Daniel DeSantis

The accused was charged with first-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, the court heard three evidentiary applications.

The accused sought to exclude text messages based on authorship and hearsay.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased under the principled approach to hearsay, and evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct to establish motive.

The court admitted the text messages, finding sufficient evidence of authorship.

The court admitted the ante-mortem statements, finding they met the threshold reliability test.

The court admitted some discreditable conduct evidence (prior gun possession, code of silence) as highly probative of motive, but excluded evidence of gang affiliation and drug trafficking as overly prejudicial.

The applicant sought a second bail review following a prior Superior Court decision denying judicial interim release on a charge of robbery with a firearm.

The application argued a material change in circumstances based on a new release plan involving different family sureties and proposed employment.

The court held that merely proposing new sureties did not constitute a material change where the plan remained substantively similar to the earlier proposal rejected by the court.

Given the applicant’s criminal history, prior breach of bail conditions, the seriousness of the allegations, and the strength of the Crown’s case, the court found continued detention justified on the secondary ground and also on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted by a jury on two counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving two college students at a campus residence.

The first offence involved forced sexual touching after the complainant repeatedly refused consent, while the second involved forced vaginal intercourse with ejaculation despite the complainant’s protests.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the serious nature of sexual violence and the vulnerability of the victims in a residence setting.

Although the accused was a youthful first offender with family support and rehabilitative prospects, the gravity of the offences and their lasting psychological impact on the victims warranted a penitentiary sentence.

A total sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

The offender pleaded guilty to stealing $777 from his employer, the LCBO, due to severe family financial stress.

The court granted a conditional discharge, finding it was in the offender's best interest and not contrary to the public interest given his lack of prior record and extensive community service.

The offender also challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that the surcharge is a user-fee or general restitution rather than a sentence, and its mandatory imposition does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The offender was ordered to pay a $200 victim surcharge with one year to pay.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was tried on multiple firearm and ammunition possession and storage charges after a prohibited firearm and loaded magazines were found in a bag on her bed when police investigated a reported break and enter.

The case turned on circumstantial evidence and whether the accused knew the firearm and ammunition were in the apartment.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court held the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, particularly given her repeated opportunities to remove the firearm before police found it and the plausibility of her explanation that another person had access to her room.

The Crown failed to establish that guilt was the only rational inference.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a minor complainant.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence from two additional witnesses (sisters of the complainant) alleging similar sexual misconduct by the accused.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the similar fact evidence under the established legal framework.

The court found that while there were similarities in the conduct alleged by all three witnesses, the potential for collusion, combined with material inconsistencies in the evidence and credibility concerns, meant that the probative value of the similar fact evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The similar fact evidence was therefore excluded from trial.

This is a judicial interim release hearing for an accused charged with nine counts including attempt fraud, uttering forged documents, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The accused, a 42-year-old with a significant criminal history including prior fraud convictions and weapons offences, sought bail.

The Crown opposed release on primary and secondary grounds.

The court found the accused's testimony to be unreliable and lacking in credibility, with numerous inconsistencies regarding his family situation, financial circumstances, and criminal history.

An initial bail program proposal was deemed inadequate.

A subsequent plan involving a private surety collapsed when the proposed surety learned of the accused's background and outstanding warrants.

The court ordered detention, finding a substantial likelihood the accused would fail to appear and commit further offences.