Christine Tier

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after convictions for impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown argued that the offences required a penitentiary sentence and that the sentencing judge erred by placing excessive weight on the offender's exemplary character and the wishes of the victims' families opposing custody.

The court held that the sentencing judge carefully considered the evidence, sentencing principles, and relevant case law, and did not overemphasize those factors.

Finding no error in the imposition of a conditional sentence and no basis for appellate intervention, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought certiorari during an ongoing summary conviction trial after the trial judge refused to quash an information on the basis that there were allegedly no reasonable and probable grounds for one of the charges when the information was sworn.

The Court of Appeal held that interlocutory review in criminal proceedings is not routinely available and that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a prohibited interlocutory appeal absent compelling interests of justice.

Applying the governing framework, the court found no reason for immediate superior court intervention and held that the trial should have proceeded to completion within the ordinary criminal process.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted to the trial judge.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judgment that set aside a stay of proceedings based on alleged unreasonable delay.

The court held that the delay between December 15 and May 5 was attributable to the defence, and that the trial judge improperly placed significant weight on systemic scheduling concerns unrelated to the actual causes of delay in the case.

Agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge, the court concluded that a fair balancing of the relevant s. 11(b) factors did not justify a stay.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal sentence following convictions for incest and indecent assault arising from historical sexual offences against the respondent's daughter and her friend.

The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence and probation after considering the respondent's advanced age, frailty, and medical condition.

The majority held that, although the normal sentencing range for incest involving sexual intercourse with a young child was three to five years' imprisonment, the case was unique and any additional custodial sentence might lead to the respondent's death.

A dissenting judge would have found the sentence manifestly unfit and imposed custody.

The appellant appealed a conviction arising from allegations of repeated sexual assaults committed against the complainant during childhood.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s use of the complainant’s prior disclosures to her mother and the application of a childhood memory standard to inconsistencies concerning disclosures made when the complainant was an adult.

The court held that the fact of disclosure was admissible as part of the narrative and, in the circumstances, could also answer the defence suggestion of fabrication linked to a property dispute.

Although the trial judge appears to have misapplied the childhood memory standard to peripheral inconsistencies about adult disclosures, the error caused no prejudice and did not affect the verdict.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the trial non-publication order was terminated on consent.