Brigitte Gratl

The applicant sought release pending appeal of convictions for two counts of sexual assault, one count of making child pornography, and one count of voyeurism, along with a six-and-a-half-year custodial sentence.

The court assessed the application under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, considering whether the appeal was frivolous, the applicant would surrender, and detention was necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was deemed not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, the court found that detention was necessary in the public interest.

This was due to the serious nature of the offences against a child victim, the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary sentence, and the preliminary assessment that the grounds of appeal, while not frivolous, did not clearly surpass that minimal standard.

The application for release pending appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision upholding a Crown wardship (extended care) order for four children.

The parents appealed, seeking return of the children to their care and challenging the access order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request based on alleged inappropriate text messages from Society workers, finding that even if the workers were discredited, ample independent evidence supported the protection finding and extended care order.

The court upheld the appeal judge's decision, which maintained the extended care order while granting access to the parents, finding this arrangement best served the children's interests.

Appellants J.V. and M.V., maternal grandparents of a child apprehended at birth, appealed from a Superior Court decision dismissing their appeal of a trial judgment declaring the child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in continuous foster care since ten months of age with prospective adoptive parents.

The appellants sought to have the child placed in their care, but the trial judge found their plan was not in the child's best interests due to concerns including the biological mother's permanent disability (Alcohol Related Neurodevelopmental Disorder), unresolved conflict between the biological mother and the appellants, and the lack of permanence in their proposed arrangement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship order, finding the trial judge's decision was soundly based on evidence and that the child's need for permanence and stability outweighed the appellants' desire to parent.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter involving division of net family property, child support, and spousal support.

The trial judge ordered an equal division of net family property (proceeds from the matrimonial home), denied child support on the basis that the respondent's income was insufficient and the children had repudiated their relationship with their mother, and ordered the appellant to pay spousal support of $500 per month based on imputed income of $40,000.

The appellant appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias, erroneous denial of child support, improper imputation of income, and failure to order unequal division of family property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the application for fresh evidence.

The accused brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at her residence.

She alleged violations of her s. 7 and s. 8 Charter rights, claiming police used excessive force during her arrest, improperly breached her door without knocking, and subjected her to humiliating strip searches both outside her residence and at the police station.

The court dismissed the application, finding the dynamic entry was justified by safety and evidence preservation concerns, the force used during arrest was proportionate and necessary, the outdoor search was a valid pat-down incident to arrest, and the strip search at the station was justified and conducted reasonably.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

Following a trial held in January and March 2016, the court granted sole custody of the children to the mother and sole discretion regarding access to the father.

The Children's Aid Society and the mother sought costs against the father and his counsel.

The court declined to award costs against the father but awarded costs of $500 each against counsel for bringing and withdrawing a patently unmeritorious Charter motion that was admittedly irrelevant to the proceedings.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society following the apprehension of three young boys.

The parents consented to a finding that the children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of emotional harm.

The father's authoritarian parenting style, combined with his voluntary withdrawal from the children's lives for nearly two years following a high-conflict marital separation, resulted in significant emotional harm to the children.

The court granted full custody to the mother with sole discretion over access, finding that the father's intransigence and refusal to cooperate with the Society made supervised access futile and potentially harmful to the children.

This appeal concerned a child protection application where the trial judge granted Crown Wardship of child A.V. to the Children's Aid Society without access.

The biological mother and maternal grandparents appealed, raising constitutional questions under section 15 of the Charter and seeking a new trial or placement of the child with the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or correctness in law, and no violation of constitutional rights, upholding the Crown Wardship based on the child's best interests.

This is a disposition hearing in a child protection application following a bifurcated hearing.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County sought Crown wardship without access for a child born in 2008.

The biological mother sought placement without supervision, while the maternal grandparents sought placement as an alternative.

The court found the child to be in need of protection based on exposure to domestic violence, parental substance abuse, mental health issues, and failure to follow protective advice.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the purpose of adoption, finding that the child had formed a secure attachment to the foster family and that returning the child to the mother or grandparents would cause significant harm.

The court dismissed the mother's and grandparents' placement plans and denied access to the biological family.

The respondent parents brought a constitutional motion challenging the validity of section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act, which permits courts to order parenting capacity assessments.

The parents argued the section was unconstitutionally vague, that the adverse inference provision violated the Charter, that the exclusion of foster parents was discriminatory, and that assessments violated section 8 rights.

The court dismissed all constitutional arguments, finding that section 54, read in conjunction with Ontario Regulation 25/07, provides sufficient criteria and guidance for ordering assessments.

The court also found the adverse inference provision reasonable in child protection proceedings and that foster parents are appropriately excluded from assessments at the protection stage.

The court determined costs following an urgent family law motion brought by the applicant.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs totalling $3,475.25, arguing the motion lacked urgency and was pursued unreasonably.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered success on the issues, proportionality, the conduct of the parties, and the applicant’s limited financial means.

