Charles T. Hackland

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action after being summarily terminated without cause following 18.5 years of service as Vice President.

The defendant failed to attend the trial, and its pleadings were struck.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to a 24-month common law notice period.

Additionally, the court awarded $50,000 in aggravated damages and $50,000 in punitive damages due to the defendant's bad faith, which included making defamatory statements, accusing the plaintiff of criminality, and pursuing a baseless counterclaim.

The defendant moved to stay a defamation action, arguing it was based on evidence obtained in violation of the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01.

The evidence in question was a surreptitious recording voluntarily attached as an exhibit to an affidavit in a separate family litigation proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the deemed undertaking rule applies only to evidence obtained through compulsory discovery mechanisms, not to evidence voluntarily put forward in an affidavit.

The appellant, B.S., appealed her conviction for criminal harassment under section 264(3) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction stemmed from repeated unannounced visits to the former matrimonial home, where her estranged husband (the complainant) and their children resided, in violation of a Family Court Restraining Order.

The appellant argued that there was insufficient evidentiary basis and that her conduct, being non-threatening, would not cause a reasonable person to fear for personal safety.

The trial judge found the complainant credible, accepting that the appellant's conduct caused him significant anxiety, stress, and mental health trauma, which constituted fear for personal safety.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, affirming that "fear for personal safety" in harassment cases can include psychological well-being, even in the absence of physical threats, and that the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable.

This case involved an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found the appellant, Gina Benz, mentally incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment for her mental disorder with antipsychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred by conflating her disagreement with her diagnosis with incapacity.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed as moot because the appellant had been discharged from the hospital and was residing in the community, no longer under the respondent's care.

The court confirmed that despite the dismissal, the appellant's future right to apply for a review of any finding of incapacity would not be barred due to the passage of time.

This supplementary endorsement addresses the defendants' cross-motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendants argued the claim was vexatious, frivolous, or an abuse of process, being an attempt to re-litigate matters previously decided in Federal Court.

The court found that the plaintiff's current claims for monetary damages, including allegations of conspiracy, malicious prosecution, negligence, defamation, and employment rights violations against the RCMP, had been extensively litigated and conclusively decided against him in numerous prior Federal Court proceedings (8 actions, 2 judicial review applications, 12 appeals).

Applying principles of res judicata and abuse of process, the court determined the claim was a clear abuse of process and struck the statement of claim without leave to amend, declining to award costs.

The plaintiff, Gary Sauve, brought a motion seeking procedural relief to pursue claims, primarily against his former employer, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), for alleged harms leading to his discharge.

He also sought to re-litigate multiple proceedings previously pursued in the Federal Court of Canada.

The court found the plaintiff's materials incomprehensible and unsupported by admissible evidence.

The motion was dismissed, as the continuation of the action was deemed manifestly vexatious, an abuse of process, and the claims were long since statute-barred.

The plaintiff's requests for state-funded counsel, a fee waiver, injunctive relief, and joining additional defendants were also denied due to lack of supporting evidence.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order to compel the respondent unit owner to allow the removal and replacement of unauthorized garage and front doors, which were modifications to common elements.

The respondent claimed verbal approval for the modifications and cross-claimed for oppression under section 135 of the Condominium Act.

The court found that the respondent had not obtained proper written approval for the modifications and dismissed the oppression claim, distinguishing the facts from a prior case where oppression was found.

The application was granted, ordering the respondent to provide access for the corporation to replace the doors, with the corporation bearing the cost of the new doors.

The Estate of Jackie Cray brought a motion to dismiss an application by Sofie Vaux-Lacelle, who sought a declaration that she was the deceased's common-law spouse for OMERS pension survivor benefits.

The Estate argued that the internal OMERS Dispute Resolution Process was a more suitable forum.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the OMERS process was a valid avenue, the Superior Court application was also appropriate given the factual complexity, credibility issues, significant value of the benefit, and greater flexibility for settlement and witness accommodation in court proceedings.

Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 519 (CCC 519) brought an application seeking to compel Ottawa-Carleton Standard Condominium Corporation No. 656 (OCC 656) and Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 522 (CCC 522) to share the costs of replacing a critical electric switchgear (ESG) located on CCC 519's property but serving all three condominiums.

CCC 522 agreed to contribute, but OCC 656 refused, arguing its declaration did not require it and CCC 519 was responsible for its common areas.

The court applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment, finding OCC 656 had been incontrovertibly benefited and failed to establish a juristic reason for retaining the benefit without contributing.

The court rejected the argument that the absence of a cost-sharing agreement constituted a juristic reason.

The application was granted, requiring both respondents to share costs equitably, with a reference directed for cost apportionment if necessary.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) brought an application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx from removing mature trees and commencing construction of a subway station on the historic Osgoode Hall site.

