Civil Litigation - Plaintiff

The plaintiffs (defendants to the counterclaim) brought a motion under Rule 56.01(1)(d) for an order requiring the corporate defendant (plaintiff by counterclaim) to post security for costs in the amount of $80,000.

The court found that while the corporate defendant was impecunious, it would be unjust to order security for costs because the counterclaim was closely related to the main action, the impecuniosity may have been caused by the moving parties' conduct, and the co-defendants undertook to pay any costs awarded against the corporate defendant.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to add a claim for punitive damages against a defendant who rear-ended the plaintiff's vehicle while impaired.

The defendant opposed the amendment, arguing she had already paid her debt to society through a criminal conviction and fine.

The court granted the motion, noting that a prior criminal penalty is a factor to consider but not an absolute bar to punitive damages, and found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the estates of the deceased drivers.

Due to the plaintiff and his father sharing the same name, the plaintiff's counsel mistakenly believed the plaintiff owned the vehicle and did not name the father as a defendant.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff added the father as a defendant.

The third-party insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against the father as statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the father's ownership was discoverable with reasonable diligence before the limitation period expired, and drew an adverse inference from the failure of the plaintiff, his father, and their senior counsel to provide affidavits.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $1,573,903.94 from the defendant for unremitted HST on the sale of unrefined gold.

The Canada Revenue Agency had audited the plaintiff and assessed the outstanding HST, which the plaintiff paid.

The defendant argued the claim was precluded by the Excise Tax Act and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, holding that the cause of action under section 224 of the Excise Tax Act only arose when the plaintiff paid the tax, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

Summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the amount owing by the defendant on a mortgage.

The court found that the stated interest rate of 0.8% was a typo and the agreed rate was 8%.

The court disallowed the plaintiffs' claims for a lender's fee, an automatic renewal fee, and administrative fees, finding the renewal fee to be a penalty and the others unsupported by evidence.

The court also found the plaintiffs had received a payment of $86,184.68, contrary to their assertions.

The defendant was ordered to pay the remaining balance of $11,826.98, and the plaintiffs were denied their pre-litigation legal fees.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP), the defendant sought full indemnity costs of $122,286.94 pursuant to section 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff argued the time claimed was excessive and proposed a reduced amount.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that the defendant's use of junior counsel resulted in a total fee comparable to the plaintiff's own costs, which relied heavily on senior counsel.

The court awarded the defendant the full amount claimed.

The applicant, having been entirely successful in the underlying application, sought partial indemnity costs of $89,703.50.

The respondent argued for no costs or a maximum of $50,000, citing the applicant's failed allegation of bad faith.

The court noted that much of the parties' submissions were not directed to the determinative issue, which the court identified independently based on the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The court also questioned the necessity of multiple counsel.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the reduced amount of $68,407.68 plus HST.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against a mining corporation, its executives, and its underwriters for misrepresentations in a short form prospectus related to a secondary public offering.

The corporate defendants consented to certification of the statutory misrepresentation claims.

However, the underwriters opposed certification of the common law negligent misrepresentation and negligence claims against them.

The court certified the action against the corporate defendants but dismissed the certification motion against the underwriters, finding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the inevitability of individual trials on reliance and damages, and that the negligence claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action as it was subsumed by the negligent misrepresentation claim and did not establish a novel duty of care.

The applicant lawyer successfully moved to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer's ruling regarding unpaid legal accounts, while the respondents' motion to oppose was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $21,109.76 for the two motions, including a portion on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' late adjournment request.

The court found no conduct justifying an elevated scale of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $15,448.46 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendants previously brought an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' $27 million defamation action regarding a publication about contraband tobacco.

The plaintiffs, as the successful responding parties, sought costs for the motion.

The court considered the presumption under section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which states that a successful responding party is not entitled to costs unless appropriate in the circumstances.

Finding that the motion was not frivolous, involved matters of public interest, and lacked inappropriate behaviour by the defendants, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on a contractual refund claim after the CRA disallowed SR&ED tax credits prepared by the defendant tax consultants.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim based on the limitation period, and the personal defendant sought to dismiss the claim against him.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the refund claim was inextricably linked with the defendants' counterclaim for breach of contract, making partial summary judgment inappropriate.

The court also found sufficient evidence to require a trial on the personal claim against the individual defendant.

The purchaser brought a motion for summary judgment for specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a commercial property.

The vendor attempted to repudiate the APS, alleging various formal defects, lack of authority of its own signatory, and relying on an annulment clause to refuse to discharge a mortgage and construction lien.

The court found the APS valid, applying the indoor management rule to bind the vendor to its director's signature.

The court held the encumbrances were matters of conveyance, not title, and the vendor acted in bad faith.

Finding the property unique and damages inadequate, the court granted specific performance.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a 2002 dismissal order for non-appearance and to reinstate the action.

Several defendants requested an adjournment to retrieve their files, which the plaintiff opposed.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, noting that the plaintiff failed to serve all relevant defendants, did not include the dismissal order in the motion materials, and provided little evidence explaining the delay since a vexatious litigant order against him was rescinded in 2010.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action after a 26-day trial, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued the defendant should be deprived of costs because two of its witnesses gave untruthful evidence.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiffs' conduct was not egregious.

The court also refused to completely deprive the defendant of costs, but applied a 10% reduction to the fee award to sanction the untruthful testimony.

The court significantly reduced the defendant's claimed expert witness disbursements, finding them grossly excessive, and fixed total fees at $483,300 plus disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion for summary judgment on its construction lien claim against the general contractor.

The general contractor failed to file any responding materials and relied solely on its pleadings and technical arguments.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the general contractor had admitted the supply of services and materials and had no evidence to dispute the quantum or timeliness of the lien.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion for summary judgment on its construction lien claim for $94,729.17 against the general contractor, who had posted a lien bond to vacate the lien.

The general contractor filed no responding materials, arguing instead that leave was required and that the evidentiary record was deficient under s. 17(1) of the Construction Lien Act.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that leave was granted, Rule 48.04 did not bar the motion, and the uncontradicted evidence established the timeliness and quantum of the claim.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to recuse the judge for bias, the responding party, Falconers LLP, sought its costs.

The applicant had relied on an unsworn complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council containing serious, unsubstantiated allegations against the court.

The court held that costs should follow the event and that the responding party was reasonably required to attend the motion.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $3,165.

The plaintiff brought a motion to substitute a known roofing contractor for a 'John Doe Contractor' defendant on the basis of misnomer, to have three related fire damage actions tried together, and to assign the matter to case management.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding the proposed defendant could not have reasonably known the 'litigating finger' was pointed at him since he was known to the plaintiff and the pleading described an unknown entity.

The court granted the request to try the actions together due to overlapping facts and witnesses, but declined to order case management.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment on a personal guarantee, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis or, alternatively, partial indemnity up to the date of an offer to settle and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The defendant argued the claimed amounts were excessive.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $12,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, noting the motion was not complex but the defendant had unreasonably defended it and rejected a favourable offer to settle.

During a medical malpractice trial involving a newborn who developed kernicterus from untreated jaundice, the plaintiffs sought to qualify a registered nurse as an expert in perinatal nursing.

The defendants objected, arguing she lacked specific recent experience in tertiary hospital nurseries and was a 'roaming expert.' The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the proposed expert possessed the requisite specialized knowledge and experience in newborn care and jaundice assessment.

The court admitted the expert evidence, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.