Brigitte Gratl

In a family law appeal concerning custody, access, and allegations of parental alienation, the Office of the Children’s Lawyer brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence in the form of an affidavit from a clinical investigator.

The father opposed admission of the affidavit and alternatively sought to strike portions or require cross-examination.

The court reviewed the governing test for fresh evidence under s. 134(4) of the Courts of Justice Act and applicable appellate jurisprudence, noting that a more flexible approach may apply where the best interests of children are implicated.

Portions of the affidavit providing background information were admitted, certain paragraphs were excluded, and other portions containing hearsay statements from the mother and children were conditionally admitted subject to a voir dire on necessity and reliability.

The motion of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the father’s responding motion were each allowed in part.

A costs decision in a family law matter involving child support and custody disputes.

The mother sought child support from the father in 2009, but the father failed to provide financial disclosure and instead brought multiple motions to change custody, access, and contempt motions against the mother.

The father's counsel repeatedly failed to appear in court as directed.

The court found the father's conduct unreasonable throughout the litigation and awarded the mother costs of $9,000 payable at $200 per month, plus ordered the father's counsel to pay $910 in costs for failing to appear prepared for trial on two consecutive days.

The appellant appealed a child protection judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the best interests of children require child protection matters to proceed expeditiously.

The court noted that permitting the appeal to proceed would delay final resolution contrary to policy imperatives, and that the appeal had very little merit.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal for delay.

Her original appeal was from a summary judgment finding her child in need of protection.

The mother failed to perfect her appeal within the 14-day period mandated by Rule 38(22), mistakenly believing she needed a transcript of submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the status hearing judge, as the paramount consideration was the best interests of the child and the need for expeditious resolution of placement and access issues.

The biological mother appealed a child protection disposition order that made the child a Crown ward without access under the Child and Family Services Act.

She argued that the trial judge erred by proceeding with the disposition trial while the protection finding was under appeal, by taking seven months to release reasons, and by misapprehending evidence in assessing the child’s best interests.

The court held that the protection appeal had been abandoned and the issue was moot, and that delay alone does not establish unfairness absent demonstrated prejudice.

Applying the deferential appellate standard for factual findings in child protection matters, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence, including findings regarding the lack of emotional connection between the parent and the child.

The appeal was dismissed and the Crown wardship order without access was upheld.

The moving parties sought a stay of a children’s aid society’s cross‑appeal concerning access to children who had been made Crown wards following a lengthy child protection trial.

The stay was requested pending the disposition of the mother’s appeal to the Court of Appeal from the summary dismissal of her appeal and pending a sibling’s appeal of a legal aid funding denial.

Applying the three‑part test for a stay—serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience—the court found the threshold met, particularly given the serious implications for parental rights and the interconnected nature of the wardship and access issues.

The court held that hearing the access cross‑appeal separately from the wardship appeal risked unfairness and potential prejudice.

A temporary and conditional stay of the cross‑appeal was therefore granted, subject to strict timelines to expedite the appeals process in the children’s best interests.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for child pornography and weapons offences.

He argued the trial judge erred by not severing the charges, admitting his statement, refusing mid-trial disclosure of his computer, and providing the jury with a written copy of the charge.

He also argued the verdict was unreasonable and the sentence for the firearms offence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary decisions or findings of fact, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly imposed a consecutive sentence above the minimum for the loaded restricted firearm.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellant's notice of appeal in a family law dispute.

The Court of Appeal found that most of the orders appealed from were interlocutory and outside its jurisdiction.

While the orders regarding the sale of the matrimonial home were final, the property had already been sold and the proceeds paid into court, rendering the appeal moot.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted with costs.

The moving party appealed a joint custody order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 110, finding little apparent merit to the appeal based on the deferential standard of review for custody orders.

Furthermore, the court noted that both parties sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding post-trial events, making a variation application based on a material change in circumstances a more appropriate remedy than an appeal.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption under the Child and Family Services Act.

She alleged multiple errors of fact and law by the trial judge, including improper weighing of the Society’s plan against her plan of care and reliance on outdated expert evidence.

The Superior Court emphasized the deferential standard of review applicable to factual findings in child protection proceedings and the requirement to demonstrate a palpable and overriding error.

The court found the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence, including the mother’s instability, lack of cooperation with the Society, and the child’s long-term placement with a foster family willing to adopt.

The appellant failed to rebut the presumption against access to a Crown ward, and the order was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine.

He argued that the jury verdicts were inconsistent, the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on aiding and abetting, and the trial judge erred in finding he was not entrapped.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or the entrapment ruling.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-month sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship without access of his child to the Children's Aid Society.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial given the father's failure to address risks and lack of insight into his parenting deficiencies.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, and the father appealed to the Court of Appeal, tendering fresh evidence of his progress as a parent with a new child.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, holding that the child's best interests required finality and a permanent adoptive home.

The applicants brought a complaint before the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board regarding noise disturbances from bird bangers operated by the respondents on their adjacent grape farm.

The Board found that the applicants established the existence of a nuisance, as the noise caused an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of their property.

The Board further determined that the respondents failed to prove the disturbance resulted from a normal farm practice.

Evidence showed the equipment was used maliciously, contrary to Best Management Practices, and without agricultural justification.

The Board ordered a permanent ban on the respondents' use of any acoustical bird control devices on the specified properties.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and had no significance beyond the immediate case.

The appellant mother appealed a decision making her older child a Crown ward with no access.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing that the expert witness, Dr. Benoit, gave contradictory evidence in a subsequent trial regarding her younger child and lacked expertise on the effects of Cortisol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, noting the lack of expert evidence to support the appellant's claims.

The court upheld the trial judge's reliance on Dr. Benoit's parental capacity assessment and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the child's need for stability in a potential adoptive home.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the anticipated evidence of an alleged co-conspirator was directly admissible against the appellant to prove both the conspiracy and the substantive offence, without engaging the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

The court also upheld the extradition judge's finding that the appellant's identification was established through a combination of circumstances.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender.

The Court of Appeal applied the narrow scope of review established in U.S.A. v. Lake and found that the Minister had considered all arguments put forward by the appellant.

The court concluded the Minister's decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary a final child support order and rescind arrears.

The original order imputed an income of $30,000, but the appellant provided uncontradicted evidence that he had not held employment since 1998 due to severe depression and was receiving disability benefits.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge made a palpable and overriding error by ignoring this material change in circumstances and relying on the respondent's unsworn statements.

The appeal was allowed, arrears were reduced to $15,240, and ongoing support was reduced to $161 per month.

The applicants and respondents both brought motions for costs following a hearing before the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board.

The applicants sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $98,731, alleging the respondents' counsel engaged in unreasonable and delaying conduct.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $40,683, alleging the applicants' agent called irrelevant evidence and prolonged the hearing.

The Board found that neither party's conduct met the threshold of being clearly unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.

Both motions for costs were dismissed without costs, with the Board noting that costs awards will be rare to avoid dissuading public participation.

The applicants sought relief under section 5 of the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998 regarding noise and vibration from propane bird bangers used in the respondents' adjacent vineyard.

The Board found that the applicants were directly affected by the disturbance and that the respondents' use of the bird bangers did not constitute a normal farm practice, as it failed to comply with established best management practices.

The Board ordered the respondents to modify their practices, including maintaining a 183-metre setback from the applicants' residences and restricting the hours and methods of operation.