C. Jane Arnup

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the common sense inference and intoxication.

The appellant admitted to causing the elderly victim's death and sexually assaulting her but claimed an alcohol-induced blackout negated the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the common sense inference was properly left to the jury and the intoxication instruction did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking to reduce his period of parole ineligibility from 14 to 10 years based on fresh Gladue evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence added little more than context and that the sentencing judge was fully alive to the appellant's difficult personal circumstances, including his aboriginal status.

The court upheld the increased period of parole ineligibility due to the brutality of the victim's slow death and the indignities perpetrated on the victim.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for multiple historical sexual offences against young children.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by emphasizing rehabilitation over deterrence and denunciation, and by failing to appreciate the gravity of the offences and the risk of re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a global sentence of five years' imprisonment, less one year credit for pre-sentence custody, was substituted.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of a five-year-old child.

The main issue was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the child's out-of-court statements to her foster mother under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the statements were both reasonably necessary and reliable.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the admission of the foster mother's notes as exhibits and the reasonableness of the verdicts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the defence of intoxication and erred in admitting similar fact evidence of a prior sexual assault.

The Crown alleged the appellant murdered the victim during a sexual assault or attempted sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the jury instructions regarding intoxication, noting the charge as a whole correctly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

The Court also upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, concluding its probative value in establishing the occurrence of a sexual assault outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, which arose from an incident involving a bondage fantasy.

The defence argued the complainant had consented while in an alcohol-induced blackout.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Crown's closing address was inflammatory and misstated evidence, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the expert evidence regarding blackouts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Crown overstated the evidence in some instances, the trial judge's instructions adequately corrected the errors and prevented prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of a boating accident after his boat collided with another vessel at night.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the standard for criminal negligence, the knowledge requirement for failing to remain, the presumption of intent to escape liability, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault, and pointing a firearm after shooting an intruder who was stealing marijuana plants from his property.

The intruder was rendered a permanent paraplegic.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the burden of proof, propensity reasoning, and the treatment of defence expert evidence.

The appellant also appealed his eight-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the devastating consequences to the victim and the need to denounce and deter the use of firearms to protect illegal grow operations.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and sentence of indeterminate detention following guilty pleas to assault causing bodily harm and aggravated assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting the 'burnout theory'—that his age would reduce his risk of violence—and by dismissing his psychiatrist's opinion that he could be managed in the community as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded that the burnout theory was speculative and that the preconditions for community management were absent given the appellant's history of violence and lack of motivation to change.

The appellant appealed his convictions for inviting a minor to touch for a sexual purpose and sexual assault, as well as his sentence of six months' incarceration and two years' probation.

The offences occurred when the complainant was between nine and eleven years old.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and failing to reconcile inconsistencies in the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a custodial sentence was appropriate given the breach of trust and continuing course of conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for murder and his sentence, which included a 14-year period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on aiding and abetting, recent possession, or other evidentiary issues.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found the trial judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on the appellant's minor criminal record when setting the parole ineligibility period.

The period of parole ineligibility was reduced from 14 years to 12 years.

The appellant, a former bank employee, was convicted of fraud and theft-related offences arising from a scheme to steal from dormant accounts using inside information.

He appealed the restitution order of $40,734, arguing it was unfair to impose the full amount on him rather than apportioning it among his co-conspirators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, finding the full restitution order appropriate given the appellant's breach of trust as an employee.

However, based on a Crown concession regarding a calculation error, the restitution order was reduced to $33,733.96.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault causing bodily harm and one count of assault against three separate intimate partners, receiving a three-year sentence.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than merely a lack of a mitigating factor.

However, upon determining a fit sentence, the Court of Appeal upheld the three-year term, citing the prolonged, severe violence and use of weapons against multiple victims.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings for charges arising from incidents in 1990 and 1991.

The complainant and police had initially decided not to pursue an investigation in 1992, and charges were not laid until 2000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to grant the stay.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical indecent assault and sexual assault against three sisters, as well as his 18-month custodial sentence.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable due to an inconsistency with an acquittal on one count, and that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence of him exposing himself and masturbating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts were based on a careful assessment of the evidence and the similar fact evidence was properly admitted to rebut the defence's attacks on the complainants' credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was appropriate given the breach of trust and psychological harm.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of a frail, vulnerable friend and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by denying two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody based on the appellant's change of counsel, and by holding that provocation could not mitigate the sentence.

The Court held the appropriate range was 8 to 12 years due to numerous aggravating factors.

Factoring in proper pre-trial custody credit and provocation, the sentence was reduced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and common assault following a bar room brawl where a victim was stabbed.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof, the verdicts were unreasonable, and the rule against multiple convictions should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the burden of proof and unreasonable verdict arguments but agreed that the Kienapple principle applied to the charges of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as they arose from the same delict.

The conviction for assault with a weapon was stayed, but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the original sentence remained fit.

The appellant was convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

At trial, the judge disbelieved the appellant's evidence, finding it could not provide a foundation for 'evidence to the contrary', and drew an adverse inference from his failure to call a confirmatory witness.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's disbelief of the appellant's evidence was the primary basis for rejecting the defence, and the adverse inference was merely ancillary.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences.

He argued the trial judge rendered inconsistent verdicts by convicting him of some acts and acquitting him of others based on the same complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the allegations were logically severable and the acquittals did not imply the complainant was untruthful.

The court also dismissed grounds relating to incomplete Crown disclosure and the trial judge's approach to a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in handling jury selection and failing to hold a fitness hearing.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly denied the appellant's right to challenge jurors for cause regarding pre-trial publicity by instead asking a general question to the panel.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not directing a fitness hearing when the self-represented appellant exhibited clear signs of mental illness and an inability to understand the proceedings.

The convictions were set aside, and the appellant was declared unfit to stand trial.