Bruce John Daley

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Ross Flight for accessing and possessing child pornography, following his guilty plea.

The case involved over 3,000 unique images and 27 videos, including highly exploitative and gruesome material depicting children ranging from nudity to sadistic abuse.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the volume and nature of the material and Flight’s role as both consumer and uploader.

Mitigating factors included Flight’s advanced age (82), serious health issues, lack of prior record, and demonstrated remorse and insight.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence, a 10-year s. 161 order, a 20-year SOIRA order (rejecting the Crown’s request for a lifetime SOIRA), and a DNA order.

The decision carefully balanced denunciation and deterrence with Flight’s personal circumstances, relying heavily on recent appellate guidance on sentencing for child pornography offences.

This decision addresses the credibility assessment in a criminal trial involving three assault charges arising from incidents between separated spouses living in the same house.

The court carefully analyzes conflicting testimonies and an audio recording secretly made by the accused.

The judge finds the complainant credible and the accused's evidence undermined by the recording, resulting in convictions on two counts of assault under section 266 of the Criminal Code, while one count is dismissed due to insufficient proof of bodily harm.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

He challenged the admissibility of breath readings, alleging Charter violations under ss. 8 (unreasonable search) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found the defendant was the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

While breaches of ss. 8 (untimely breath demand) and 10(b) (delayed access to counsel) were established, the court applied the R. v. Grant test and determined that admitting the breath sample results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired operation.

Nima Tork pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failing to stop after an accident causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the intentional use of a vehicle as a weapon and the significant injuries to the victim, and the mitigating factors, such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and guilty plea.

The judge determined that a conditional sentence would not adequately address denunciation and general deterrence, imposing a nine-month period of incarceration for aggravated assault and six months concurrently for failing to stop, followed by two years probation, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused, Russell Collins, was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80mg.

The defence challenged the officer's grounds for demanding a breath sample and the Crown's proof of a system calibration test.

The court found the officer's subjective grounds for suspicion were objectively reasonable, dismissing the Charter challenge.

The court also determined that the Crown had proven the calibration test was conducted with a certified alcohol standard, despite an ambiguous notation, by considering the totality of the evidence.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty as charged.

The defendant, Clyde Williams, was convicted of assault, two counts of sexual assault, and sexual exploitation.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust (as a Senior Pastor), grooming, victim vulnerability (minor and employee), duration and repetition of offences, and the profound harm caused to the victims (M.M. and D.D.).

Mitigating factors included his unblemished record and potential for rehabilitation, though tempered by his lack of remorse and denial of culpability.

The court applied sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and totality, ultimately imposing a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with specific terms for each offence.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a suitable breath sample into an Approved Screening Device (ASD) contrary to s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had to prove the ASD was in proper working order and that the defendant intentionally failed to provide a sample.

The court found the ASD was functioning correctly based on officer demonstrations.

Despite the defendant's testimony that he tried his best and was nervous, the court concluded, based on his repeated failed attempts and demonstrated ability to blow through a straw unattached to the device, that he purposely did not provide a suitable sample when the straw was inserted into the ASD.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Meryem Iftikhar, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The defense raised a Charter application alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel and a "regurgitation defense" regarding breath samples.

The court dismissed the regurgitation defense, finding no evidence of mouth alcohol.

However, the court found that Constable Alszegi violated Ms. Iftikhar's right to counsel of choice by waiting only six minutes before offering duty counsel and by steering her towards duty counsel based on his personal practice, rather than providing other means to contact her chosen lawyer or another lawyer.

Despite Ms. Iftikhar having spoken to duty counsel, the breach was deemed serious due to institutional issues.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

This is a ruling on a challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of the Criminal Code for a drinking and driving offence.

The applicant, Ali Haider Cheema, was found guilty of having care or control of a motor vehicle with excess alcohol and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence (conviction and $1500 fine) under s.12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment due to the risk of removal from Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

The court found that a conditional discharge was not a fit sentence for the offence, considering the gravity of drinking and driving offences and the public interest in deterrence and denunciation, even with the sympathetic personal circumstances and serious immigration consequences.

The application was dismissed, and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with an excessive blood alcohol concentration.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples based on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach, the voluntariness of statements made to police, and whether the Crown could prove operation of the conveyance.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that s. 10(b) rights were suspended during the roadside investigation.

