Immigration Law

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States for identity theft and misrepresentation, applied for judicial interim release pending the Minister of Justice's decision on surrender.

The applicant had previously fled the United States to Canada while on bail and made a refugee claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he would surrender himself into custody, given his history of using fraudulent identification and breaching bail conditions to avoid returning to Ghana.

The appellant was convicted of several offences arising out of an armed home invasion and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, and his counsel pursued production of records to advance an alibi and alternate suspect defence.

However, the appellant was subsequently found inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality and deported.

As he was no longer amenable to the court's jurisdiction, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break and enter and breach of probation, receiving an eight-month sentence based on a joint submission.

Four months later, an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into force retrospectively, rendering him inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality with no right of appeal due to the sentence length.

The appellant sought to reduce his sentence to five and a half months to preserve his right of appeal against deportation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reduced sentence remained proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's circumstances.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less a day because he was unaware of the significant immigration consequences at the time of his plea and sentencing.

The Crown consented to the reduction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the requested reduction modest and the proposed sentence fit.

The appellant, an undocumented immigrant living in Ontario, was struck by an unidentified motorist and sought compensation from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Superintendent denied the claim under s. 25(1) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, arguing the appellant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the Superintendent, finding the appellant's presence was illegal and deceptive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Superintendent only needed to prove the appellant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario, not his specific foreign jurisdiction of residence.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 42 months for fraud, arguing it was excessive and had uncontemplated negative immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not excessive for a major and serious fraud.

The Court also declined to artificially reduce the sentence to avoid immigration consequences, citing Parliament's intent regarding serious crimes committed by immigrants.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault and breach of probation and was sentenced to 183 days in custody based on a joint submission.

He subsequently discovered that this sentence triggered potential inadmissibility as a permanent resident.

He appealed the sentence based on fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences.

The Crown conceded that a sentence of six months less a day would have been fit and that the fresh evidence should be admitted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to six months less a day to obviate the unforeseen immigration consequences.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from her 2010 convictions, citing unforeseen immigration consequences that recently culminated in an admissibility hearing.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed regarding collateral consequences and raised potential ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the applicant acted promptly upon receiving notice of the admissibility hearing and that there were arguable grounds of appeal, making the extension in the interests of justice.

The applicant was convicted of a terrorism offence in 2010 and received a sentence functionally equivalent to over six years.

Years later, legislative amendments allowed the government to revoke the citizenship of individuals with terrorism sentences of five years or more.

Facing citizenship revocation, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that the severe collateral consequences and the retrospective nature of the legislation meant the interests of justice favoured allowing the applicant to seek a sentence reduction.

The appellants, who had been in immigration detention for lengthy periods awaiting deportation, brought applications for habeas corpus in the Ontario Superior Court.

The application judge declined jurisdiction, finding that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provided a comprehensive statutory review mechanism as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that where the legality of a continuing lengthy detention of uncertain duration is challenged, the IRPA review process is less broad and less advantageous than habeas corpus.

The Court found that habeas corpus places the onus on the Minister to justify the detention and is available as of right, unlike the discretionary judicial review process under the IRPA.

The appellant filed two notices of appeal regarding interlocutory orders made during his ongoing habeas corpus application in the Superior Court of Justice, which challenged his immigration detention.

The appellant sought directions for the Superior Court judge to issue certain orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders in a habeas corpus application until a final determination is made by the Superior Court.

The moving party brought an urgent motion to stay a deportation order pending the release of the Court of Appeal's decision in an appeal concerning habeas corpus applications for lengthy immigration detention.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no serious question to be tried because the deportation order is an independent immigration determination that would not be affected by the outcome of the habeas corpus appeal.

The court noted that deportation would actually bring an end to the detention the moving party sought to review.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to robbery and was subsequently deported.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his lawyer allegedly failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was already subject to a stayed deportation order and knew that further criminal convictions could lead to deportation.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant understood deportation was a potential consequence of his plea.

The appellant applied to re-open his sentence appeal and introduce fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences of his 26-month sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that a sentence of two years or more would deprive him of the right to appeal a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, admitted the fresh evidence, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day, noting the appellant's long-term residence in Canada, family ties, and lack of connections to his homeland.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.

On appeal, she introduced fresh evidence that her trial counsel failed to advise the sentencing judge of a co-accused's six-month sentence and the immigration consequences of a sentence of six months or more.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the appellant's culpability similar to her co-accused, and reduced the sentence to six months less a day to preserve her right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing it should be reduced to under six months to avoid significant immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis of an error in principle but found that a sentence of six months was well outside the appropriate range given the appellant's serious criminal background and numerous violations of court orders.

As immigration consequences cannot justify a sentence outside the appropriate range, and the appellant had already served the sentence, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was convicted of aggravated assault after burning her ten-year-old child with a hot iron.

She appealed her 20-month sentence, seeking a reduction to five months to preserve her right to appeal a removal order under immigration law.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred by failing to expressly consider the specific immigration consequences, the 20-month sentence remained fit and proportionate given the egregious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.