Christine Bartlett-Hughes

The moving party, Maggie's: The Toronto Sex Workers' Action Project, brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of prostitution-related offences.

The moving party sought to raise a new challenge under s. 15 of the Charter and to argue that the legislation was impermissibly driven by moral views.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene on the s. 15 issue, finding that the evidentiary record was not developed for such a challenge and that allowing it would be unfair to the parties and delay the appeal.

The court also declined to grant separate intervener status on the morality issue, as it was already being raised by others, but permitted the moving party to join an existing intervener group.

The appellant, who had been subjected to years of coercive control and psychological abuse by her husband, stabbed him to death while he slept.

At trial, the jury acquitted her of murder but convicted her of manslaughter, and she was sentenced to eight years in prison.

She appealed the conviction, arguing self-defence should have been left to the jury, and appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim as she did not apprehend imminent death or grievous bodily harm.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in minimizing the mitigating impact of the psychological abuse and mischaracterizing the offence as a 'near murder'.

The sentence was reduced to time served (approximately three years).

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography collected between 1999 and 2006.

At trial, he admitted the images were child pornography but claimed he collected them for a planned artistic exhibition to raise awareness about child exploitation.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding he could rely on the pre-2005 'artistic merit' and 'educational purpose' defences, as well as the post-2005 'legitimate purpose' and 'no undue risk of harm' defence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pre-2005 defences did not apply because the materials themselves lacked artistic or educational merit.

Furthermore, the post-2005 defence did not apply because the accused's possession of thousands of images, stored insecurely over seven years, posed an undue risk of harm to children.

A conviction was substituted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting him a conditional discharge rather than an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was not unreasonable given the evidence and the agreement of all parties that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to the public.

The Court noted the appellant's progress on new medication but held that consideration of an absolute discharge or Community Treatment Order was premature on the current record.

The accused appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant and the accused were intimate partners who engaged in erotic asphyxiation.

The complainant testified that she consented in advance to being choked into unconsciousness and to the sexual activity that occurred while she was unconscious.

The trial judge convicted the accused, holding that a person cannot legally consent in advance to sexual activity while unconscious.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding that the Criminal Code does not prohibit a person from consenting in advance to sexual touching expected to occur while unconscious, and that the Crown could not rely on bodily harm to vitiate consent on a charge of sexual assault simpliciter.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the killing of his mother.

He raised three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial application based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after the appellant allegedly overheard the judge discussing expert evidence with a deputy; that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant failed to establish the defence of not criminally responsible; and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a sufficient factual inquiry regarding the bias allegation, that the weighing of conflicting medical opinions on the NCR defence was within the trial judge's exclusive province, and that the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the killing.

The appellant was convicted of prostitution-related offences, including living off the avails of a person under eighteen, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.

On his sentence appeal, the appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for the first time.

The Crown objected.

The Court of Appeal held that an appellate court should generally decline to hear a new constitutional argument if it requires resolving contentious evidentiary disputes that were not vetted at trial.

The court directed that the appellant could not raise the constitutional issue on his sentence appeal.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in foreclosing the appellants from challenging the factual underpinnings of the counselling to commit murder charges for which the appellant Vanderheyden stood convicted.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the counselling convictions provided a significant boost to the credibility of two unsavoury witnesses.

The court found that the curative proviso could not be applied, as it could not be satisfied that Vanderheyden would not have testified had the trial judge ruled differently.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The trial judge erred by instructing the jury on the unconstitutional objective intent language in section 229(c) of the Criminal Code and by providing the jury with unedited written copies of the provision.

The Court of Appeal found the error fatal to the murder conviction.

On consent of both parties, the Court substituted a conviction for manslaughter and imposed a sentence of eight years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and encouraging others to act on a forged document, for which he received a four-year sentence and a restitution order.

He argued he was entitled to use investors' funds as he chose and raised procedural fairness issues regarding his self-representation at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant misrepresented how funds would be held and used them for operational expenses.

The court also found the trial judge provided appropriate assistance to the self-represented appellant and did not unfairly restrict his cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for oral reasons delivered in open court.

The sentence appeal was adjourned to a later date to allow the appellant to make submissions.

The appellant's request for an extension of bail pending the sentence appeal was denied, as any potential reduction in sentence was unlikely to reduce his remaining day parole, and bail was revoked.

The accused was charged with wilfully promoting hatred after police seized CDs containing hate-promoting lyrics from a table he was manning at a skinhead party.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding insufficient evidence that he sold the CDs.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal.

The Court held that while there was evidence of intent, there was no evidence the accused actually communicated the statements in the lyrics.

Furthermore, the Crown could not rely on a new theory on appeal that the CD covers themselves promoted hatred, as this would offend the rule against double jeopardy.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately explain his findings on whether the complainant cocked his fist.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had found a reasonable doubt on that point, but correctly concluded that the appellant's response was disproportionate given his martial arts training and could not be justified as self-defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to admit an out-of-court statement he made to his father and by failing to give a 'no probative value' instruction regarding post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement did not meet the necessity requirement as the appellant was available to testify, and the jury instruction on post-offence conduct was fair and did not cause significant prejudice.

The appellant appealed his 18-month sentence and lifetime driving prohibition for impaired driving and refusing a breath test.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit given the egregious circumstances and the appellant's record, noting the trial judge properly considered his guilty plea and gap in alcohol-related convictions.

The court varied the sentence to 17 months to clarify the trial judge's intention to grant one month of pre-trial custody credit, but upheld the lifetime driving prohibition.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and carrying a firearm for the purpose of forcible confinement.

At trial, the Crown relied on DNA and fingerprint evidence, while the appellant relied on a denial and an alibi defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made three reversible errors: giving a deliberate fabrication instruction without independent evidence, improperly instructing the jury on the late disclosure of his alibi, and making a prejudicial Corbett ruling that allowed the Crown to elicit that he had other unspecified convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these three errors cumulatively rendered the trial unfair and deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to have the jury consider his defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder following the death of his wife, which the Crown alleged was a staged suicide via drug overdose and blunt force trauma.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct and the absence of proven motive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and properly summarized the defence's position.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of criminal harassment.

At trial, the judge excluded evidence of six prior incidents of discreditable conduct by the respondent toward the complainant, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value under the Handy framework.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapprehended the probative value of the evidence.

The prior conduct was highly relevant to establishing the context of the harassment, the reasonableness of the complainant's fear, and the respondent's knowledge or recklessness regarding that fear.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent of both the Crown and the appellant, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to time served plus a 15-month period of probation.