It also found the accused's statements to police voluntary, despite the officer not re-advising rights and cautions between breath samples, as the accused had already received counsel advice and understood her right to silence.

Finally, the court found the Crown proved operation beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on the presumption of operation and the accused's clear intention to drive.

The accused was found guilty.

Jared Gould pleaded guilty to three counts of child luring and one count of inviting a person under 16 to touch themselves sexually.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to the one-year mandatory minimum sentence for luring, finding it inoperative based on recent Superior Court decisions.

The Crown sought an 18-month jail sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences, particularly in light of R. v. Friesen and R. v. Rafiq, determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the repetitive nature of the conduct, the number of victims, and the fact that the offences occurred while the offender was on probation for a related sexual offence.

An 18-month jail sentence was imposed, along with a two-year probation order and various prohibitions.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC) within two hours of ceasing to operate a vehicle.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no violations of sections 8 and 9, concluding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found an impermissible delay in providing the defendant's section 10(b) right to counsel, but ultimately decided not to exclude the breath sample results under section 24(2) of the Charter, weighing the minor nature of the breach against society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

On the merits, the court acquitted the defendant of impaired operation but found him guilty of having an excess BAC, rejecting the "bolus drinking" defence under s. 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code due to lack of expert evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The court addressed three issues: reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand, violation of the right to counsel, and proof of impaired operation.

The court found ample reasonable grounds for the arrest and demand, and that no Charter breach under sections 8 or 9 occurred.

Regarding the right to counsel, the court found the accused failed to prove a section 10(b) Charter breach due to insufficient evidence from a poor video recording.

Ultimately, the Crown proved impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt based on erratic driving, physical signs of intoxication, and the officer's credible observations.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with a Kienapple stay to be determined.

The accused was found guilty of impaired operation and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit after a vehicle collision.

The court addressed three main issues: whether the Crown proved operation, whether the accused's statements to police were voluntary, and whether the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The court found no s. 10(b) breach, determined the statements were voluntary, and concluded that operation was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on both the accused's admission and strong circumstantial evidence.

The defendant was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of breath samples and statements.

The court found no violation of the "immediately" requirement for the ASD demand and no residual mouth alcohol issue.

However, a s. 10(b) Charter violation was found due to a 7-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after arrest.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the breath sample evidence and statements should not be excluded.

The Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, finding the defendant's BAC was at least 160 mg.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence sought to exclude breath test evidence, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Specifically, the defence argued that the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand was not made immediately, the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the Approved Instrument demand due to uncertainty regarding mouth alcohol, and right to counsel advice was not provided immediately upon arrest.

The court found that a brief delay in the ASD demand for officer safety was reasonable and did not constitute a Charter breach.

It also found no issue with the officer's grounds for the Approved Instrument demand despite a misunderstanding about mouth alcohol detection.

While a section 10(b) breach was found due to a five-minute delay in providing right to counsel advice, the court determined that this breach was not serious and had no impact on the accused's Charter rights, thus declining to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and having more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The Crown called two OPP officers as witnesses.

The defence abandoned a Charter application prior to trial.

The court dismissed the over 80 charge due to the Crown's failure to establish the target value of the alcohol standard used in the calibration check, as required under section 320.31(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following recent legislative changes.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the officer observations of poor driving, slurred speech, unsteady balance, and odour of alcohol on the breath, rejecting the defence argument that a prior head injury and recent fall could account for the observations.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood).

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption of accuracy under section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code for breath test results.

The court determined that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the target value of the standard alcohol solution used in the calibration check was 100 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The breath technician's evidence was undermined by cross-examination revealing he had received instructions from the Crown on what testimony to provide and had no independent recollection of the specific solution used.

The court found that without proof of the target value, the presumption of accuracy could not be invoked, and the Crown could not establish accuracy through common law means either.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application asserting breaches of sections 8 and 10(b), seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court found that the officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, that the demand for an approved screening device test was not made forthwith as required by statute, and that these breaches violated the accused's section 8 rights.

The court applied the three-part test under section 24(2) of the Charter and determined that exclusion of the breath sample evidence was appropriate to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol count exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police found the defendant asleep in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the engine running.

The defence raised three issues: (1) whether a 30-minute delay in administering the roadside screening device breached Charter rights; (2) whether the defendant's right to counsel of choice was violated; and (3) whether the Crown proved a realistic danger that the vehicle could be put in motion.

The court found no Charter violations and determined that while the defendant rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.