Brian John Gover

Following a request for clarification and further submissions respecting costs in relation to an initial disciplinary hearing, the Court of Appeal ordered that the costs for that hearing be reserved to the Tribunal presiding over the re-hearing.

The parties made written submissions regarding costs following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity scale rather than an elevated scale.

The court awarded the respondent a total of $61,000 in costs, which included amounts for proceedings before the professional discipline appeal panel, the lower court stay motion, the lower court appeal, and the appellate proceedings, after setting off a previous costs award in favour of the appellant.

Hahn Investment applied for a hearing and review of a decision by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) refusing to vary or cancel certain trades in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) made on October 14, 2008.

Hahn Investment argued the trades were unreasonable due to significant divergence between the underlying values of the indices and the traded prices.

The Ontario Securities Commission dismissed the application, finding that IIROC correctly applied its policies and procedures, did not overlook material evidence, and that new evidence regarding the underlying security of one ETF was not compelling enough to change the outcome.

The Commission emphasized the need for deference to SRO decisions, particularly those involving technical expertise and time-sensitive market rulings.

David Berry, a former employee of Scotia Capital Inc., applied for a hearing and review of a decision by a hearing panel of Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS) that dismissed his motion to stay an RS proceeding against him.

Berry argued that the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) were not validly adopted by the TSX and that RS lacked jurisdiction over him as a former employee.

The Ontario Securities Commission dismissed the application, finding that UMIR are rules of RS, approved by the Commission, and enforceable against TSX Participants and their employees.

The Commission also held that the TSX Act provides the basis for RS's jurisdiction to proceed against Berry as a former employee.

The Law Society and the respondent lawyer brought separate appeals from a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Law Society Appeal Panel's order upholding a finding of professional misconduct and disbarment.

The Divisional Court had remitted the matter to a new hearing panel due to breaches of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

It held that the Hearing Panel breached natural justice by refusing a brief adjournment to allow the lawyer to be represented by counsel, and by proceeding immediately to the penalty phase without adequate notice.

The Court also upheld the Divisional Court's refusal to stay the proceedings for undue delay, binding the new hearing panel to the original findings on delay up to the start of the first hearing.

TSX Inc. sought intervenor status in a hearing and review requested by the respondent regarding a decision of Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS).

The respondent had challenged the validity of the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) and the TSX's delegation of market regulation to RS.

The Commission granted TSX limited intervenor status, finding that the TSX had a direct interest in the proceeding because its market regulation and enforcement regime was being challenged, and that its participation would be useful without unfairly prejudicing the existing parties.

The respondent was previously found guilty of civil and criminal contempt for his open, continuous, and flagrant refusal to obey a court order to testify at the Cornwall Public Inquiry.

Having served a six-month sentence for civil contempt, the court convened to determine the sentence for criminal contempt.

Applying the totality principle and considering mitigating factors such as pre-sentence custody and harsh incarceration conditions, the court sentenced the respondent to a further 30 days of incarceration, to be served consecutively without remission or parole.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding a Hearing Panel's finding of professional misconduct and order for disbarment.

The appellant argued that the proceedings should have been stayed for delay, and that the Hearing Panel breached natural justice by refusing an adjournment and proceeding to the penalty phase without adequate notice.

The Divisional Court held that the decision not to stay for delay was reasonable.

However, the court found that the Hearing Panel breached natural justice by refusing a brief adjournment when the appellant's counsel had a scheduling conflict, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The court also found a clear breach of natural justice in proceeding to the penalty phase with less than 24 hours' notice.

The findings of misconduct and penalty were set aside, and a new hearing was ordered.

The respondent, a former police officer and whistleblower regarding child sexual abuse allegations, refused to testify before the Cornwall Public Inquiry.

He was previously found in civil contempt and ordered by the court to appear and testify.

He deliberately and publicly defied this order, orchestrating his arrest before the media and supporters.

The court sentenced him to six months' imprisonment for civil contempt and found him guilty of criminal contempt, with sentencing for the criminal contempt deferred until the completion of his civil sentence.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application to direct the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry to state a case regarding his jurisdiction to hear certain evidence.

The Commissioner had ruled he had jurisdiction to hear evidence from a complainant regarding a recent sexual assault by teenagers and the subsequent police investigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Commissioner committed a jurisdictional error by misconstruing the Order in Council that established his mandate.

