Brian John Gover

The appellant brought a motion to stay the execution of his disbarment by the Law Society of Upper Canada pending his appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that he was denied procedural fairness when the Law Society refused an adjournment and proceeded with the hearing in the absence of his newly retained counsel.

The court found that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding procedural fairness, that the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if disbarred before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry stated a case to the Divisional Court after a witness refused to answer questions at the inquiry.

The witness attended the inquiry but refused to answer questions, claiming he had no faith in the justice system and was a scapegoat.

The Divisional Court found that the witness had no lawful excuse for his refusal and found him guilty of contempt under section 8 of the Public Inquiries Act.

The witness was ordered to re-attend the inquiry to answer questions and to appear before the Court for punishment.

The applicants sought a stay of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry and a Divisional Court decision pending an application for leave to appeal.

The Commissioner had ruled he had jurisdiction to hear evidence from two witnesses regarding alleged police failure to respond to a sexual assault complaint.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the applicants' reputation if the evidence was heard publicly before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted and the leave application expedited.

The applicants sought an order directing the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry to state a case to the Divisional Court regarding whether the proposed evidence of two witnesses fell within the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

The evidence concerned a sexual assault reported contemporaneously, which the applicants argued did not constitute 'historical abuse' under the mandate.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner had not exceeded his jurisdiction and that the evidence was reasonably relevant to the Inquiry's mandate to examine the institutional response to allegations of abuse.

A dissenting opinion would have granted the application.

Several police officers sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Police Services Board granting the Chief of Police an extension of time to serve notices of disciplinary hearings under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The officers argued that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide full disclosure of the investigative brief, denying an oral hearing, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Board's procedure met the minimal requirements of fairness for an administrative, pre-charge decision and that the Board's decision to allow the delay was reasonable given the unprecedented complexity of the underlying criminal investigation.

The applicants, several police officers, brought a motion for a limited publication ban regarding Notices of Hearing and the Chief of Police's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that inadequate notice was given for the relief regarding the Notices of Hearing, and that the applicants failed to satisfy the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban on the Chief's report, agreeing with the prior endorsement of the motion judge.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry that allowed public disclosure of CAS documents containing information reported to the Child Abuse Register.

The Commissioner had reasoned that because the documents came from CAS files rather than the Register itself, they were not protected by the confidentiality provision in s. 75(6) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the ruling, holding that a literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity and frustrate the legislative intent.

The court found that the information in the CAS files and the information protected by the Register's confidentiality provision are co-extensive and must be protected from public disclosure.

The appellant sought a publication ban on the name of its employee, who had been acquitted of historical sexual abuse charges, in relation to evidence given at the Cornwall Public Inquiry.

The Commissioner refused the ban, finding the public interest in openness outweighed the employee's privacy interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed an application for judicial review, applying a reasonableness standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court correctly identified reasonableness as the standard of review and that the Commissioner reasonably applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test in balancing the protection of innocence against the public interest in an open inquiry.

The applicant sought judicial review of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry denying a publication ban on the identity of one of its employees.

The Divisional Court determined the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

The court found the Commissioner did not err in concluding the employee's identity was relevant to the inquiry's mandate, nor did he act unreasonably in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test to deny the publication ban.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, specifically a memorandum containing foundational information for the final opinion of an expert retained by the respondents.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal ordered the production of the memorandum under Rule 31.06(3).

The respondents moved to set aside this order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that Rule 31.06(3) applies only to the discovery stage of litigation and does not entitle a party to obtain disclosure after trial, especially when the party knew of the expert's final opinion prior to trial but failed to seek discovery of the foundational information at that time.

The applicant sought judicial review of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry that allowed the Commission to hear evidence from alleged victims of historical sexual abuse.

The applicant argued that hearing such evidence would convert the inquiry into a substitute police investigation and exceed its mandate by requiring findings of civil or criminal responsibility.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner clearly understood his mandate to assess the institutional response rather than determine individual liability, and that he appropriately balanced the need for the evidence against the applicant's reputational interests.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the production of a memorandum detailing a conversation between the defendants' former counsel and their expert witness, Dr. Grafius.

