Employment and Labour Law

The appellant, an investment advisor, appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim for additional compensation under a letter agreement.

The trial judge found the agreement ambiguous regarding its application to Capital Markets transactions and relied on the parties' subsequent conduct to conclude it did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while subsequent conduct is not part of the factual matrix, it is admissible to resolve ambiguity.

The trial judge made no extricable error of law in finding ambiguity and properly weighed the appellant's subsequent conduct, which was overwhelmingly consistent with the respondent's interpretation.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal, specifically challenging the inclusion of commission income and a bonus during the 16-month notice period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the commission award, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent should continue to receive commission on all advertising revenue.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bonus, finding the motion judge misapprehended the evidence regarding a guaranteed bonus.

The costs award from the court below was also reduced.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment that allowed the respondent's action for wrongful dismissal and awarded damages based on a one-year notice period.

The motion judge had refused to admit new evidence regarding an employment contract the respondent signed with another firm shortly after termination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in failing to admit the new evidence, which raised issues about the respondent's actions and intentions.

The Court set aside the order and referred the entire matter for trial alongside the existing counter-claim and oppression action.

Sobeys appealed a decision finding it contractually obligated to directly fund a pension plan deficit following the termination of a warehousing and transportation agreement with Tibbett.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the parties had entered into a new agreement for Sobeys to assume direct responsibility for the deficit, that Tibbett had acted with due diligence, and that the claim was not statute-barred because Tibbett was not notified of Sobeys' refusal to fund the deficit until 2013.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant unions challenged the constitutionality of the federal Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA) and the Government's conduct in collective bargaining, arguing they infringed their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The ERA imposed wage increase caps and rolled back previously negotiated increases in response to the 2008 global economic crisis.

The Court of Appeal held that the ERA and the Government's conduct did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

In the alternative, any limits on s. 2(d) rights were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the pressing and substantial objective of managing the economic crisis.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to admit and prefer the evidence of the Government's participant expert over the unions' expert.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee without cause and awarding 15 months' reasonable notice plus damages for lost bonus payments.

The employer argued the employee breached its Code of Business Conduct by sharing a private placement memorandum with a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the document was not confidential and its disclosure did not violate the Code.

The Court also upheld the 15-month notice period and the award of damages for lost bonuses, finding that unilateral changes to the bonus plan introducing forfeiture provisions had not taken effect.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed after 14 years of employment.

The motion judge awarded a 17-month reasonable notice period but denied damages for lost bonuses, finding the bonus plan required 'active employment'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on whether the 'active employment' term was ambiguous rather than whether it unambiguously limited the appellant's common law right to damages.

The Court found the term did not oust the common law entitlement and awarded the appellant damages for the bonuses he would have earned during the notice period.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing its claim for breach of a non-competition covenant.

The appellant alleged the respondent, as a director of a holding company, supplied a refrigerated truck to a competitor for free.

The motion judge found evidence that rental payments were being made for the truck, which permitted the rejection of the appellant's claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee and discriminated against her based on family status.

Upon returning from maternity leave, the respondent was demoted, had her hours reduced, and faced reprisals when she objected, culminating in her termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that there was no just cause for dismissal, the 12-month notice period was reasonable, and the $20,000 human rights damages award for family status discrimination was justified.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, a software developer and his company, appealed the dismissal of their counterclaim for wrongful dismissal and unpaid compensation against the respondent trading company.

The trial judge had found the developer was terminated for just cause due to sabotage and competition, and rejected claims for commissions, salary, and bonuses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the commissions claim and the finding of just cause, but allowed the appeal regarding unpaid salary and declared bonuses, finding the respondent had no right to withhold them.

The Court also reduced the trial costs award, noting a defendant is not entitled to substantial indemnity costs merely for beating its own offer to settle.

The moving party brought a motion to rehear an appeal that had previously been dismissed in part.

The moving party argued that the appeal panel erred in law and fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the moving party was merely attempting to re-argue the same points.

The court also prohibited the moving party from bringing further motions without leave.

The respondents, former employees, sued the appellant employer for unpaid wages and were granted summary judgment.

The appellant argued it was authorized under s. 13 of the Employment Standards Act to deduct amounts from the unpaid wages because the respondents failed to return a company computer containing intellectual property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the employment contracts did not contain written authorization permitting such deductions.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary refusal to stay the enforcement of the judgment pending the appellant's counterclaim for conversion.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent employee had adequately mitigated his damages following wrongful termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was well supported by the evidence.

The respondent, who was in his fifties with limited education and had worked for the appellant for 19 years, faced diminished re-employment prospects, exacerbated by the lack of a reference letter and accusations of wrongdoing.

The Court held that the respondent made reasonable efforts to find comparable employment and was not obliged to accept non-comparable positions.

The moving party, a former employee of the respondent hospital, sought to review an order dismissing her motion for a stay and a capacity assessment.

She had a history of attempting to obtain medical opinions stating she lacked legal capacity to conduct proceedings, but no such opinions were provided.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the previous order, noting that the moving party could request her own capacity assessment under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The motion to review and the motion to admit fresh evidence were dismissed.

The appellant teachers were wrongfully dismissed by the respondent private school.

The motion judge reduced their reasonable notice period from twelve months to six months due to the school's financial difficulties and a presumption about the availability of alternative teaching positions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an employer's financial circumstances are not relevant to determining the reasonable notice period under the Bardal factors.

The twelve-month notice period was restored.

The plaintiff sued his former employer and a disability insurer for long-term disability benefits after suffering a stroke shortly after his termination.

In his reply to the employer's statement of defence, the plaintiff claimed wrongful dismissal.

The employer moved for summary judgment, arguing the reply raised a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the statement of claim's factual matrix provided sufficient notice of the wrongful dismissal claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, agreeing that the wrongful dismissal claim was not a new cause of action and came as no surprise to the employer.

The appellant employee accepted an offer of employment that did not contain a termination provision.

Nine months later, he signed an employment agreement limiting his termination entitlements to the minimums under the Employment Standards Act.

After being terminated without cause seven years later, he sued for wrongful dismissal and unpaid commissions.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination provision in the subsequent employment agreement was unenforceable for lack of fresh consideration, entitling the appellant to common law reasonable notice.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's claims for commissions on a major account finalized after his termination, finding no error in the interpretation of the commission plan or the rejection of his unjust enrichment claim.

The respondent investment dealer terminated the contracts of four sales agents when it closed its Thunder Bay office.

The respondent sued for repayment of transition loans that became due upon termination.

The appellants defended the action, claiming misrepresentation by omission regarding the office closure and equitable set-off.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against two of the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in fact and law, and that a fair and just determination required a trial of all claims and counterclaims together to avoid inconsistent verdicts.

Following success on a summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff sought enhanced costs based on an unaccepted Rule 49 offer.

The court held that the offer was too indeterminate to trigger Rule 49 consequences because the amount payable to settle was not fixed or knowable at the time of acceptance.

The court also allowed pre-judgment and post-judgment interest that had been overlooked on the summary judgment motion.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $31,000 all inclusive.

The plaintiffs moved to certify a class proceeding arising from a pension surplus dispute involving former employees who left the pension plan after taking commuted values during a work force adjustment.

The court treated the action as a companion to related pension litigation and certified common issues mirroring those already certified in the related action, including additional conflict of interest issues under the PBSA.

The court rejected the argument that the proposed class definition was irrationally over-inclusive or under-inclusive, found the class action procedure preferable, and accepted the proposed representatives.

The action was certified, the plaintiffs were directed to deliver an updated litigation plan, and the two related actions were ordered to be tried together subject to the trial judge's discretion.