The Court held that the inquiry's subject matter was limited to historical sexual abuse of young people by persons in authority or positions of trust, and the proposed evidence fell outside this scope and was not reasonably relevant.

The appellant brought a motion to stay the execution of his disbarment by the Law Society of Upper Canada pending his appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that he was denied procedural fairness when the Law Society refused an adjournment and proceeded with the hearing in the absence of his newly retained counsel.

The court found that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding procedural fairness, that the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if disbarred before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry stated a case to the Divisional Court after a witness refused to answer questions at the inquiry.

The witness attended the inquiry but refused to answer questions, claiming he had no faith in the justice system and was a scapegoat.

The Divisional Court found that the witness had no lawful excuse for his refusal and found him guilty of contempt under section 8 of the Public Inquiries Act.

The witness was ordered to re-attend the inquiry to answer questions and to appear before the Court for punishment.

The Requesting Parties sought a hearing and review by the Ontario Securities Commission of the TSX's filing of amendments to the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) and the Director's acceptance of that filing.

Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS) brought a motion to quash the request, arguing it was moot, premature, and that the RS Hearing Panel had jurisdiction to decide the issues in the first instance.

The Commission held that there was no reviewable decision under sections 8 or 21.7 of the Securities Act, though it retained overriding supervisory jurisdiction under section 21(5).

The Commission declined to exercise its discretion to hear the matter, finding that the application was premature and would unduly fragment the ongoing RS disciplinary proceeding.

The Commission remitted the matter back to the RS Hearing Panel to determine the validity of the UMIR amendments.

The applicants sought a stay of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry and a Divisional Court decision pending an application for leave to appeal.

The Commissioner had ruled he had jurisdiction to hear evidence from two witnesses regarding alleged police failure to respond to a sexual assault complaint.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the applicants' reputation if the evidence was heard publicly before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted and the leave application expedited.

The applicants sought an order directing the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry to state a case to the Divisional Court regarding whether the proposed evidence of two witnesses fell within the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

The evidence concerned a sexual assault reported contemporaneously, which the applicants argued did not constitute 'historical abuse' under the mandate.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner had not exceeded his jurisdiction and that the evidence was reasonably relevant to the Inquiry's mandate to examine the institutional response to allegations of abuse.

A dissenting opinion would have granted the application.

The Member, a registered nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for making inappropriate comments to a client, failing to maintain boundaries, and bathing the client without consent.

Following a contested start to the hearing, the parties reached an agreement and the Member admitted to the allegations.

The Discipline Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct and accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a reprimand, a three-month suspension, and various remedial conditions on the Member's certificate of registration.

Several police officers sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Police Services Board granting the Chief of Police an extension of time to serve notices of disciplinary hearings under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The officers argued that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide full disclosure of the investigative brief, denying an oral hearing, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Board's procedure met the minimal requirements of fairness for an administrative, pre-charge decision and that the Board's decision to allow the delay was reasonable given the unprecedented complexity of the underlying criminal investigation.

The appellant onion growers suffered significant crop losses due to onion maggots and sued the manufacturer and seller of the insecticide Dyfonate for breach of warranty and negligence.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the crop failure was caused by unusually cool and dry environmental conditions that delayed the emergence of the maggots, rather than a defect in the insecticide.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings and concluded that the respondents provided no express or implied warranties regarding the insecticide's effectiveness under those unusual conditions, nor were they negligent.

Canada Post Corporation brought an application for an injunction to restrain the appellant from violating its exclusive privilege to collect and deliver international mail under section 14(1) of the Canada Post Corporation Act.

The appellant argued that the Act provided a complete code with specific penalties, precluding civil proceedings, and raised equitable defences of laches, delay, and estoppel.

The Court of Appeal held that Canada Post has the right to seek an injunction to enforce its statutory privilege, as the penalty provisions alone are insufficient to protect its mandate.

The Court further held that equitable defences cannot be raised against a Crown agent to prevent the operation of a public policy statute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, several police officers, brought a motion for a limited publication ban regarding Notices of Hearing and the Chief of Police's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that inadequate notice was given for the relief regarding the Notices of Hearing, and that the applicants failed to satisfy the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban on the Chief's report, agreeing with the prior endorsement of the motion judge.