The defendants claimed the memorandum was protected by litigation privilege.

The Court of Appeal held that rule 31.06(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure must be interpreted broadly, requiring the disclosure of all foundational information for a testifying expert's report.

The court ordered the production of the memorandum, finding that litigation privilege does not protect the foundational information of an expert called to testify at trial.

The Chief of Police appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) which reinstated a police officer who had been terminated by a Hearing Officer.

The officer, who developed a cocaine addiction and post-traumatic stress disorder while working undercover, had pled guilty to drug possession and disciplinary charges.

The employer and the officer had presented a joint submission on penalty proposing reinstatement with strict conditions, which the Hearing Officer rejected in favour of termination.

OCCPS found the Hearing Officer's decision unreasonable and substituted the joint submission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Chief of Police's appeal, holding that OCCPS correctly applied the reasonableness standard of review and reasonably concluded that the Hearing Officer ignored relevant evidence and the employer's duty to accommodate the officer's disability.

The respondents, the City of Toronto and the Toronto Transit Commission, brought a motion for the recusal of Justice Matlow and to strike the panel that had previously granted an application for judicial review.

The moving parties argued that Justice Matlow's prior involvement in contentious issues with the City created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Justices Greer and E. Macdonald, the other members of the panel, were unaware of the extent of Justice Matlow's involvement prior to the motion.

They concluded that an objective third party would find a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Consequently, they decided to stand down, strike the panel, and declare their previous decision null and void to ensure the matter did not proceed in breach of natural justice.

The respondents, the City of Toronto and the Toronto Transit Commission, brought a motion requesting that Justice Matlow recuse himself from a judicial review panel due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from his prior advocacy against a City development project.

Justice Matlow, deciding the recusal issue alone, dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and that the respondents had waived their right to object by delaying.

However, the other two panel members, Justices Greer and E. Macdonald, concluded that a reasonable apprehension of bias did exist.

Because they could not order Justice Matlow to recuse himself, they stepped down from the panel to prevent a breach of natural justice, resulting in the panel being struck and the application ordered to be heard de novo.

Two competitors in the outbound international mail industry brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the interpretation of the Canada Post Corporation Act's exclusive privilege provisions.

The moving parties sought to be added as parties or friends of the court, arguing they had a direct interest as they were facing similar injunction proceedings by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, adding the moving parties as intervenors with the right to augment the record, finding they had a sufficient interest and common questions of law with the main proceeding.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings before the Alcohol and Gaming Commission, alleging that its witnesses had been interfered with by their supervisor.

During an adjournment, the LCBO retained an investigator to interview the witnesses.

The applicant sought to compel the investigator's attendance and the production of witness statements to support its stay motion.

The Commission refused to issue the summons, finding the evidence irrelevant.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Commission breached natural justice by precluding the applicant from leading material evidence.

The Court ordered the Commission to issue a summons for the investigator and require the production of the witness statements, finding they were not protected by solicitor-client or litigation privilege.

The Chief of Police appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services that set aside a Hearing Officer's finding of discreditable conduct against a police officer.

The officer had been accused of sexually assaulting a woman while off-duty in the Dominican Republic.

The Hearing Officer found the complainant credible and ordered the officer dismissed.

The Commission overturned this decision, finding the complainant's evidence incredible.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Commission failed to apply the correct standard of review (reasonableness) and improperly substituted its own credibility findings for those of the Hearing Officer.

The Hearing Officer's decision and penalty of dismissal were restored.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash an order of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that granted intervenor status to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in two stay motions.

The stay motions were based on allegations of witness tampering by an LCBO employee and the improper distribution of transcripts.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was correctness and found that the Board erred in granting intervenor status.

The Court concluded that the LCBO had no interest in the stay motions and its intervention would introduce a distortion into the adversarial process.

The order granting standing to the LCBO was quashed.

The applicant brought an application to quash an order of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that granted intervenor status to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in two stay motions.

The stay motions were based on allegations of witness tampering by an LCBO employee.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision to grant intervenor status was incorrect, as the LCBO had no interest in the stay motions and its intervention would distort the adversarial process.

The order granting standing to the LCBO was quashed.