The LSO argued that Metrolinx's actions required municipal approval under s. 33(1) of the Ontario Heritage Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding no serious issue to be tried because s. 33(1) does not apply to neighboring property owners or to prescribed public bodies like Metrolinx, which are governed by a separate statutory regime.

The court also found that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the critical public transit project to proceed.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx from removing 11 trees on its property near Osgoode Hall, pending adequate engagement regarding the Ontario Line subway project.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that HDI would suffer no irreparable harm as the trees were not historically unique and would be replaced, and that monetary damages would suffice for any compensation claims.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience strongly favoured Metrolinx due to the severe financial and public interest consequences of delaying the transit project.

The applicant, charged with offences related to his involvement in the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa, brought a motion for a change of venue for his trial.

He argued that extensive negative media coverage and the high concentration of federal government employees in Ottawa would prevent him from receiving a fair trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the media coverage was not specifically directed at the applicant and that his concerns about government employees were baseless.

The court concluded that traditional safeguards, such as screening questions and challenges for cause, would be adequate to ensure an impartial jury and address any potential bias from residents directly affected by the protest.

The applicant sought a declaration that a right of first refusal (ROFR) on her property was extinguished and an order for its removal from title.

The ROFR was triggered by a third-party offer, which the respondent exercised but then failed to complete.

The court interpreted the ROFR clause and common law principles, concluding that the ROFR was extinguished once exercised, even if the transaction was not completed, as the clause did not provide for reinstatement in such circumstances.

The application was granted, and the ROFR was ordered removed from title.

The defendants, the Canada School of Public Service and five employees, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction under s. 236 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act.

The plaintiff, a former federal public servant whose security clearance was revoked, sued for breach of privacy, negligence, and defamation after her employer reported a suspicious fax to the police.

The court held that the privacy claims relating to the employer's involvement of the police fell outside the collective agreement and could proceed.

However, the negligence and defamation claims regarding workplace discipline and suspensions were in their essential character workplace disputes and were stayed.

The applicant, a 61-year-old senior draftsperson with 3.5 years of service, was terminated without cause.

The employer relied on a termination clause in the employment agreement to limit his entitlements.

The court applied the Waksdale framework, finding the 'for cause' provision violated the Employment Standards Act by contracting out of the statutory 'wilful misconduct' standard, thereby rendering all termination provisions void.

The court awarded 6 months of common law reasonable notice based on the Bardal factors and dismissed the employer's argument that the applicant failed to mitigate his damages.

Following a trial where the defendants successfully defended a claim regarding riparian rights and water access, the court determined the appropriate quantum and scale of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on a Rule 49 offer, while the plaintiffs argued for a lower amount.

The court found the Rule 49 offer was not a true compromise and awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, fixed at $16,000 plus disbursements and HST, noting the reasonable conduct of both parties.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the defendants' boathouse, located in the water in front of the plaintiffs' shoreline, interfered with their riparian rights of access.

The court found that the boathouse did significantly restrict the plaintiffs' riparian rights.

However, because the boathouse had been in its location for over 50 years, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim was statute-barred and extinguished by the 10-year limitation period under sections 4 and 15 of the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court declined to read the discoverability principle into the RPLA.

The action was dismissed.

The Plaintiff, Wael Musa, succeeded in a slip and fall personal injury trial against the Defendants, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 255 and 6669981 Canada Inc. The court then determined the quantum of costs.

The Plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs up to the date of their Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, having bettered their offer.

The Defendants made no offer.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $113,000 in fees and $28,804.71 in disbursements, acknowledging that costs could exceed damages in complex trials and that counsel's billing rates and contingency fee agreements are relevant but not determinative.

The applicant mother brought an urgent interim motion seeking an order to permit her to have the parties' seven-year-old child vaccinated against COVID-19.

Under an existing final order, the respondent father had final decision-making responsibility for the child's health.

The father opposed the vaccination, citing concerns over safety and the changing pandemic environment.

The court held that while it could take judicial notice of Health Canada advisories regarding the safety and efficacy of the vaccine, the mother failed to establish a material change in circumstances on an interim basis to justify overriding the father's decision-making authority.

The motion was dismissed, with the issue to be determined at the final hearing of the Motion to Change.

This decision addresses a motion and cross-motion for production of documents in a personal injury case.

The plaintiff sought production of defence medical expert files from Soma Medical Assessments and further documentation related to the defendants' surveillance evidence.

The defendants sought production of documents from the plaintiff's recently settled disability claim against Great West Life.

The court refused the request for Soma files, deeming it a fishing expedition and subject to litigation privilege.

However, it ordered the production of private investigator information, waiving litigation privilege due to significant privacy intrusion and public policy considerations.

The court also ordered the production of documents from the prior disability action, waiving the deemed undertaking rule given the similarity of issues and the insurer's non-opposition.

Costs were made costs in the cause.