D.A. Broad

The offender was convicted of sexual assault and uttering threats against his step-daughter, with the abuse occurring when she was between 5 and 8 years old.

The Crown sought 10 to 12 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 3 to 4 years.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for adult sexual predators, the court sentenced the offender to 8 years for sexual assault and 1 year concurrent for uttering threats.

The court also granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 2:1 for time served during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and uttering threats against his spouse after an unprovoked attack that left her with a fractured jaw requiring surgery.

The Crown sought 3.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 30 months' imprisonment for the aggravated assault, with a concurrent 6-month sentence for uttering threats.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual assault against two different complainants.

The assaults involved touching and digital penetration while the victims were sleeping in the offender's apartment.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought seven months.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the breach of trust and the profound impact on the victims.

The offender was sentenced to 15 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and SOIRA registration.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, attempt to suffocate, and breach of an undertaking.

The charges arose from an encounter with the complainant, who had agreed to provide sexual services for money.

The court found significant issues with the complainant's credibility and reliability, noting her admission to lying under oath and the impact of her fentanyl withdrawal on her memory.

Applying the W.(D.) and Villaroman frameworks, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, as the circumstantial evidence supported reasonable inferences other than guilt.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The plaintiff supplier brought a motion for summary judgment against the owner and the principal of the contractor for unpaid invoices.

The contractor had terminated its contract with the owner, and the owner signed a termination agreement promising to pay the contractor's outstanding obligations to specific suppliers, including the plaintiff.

The court found that the owner was directly liable to the plaintiff under the principled exception to the privity of contract doctrine.

The court also found that the principal's personal guarantee was not released because the release was contingent on the owner paying the invoices.

Summary judgment was granted against the owner and the principal.

The applicant, charged with serious offences including robbery with a weapon and sexual assault, sought a bail review under section 520 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to an increased frequency of seizures while in custody and a new release plan incorporating electronic monitoring.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the medical evidence was not significant enough to alter the initial balancing exercise and that the addition of electronic monitoring did not cure the unsuitability of the proposed sureties.

The court further noted that even if a material change existed, detention remained justified on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The respondent sought costs following her successful motion for summary judgment and the applicant's cross-motion in a family law proceeding.

The respondent had served two offers to settle and was successful on the issues of custody, access, life insurance, medical and dental benefits, and a no-contact order.

The court found that the respondent acted reasonably and was focused on settlement, whereas the applicant acted unreasonably by failing to provide disclosure and focusing on unfounded allegations.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a full indemnity basis fixed at $28,212.52.

The applicant tenant sought relief from forfeiture after the respondent landlord issued a notice of default for unpaid additional rent and utility arrears.

The tenant had withheld payment of the disputed amounts pending arbitration, arguing the landlord failed to properly substantiate the charges.

The court held that the tenant was in breach of the lease, as the lease contained a 'no deduction' clause requiring payment of rent without set-off pending arbitration.

The court declined to grant relief from forfeiture pending arbitration, finding the tenant's conduct wilful, but granted a temporary 20-day relief period for the tenant to cure the default by paying all arrears.

The applicants in an estate litigation matter brought a motion to remove the respondent Estate Trustee's counsel of record.

The applicants alleged bad faith, a conflict of interest arising from the lawyer's past marriage to the applicants' sister and past representation of two applicants, and the likelihood that the lawyer would be called as a witness at trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no disqualifying conflict of interest, no risk of misuse of confidential information, and no real basis to believe the lawyer would likely provide material evidence at trial.

The accused was charged with uttering a threat and aggravated assault against his spouse following a party at their residence.

The Crown alleged the accused became enraged upon finding the complainant with another man, threatened to kill her, and struck her multiple times, fracturing her jaw.

The accused denied the allegations, suggesting the injuries resulted from a fall.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory evidence as unbelievable and found the complainant's testimony corroborated by physical evidence, a 911 call, and the accused's adoptive admission by silence in text messages.

The accused was found guilty of both counts.

The parties delivered written submissions on costs following a trial regarding child support.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $15,000, while the applicant sought full recovery costs of $39,900.78 or, alternatively, that each party bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found that no costs should be awarded for the period prior to a March 2018 consent order, as costs were not reserved.

Although the respondent was successful on the threshold issue of child support, the applicant was more settlement-focused and made reasonable offers to settle.

The court concluded that the presumption of costs to the successful party was rebutted and ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous operation, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended toxicology evidence by rejecting his claim that he only consumed over-the-counter pain medication, failing to recognize that codeine (and its metabolites hydrocodone and morphine) can be found in such medication.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, as there was no evidence the specific medication ingested contained codeine, and the trial judge was not required to take judicial notice of that possibility.

The accused applied to re-open a ruling that admitted evidence derived from a search of her cell phone, arguing that the court failed to address an oral submission constituting a facial attack on the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to include this ground in her written applications as required by Rule 31 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules and provided no explanation for the omission.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the ground were considered, it would not change the conclusion that the issuing justice could have validly issued the warrant.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her prior work as an escort.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to support the defence narrative that the complainant worked willingly as an escort and was not groomed by the accused.

The Crown conceded some areas of cross-examination but opposed others.

The court granted the accused's application, finding the evidence was fundamental to the coherence of the defence narrative and did not engage the twin myths.

The court also granted the Crown's unopposed application to adduce evidence of how the complainant knew the accused.

The parties made written submissions regarding the costs of a motion on which the defendants were successful.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $32,434.14, arguing their offer to settle engaged Rule 49.10.

The court found the offer to settle did not engage Rule 49.10 because it contained stipulations not reflected in the final disposition.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs, but reduced the claimed amount due to duplication of counsel's efforts and the principle of proportionality, fixing costs at $18,295.86.

The offender was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, attempted murder, and forcible confinement against his intimate partner.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay convictions for uttering threats and assault, but declined to stay the forcible confinement conviction.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the court sentenced the offender to a global term of 6 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and other offences involving a minor complainant, brought an application to exclude evidence derived from a search of her cell phone and from production orders.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained misleading information and sought an overly broad date range, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the ITO contained some misleading information, its core substance supported the issuance of the warrant.

Regarding the production orders, the court applied the Grant framework to a previously found section 8 breach and concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith, the breach was minimally intrusive, and society has a high interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits.

The applications were dismissed.

The accused, charged with serious offences including human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The application was based on late and misleading disclosure by the police and Crown regarding the identity of a suspect named in the Information to Obtain a search warrant for the accused's cell phone.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the disclosure issues were isolated, had been remedied, and did not meet the high threshold of undermining the integrity of the justice system required for a stay or exclusion of evidence.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking sole custody and child support.

The parties settled the parenting issues, agreeing to a week-about shared parenting schedule.

The remaining issue was child support, specifically whether the respondent met the 40% threshold under section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court found that the time the children spent in school should be considered neutral, as both parents shared responsibility for the children during school hours.

Consequently, the respondent met the 40% threshold, and the applicant, having the higher income, was ordered to pay set-off child support and arrears.

The applicant sought access to manually manipulate her seized cell phone, arguing that the forensic extractions provided by the Crown might be incomplete.

The Crown had provided digital and forensic copies of the extraction but refused manual access without strict conditions, arguing that access is governed by s. 605 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if an independent right to access existed outside s. 605, the applicant failed to show an air of reality or provide evidence beyond mere speculation that the forensic extractions were deficient.