The respondent was the successful party and entitled to costs, but the court reduced the requested amount.

Partial indemnity costs of $1,780.25 were awarded.

The father brought an urgent motion to vary an interim custody order granting joint custody, seeking sole custody due to allegations of the mother's alcohol relapse and concerns about the children's safety.

The mother opposed the motion and sought continuation of joint custody with primary residence, alleging the father had wrongfully withheld the children.

The court held that conflicting affidavit evidence prevented a finding of a material change in circumstances as required under the governing custody variation test.

The interim order was largely maintained pending a case conference, though the requirement for monthly hair follicle testing was removed.

The children were ordered returned to the mother and the existing parenting regime reinstated.

The testator died leaving property in Ontario and Germany.

His widow, who resided in Germany, moved for an extension of time to elect an equalization of net family property under the Family Law Act.

The trustee of the Ontario estate moved for directions.

The court dismissed the widow's motion, finding no apparent grounds for relief because section 15 of the Family Law Act dictates that spousal property rights are governed by the law of the last common habitual residence.

Since the spouses last lived together in Germany, German law applied, precluding a claim under section 5 of the Ontario Act.

A mother sought leave to bring a status review application regarding three children who had been made Crown wards without access.

The children had been in the same foster placements for over six years and were thriving.

The court applied the five-part test for leave to bring a status review application and found that the mother failed to satisfy all five criteria.

The court found that the mother had not demonstrated bona fides, had not established an unusual circumstance, and had not proven a prima facie case.

The mother had not addressed the underlying protection concerns identified at trial, particularly her personality disorder and impulsive decision-making.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, emphasizing the importance of permanency and stability for children in care.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to Section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision with a pedestrian on September 4, 2012, at the intersection of King Street and Hickory Street in Waterloo, Ontario.

The collision resulted in the death of the pedestrian.

The defendant operated a commercial delivery truck and was making a left-hand turn from Hickory Street onto King Street when the collision occurred.

The Crown alleged the defendant operated the vehicle without due care and attention.

The defendant testified he did not see the pedestrian and was unaware of any collision.

The court found the defendant guilty based on extensive eyewitness testimony, collision reconstruction evidence, and forensic evidence demonstrating the pedestrian was lawfully crossing the crosswalk and was visible to a reasonably prudent driver exercising due care and attention.

The applicant Children's Aid Society appealed a trial judge's order granting access to three children who had been made Crown wards.

The Society argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not impair the children's future opportunities for adoption and by creating an access structure that contravened the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal court agreed, finding that the access order had deterred the only potential adoptive family, thereby impairing adoption opportunities.

The court also held that the trial judge exceeded her authority by creating a unique access reduction process that conflicted with the legislated scheme.

The appeal was granted and the access order was rescinded.

A mother appealed a summary judgment decision in child protection proceedings that found her child in need of protection and granted sole custody to the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court held that the motion judge relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay evidence, made unsupported credibility findings, and misapprehended key facts regarding the circumstances of the child's apprehension.

The court found the child had been voluntarily placed with grandparents prior to the Society’s involvement and was not in the mother’s care at the time of apprehension, undermining the protection finding.

The protection application was therefore ill-founded.

The order granting custody to the grandparents was set aside and the Society’s protection application dismissed.

A parent appealed a child protection order finding two children in need of protection under s.37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child and Family Services Act and making them Crown wards without access.

The appeal challenged the admission of a supplementary trial record, reliance on medical and professional reports, alleged hearsay in affidavits, and the trial judge’s treatment of the best interests analysis.

The court held that the evidentiary rulings were proper, noting trial counsel consented to the admission of several records and had opportunities for cross‑examination.

The court also found the trial judge’s reasons sufficiently addressed the children’s best interests and were entitled to significant deference.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the appeal was dismissed.

In a family law appeal concerning custody, access, and allegations of parental alienation, the Office of the Children’s Lawyer brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence in the form of an affidavit from a clinical investigator.

The father opposed admission of the affidavit and alternatively sought to strike portions or require cross-examination.

The court reviewed the governing test for fresh evidence under s. 134(4) of the Courts of Justice Act and applicable appellate jurisprudence, noting that a more flexible approach may apply where the best interests of children are implicated.

Portions of the affidavit providing background information were admitted, certain paragraphs were excluded, and other portions containing hearsay statements from the mother and children were conditionally admitted subject to a voir dire on necessity and reliability.

The motion of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the father’s responding motion were each allowed in part.

A costs decision in a family law matter involving child support and custody disputes.

The mother sought child support from the father in 2009, but the father failed to provide financial disclosure and instead brought multiple motions to change custody, access, and contempt motions against the mother.

The father's counsel repeatedly failed to appear in court as directed.

The court found the father's conduct unreasonable throughout the litigation and awarded the mother costs of $9,000 payable at $200 per month, plus ordered the father's counsel to pay $910 in costs for failing to appear prepared for trial on two consecutive days.