Family and Matrimonial Law

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court.

On consent, the Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, set aside the lower court's decision, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court in Milton for the scheduling of a case conference.

No costs were ordered.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two orders of the lower court.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $1,000.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence of their 16-year-old child, with parenting time at the child's discretion.

The motion judge had found the father engaged in family violence and harassing behaviour, while dismissing his claims of parental alienation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings or application of the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The court had previously raised a preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Internal Complaints Review Committee and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

After reviewing additional materials filed by the parties, the court concluded the matter should proceed to a hearing on the merits.

The court also granted the applicant leave to file an amended factum over the respondent's objection, and set a schedule for further filings.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for leave to appeal an order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and lifted the stay of the order.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to one respondent and $3,000 to two other respondents.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 22, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with costs fixed at $3,000, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The court ordered the appeal to be heard on an expedited basis and scheduled a case management teleconference to set a schedule.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Faieta J. dated August 2, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $3,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of M.D. Faieta J. dated September 12, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $2,167.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $3,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Carter J. dated August 10, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay the responding party $5,000 in all-inclusive costs.

At the outset of a judicial review, the Divisional Court raised a preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Internal Complaints Review Committee and the Child and Family Services Review Board under the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court directed that this preliminary issue be determined prior to the hearing on the merits and adjourned the matter for submissions.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interim order that denied his request to file additional evidence on a motion that had already been argued and was under reserve.

The responding party requested the motion be dismissed under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court found the motion for leave to appeal was doomed to fail because the underlying motion had not yet been decided, making the appeal premature.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to change child support.

He argued the motion judge erred by failing to impute income to the respondent and by refusing to order her to pay a proportionate share of his childcare and transportation costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of the test for intentional under-employment or in the finding that the childcare costs were neither necessary nor reasonable.

The self-represented moving party had four pending matters in the Divisional Court relating to underlying family law proceedings.

Because a final trial judgment had recently been rendered, the court issued notices under Rule 2.1 indicating it was considering dismissing several of the interlocutory appeals and review motions as moot.

The court also provided case management directions regarding a motion for leave to appeal a costs order, a motion for leave to appeal an order requiring prior leave to bring further motions, and the moving party's proposed motion seeking the judge's recusal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order that adjourned an uncontested trial sine die pending the determination of a related appeal.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.02 considering dismissing the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court found that the adjournment order was made for the moving party's benefit and that the proposed appeal had no utility.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The applicant children's aid society sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Child and Family Services Board.

The Board had assumed jurisdiction to hear a parent's complaints regarding procedural fairness and kinship placement decisions made by the society during ongoing child protection proceedings.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and held that the Board lacked jurisdiction under section 68.1(8)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court found that because the child protection proceedings were before the court, all substantive issues and related procedural fairness concerns were ultimately subject to the court's jurisdiction, precluding the Board from conducting a review.

The application was granted and the Board's decision was set aside.

The Society appealed a trial judge's order returning a seven-year-old child to her mother's care under supervision.

The Society argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in fact-finding and failed to properly weigh the child's best interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the child's placement, finding no palpable and overriding errors and noting that fresh evidence of the mother's recent alcohol use was insufficient to alter the result.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to quash a term requiring the Society to assign an American Sign Language-familiar worker, as counsel had not been given an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order of the lower court in a child protection proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, quashing the paragraph of the order that required the society to assign a family worker familiar with American sign language.

The remainder of the lower court's order was confirmed, and the parties were encouraged to prepare a re-integration plan for the child prior to the resumption of school.

The appellant ex-husband appealed a Master's order denying his request to amend his defamation claim against his ex-wife.

The proposed amendments related to statements the ex-wife made to a psychologist conducting a court-appointed custody assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made during a custody assessment are protected by absolute privilege to ensure full and free disclosure in family law proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a trial judge's order granting a mother and aunt access to two children who had been made Crown wards.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by ignoring the statutory presumption against access to Crown wards and improperly placing the burden of proof on the Society.

The court also found the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the beneficial nature of the access and its impact on the children's future opportunities for a permanent and stable adoptive placement.

The appeal was allowed, the access order for the mother and aunt was terminated, and the order was left silent on sibling access to allow the Society to facilitate it.