Christopher M. Bondy

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel, Greg Monforton and Partners, due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The child plaintiff, Sora Al Bidery, was represented by the firm, as were her parents, Amir Al Bidery and Amal Karim, who were also named as defendants by counterclaim for negligent supervision.

The court found an inherent conflict of interest based on the duties of loyalty and confidentiality.

The plaintiffs' counsel had taken positions on behalf of the parents that were adverse to the child's interests and had not obtained informed consent from all parties regarding the conflict.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs' counsel was removed from the record for all three plaintiffs.

The Attorney General of Ontario applied for civil forfeiture of $18,550 CAD and $930 USD seized from the respondent during a traffic stop.

The respondent, who was driving his uncle's vehicle, was found in possession of a small amount of marijuana and a large quantity of bundled cash.

The court admitted the expert evidence of one police officer regarding drug trafficking indicia despite a missing Form 53 affidavit, but excluded another officer's evidence.

The court rejected the respondent's explanation that the cash was savings for a music business, finding the currency was likely the proceeds and instrument of drug trafficking.

The forfeiture application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to pay $2,000 in costs.

The defendants in a securities class action brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Windsor to Toronto.

The plaintiffs opposed the transfer.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the plaintiffs' choice of venue was found to be reasonable, the court concluded that the defendants established that Toronto was a significantly better venue, given that a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was located there, and it was more convenient for the parties, witnesses, and counsel.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a securities class action from Windsor to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations in a prospectus related to the financing of a workforce accommodation complex.

The court conducted a holistic balancing of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2).

Although the plaintiffs' choice of venue was deemed reasonable, the court found that Toronto was a significantly better venue because a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was more closely connected to Toronto, and it was more convenient for the parties, counsel, and witnesses.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion compelling former counsel to deliver the litigation file after the lawyer removed himself as counsel of record due to unpaid accounts.

The former solicitor asserted a solicitor’s lien over the file under s. 6(6) of the Solicitors Act.

The court reviewed the distinction between situations where a solicitor discharges the client and where the client discharges the solicitor.

Because the solicitor had withdrawn from the retainer, the court held the file must be delivered to allow continuation of the underlying lawsuit, though the solicitor’s lien remained preserved.

The court ordered delivery of the file subject to undertakings from new counsel and maintained the lien against any eventual recovery.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving historical allegations of intra-family sexual and physical abuse, the court applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and rejected the accused's blanket denial.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable on the essential facts despite inconsistencies on peripheral details, and held that those frailties were explicable given the complainant's childhood age during the events and the family's highly isolated environment.

Prior admitted sexual assaults against the complainant were not used broadly for propensity reasoning; under the Handy framework, they were given only limited narrative use.

The court entered findings of guilt for sexual interference, sexual assault, indecent act, and assault, dismissed one assault count on consent, and stayed one sexual assault count.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), acting as litigation guardian for a plaintiff under disability, brought a motion under Rule 7.08 to approve a settlement dismissing the plaintiff's action against the police without costs.

The plaintiff and his father opposed the motion, arguing the case should proceed to trial.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked capacity to conduct the litigation and that the PGT had properly assessed the case's poor prospects of success.

The court approved the settlement, concluding that proceeding to trial would likely result in a devastating costs award against the plaintiff.

Sentencing decision following convictions for attempted murder, criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, criminal negligence causing bodily harm with a motor vehicle, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident.

The offences arose from obsessive harassment of a former romantic partner culminating in the accused intentionally striking the partner’s new companion with a vehicle.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in domestic‑context attempted murder cases but also considered the offender’s advanced age, severe health issues, lack of prior criminal record, and lengthy history of positive community contributions as mitigating factors.

A six‑year sentence for attempted murder was imposed with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.

The court also granted enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre‑trial custody due to the unusually harsh impact of incarceration on the offender’s health.

The applicant father sought interim relief after the respondent mother refused to return one of the children following a weekend visit.

The court applied subsection 20(4) of the Children's Law Reform Act and held that the mother’s unilateral retention of the child constituted improper “self-help,” as the children had been residing with the father since separation.

Emphasizing the importance of stability for children and discouraging unilateral changes to residence, the court ordered the immediate restoration of the status quo pending further proceedings.

The court also criticized both parents for exposing the children to the parental conflict and rejected affidavits obtained directly from the children as having no evidentiary value.

An interim order was made requiring the child’s return to the father, setting a structured access schedule for the mother, and authorizing police enforcement under s. 36 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interim family court order requiring the parties’ child to return to Essex County pending a custody determination, and also sought a stay of that order.

The court considered the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the governing principles for interim mobility disputes, including the best interests of the child and the maximum contact principle.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish conflicting authority or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The motion judge’s decision was fact-driven and aimed at preserving meaningful relationships with both parents until a custody assessment could be completed.

Leave to appeal and the request for a stay were dismissed.

The applicant mother and respondent father brought cross-motions regarding interim child and spousal support.

The mother sought to maintain the status quo, arguing there was insufficient evidence to impute income to the self-employed father, whose tax returns showed negative income despite significant spending.

The father sought to impute his income at $50,000 and requested the mother pay child support for their adult daughter attending college.

The court agreed there was insufficient evidence to impute the father's income and maintained the status quo for his support obligations.

However, the court ordered the mother to pay $350 per month in child support for the college-aged daughter, calculating an estimated range based on the parties' likely incomes.