemnity. ## ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE [18] There is no issue was to whether the Third Party Claim should be dismissed.

Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada consent to both the main action and the Third Party Claim being dismissed on a without costs basis.

The only issue is whether RockTenn is entitled to its costs. [19] Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act gives the court general discretion to fix costs [^1].

Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure sets out factors the court should consider in making its determination [^2]. [20] Justice Perell summarized the purposes that costs orders serve in *394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek* (2010) [^3].

He stated: Modern costs rules are designed to advance five purposes in the administration of justice: (1) to indemnify successful litigants for the costs of litigation, although not necessarily completely; (2) to facilitate access to justice, including access for impecunious litigants; (3) to discourage frivolous claims and defences; (4) to discourage or sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants in their conduct of the proceedings; and (5) to encourage settlements. (internal citations omitted). [21] Ultimately, in determining the costs to be awarded, the court applies fairness and reasonableness as overriding principles [^4].

In assessing what is fair and reasonable, it does not engage in a mechanical exercise but, rather, takes a contextual approach, applying the objectives described above and the factors set out in Rule 57, and sets a figure that is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances [^5].

Rule 1.04(1.1) requires the court to consider proportionality; that is, the amount of costs ordered should be proportional to the amount of money and other interests at stake in the proceeding [^6]. [22] A party will be relieved from paying costs where their claim contains a bona fide cause of action that is not frivolous or vexatious and where it was justified in commencing the action having regard to the conduct of the third party [^7]. [23] Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada were justified issuing the Third Party Claim.

There was a substantial risk that Ms. Deonath’s claim to the WSIB for benefits would not be successful or would not be resolved within the limitation period for issuing a third party claim.

As events unfolded, her claim was not successful until May 2015, a year and a half after August 2013, when the limitation period for issuing a Third Party Claim would have expired. [24] RockTenn’s lawyer acknowledges that even if Ms. Deonath had made her claim to the WSIB immediately upon issuing her Claim, having regard to the initial disposition of her claim, after 5 months, and the appeal period, of a further year and five months, the limitation period would still have expired for issuing a Third Party Claim before Ms. Deonath would have known that her claim to the WSIB would be successful. [25] Based on RockTenn’s lawyer estimate of the full indemnity costs of $5,000 incurred by her client in preparing a Statement of Defence to the Claim and to the Third Party Claim, based on her hourly rate of $345, it would appear that she spent approximately 14.5 hours drafting those pleadings.

That amount of time is, on its face, unreasonable, and affords some explanation for why RockTenn brought the present motion for the purpose only of recovering its costs. [26] After receiving the Third Party Claim, RockTenn’s lawyer was as capable of investigating the merits of a possible claim to the WSIB as Ms. Deonath’s lawyer was, and could have suggested an adjournment of the examinations for discovery from the September date when they had been scheduled to take place, and then made a proposal to Ms. Deonath that she apply to WSIB, if she was of the opinion at that time that the exclusive jurisdiction of the WSIB was self-evident.

She did not do so, apparently because she considered it to be in her own client’s interests to proceed to discovery before making that proposal. [27] RockTenn’s lawyer acknowledges that it was not until the discovery that it became apparent to their client that a WSIB claim was viable.

It was no more unreasonable for Ms. Deonath to wait until the discoveries to make that determination. [28] Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada assisted Ms. Deonath in making her claim for benefits, which efforts were ultimately successful.

RockTenn took no steps to participate in the WSIB application or appeal.

Between July 2015 and February 2017, they did not respond to the efforts by the lawyers for Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada to seek a resolution of the Third Party Claim on a without costs basis.

It was unreasonable for RockTenn not to cooperate in these efforts, and unreasonable for it to bring the present motion for the purpose only of seeking its costs of the action. [29] It was unreasonable for RockTenn to bring the present motion, solely for purpose of recovering costs which it had incurred defending the Third Party Claim, the majority of which could have been avoided, and based on an argument that Ms. Deonath failed to take steps that RockTenn’s lawyer also did not take, and that, had they been taken, would not have avoided the Third Party Claim or reduced the costs associated with it.

RockTenn, had it acted reasonably, should have consented, as the other parties did, to a dismissal of the Third Party Claim without costs.

A motion, brought in these circumstances, makes unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources. ## CONCLUSION AND ORDER [30] For the foregoing reason, it is ordered that: 1.

The Third Party Claim is dismissed without costs. 2.

RockTenn shall pay the costs of Mr. Iqbal and Honda Canada in this motion, fixed in the amount of $1,500.00 plus H.S.T., within 60 days. --- Price J. Released: June 13, 2017 --- ### Footnotes [^1]: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.

C.43, section 131 [^2]: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 [^3]: *394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek*, 2010 ONSC 7238, para. 10 [^4]: *Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario* (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.); and *Moon v. Sher* (2004), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 440 (C.A.) [^5]: *Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. (c.o.b.

Ecoflow Ontario) v. Building Materials Evaluation Commission*, 2003 ONSC 8279 (ON SCDC), [2003] O.J. No. 1658, at para. 17 [^6]: *Patene Building v. Niagara Home*, 2010 ONSC 468 [^7]: *Maida v. Goodmurphy*, 2012 ONSC 222, para. 22

The applicant, Beverley Hathway, sought spousal support, medical/dental coverage, life insurance designation, and costs from the respondent, Richard Hathway.

The trial proceeded undefended due to the respondent's failure to deliver an Answer or file a Financial Statement.

The court found the applicant entitled to both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support, having suffered economic disadvantage by resigning from her employment to reside with the respondent in Florida and experiencing financial hardship upon separation.

A lump sum spousal support of $60,019.00 was awarded, along with orders for the respondent to maintain medical and dental coverage, irrevocably designate the applicant as a life insurance beneficiary to the extent of the support obligation, and establish a first charge on his RCMP pension survivor benefits.

The applicant was also awarded costs on a full recovery basis due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct and lack of participation.

The respondent, Maria Preciosa Ramos Doforno Sutton, brought a motion for interim spousal support and further financial disclosure from the applicant, Ronald John Sutton, following a 35-year marriage and separation in 2010.

The court found Ms. Sutton entitled to compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support due to her contributions to the marriage, economic disadvantage, and current health issues preventing self-sufficiency.

Mr. Sutton's arguments regarding Ms. Sutton's modest lifestyle in Portugal and the inadmissibility of an internet article on cost of living were rejected.

The court ordered Mr. Sutton to pay interim spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and to provide extensive financial disclosure regarding his assets, debts, and business interests.