Anna L. Marrison

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical negligence action relating to a birth injury that resulted in cerebral palsy.

The trial judge had dismissed the action against the attending obstetrician, nurse, and hospital.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal with respect to the obstetrician, finding that the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding the interpretability of fetal heart rate monitor outputs and erred in concluding that the bradycardia would have occurred regardless of the application of a vacuum extractor.

A new trial was ordered for the claim against the obstetrician.

The appeal regarding the nurse and hospital was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision refusing to add a nurse and a private clinic as defendants in a medical malpractice action after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Master found the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the nurse's identity within the limitation period, and dismissed the motion to add the clinic without prejudice to bringing a new motion on proper material.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error of law in applying the Limitations Act, 2002, which prohibits adding parties after the limitation period expires.

The court allowed the cross-appeal in part, imposing a 30-day time limit for the plaintiff to bring the second motion regarding the clinic.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical negligence and battery action against a surgeon and hospital defendants.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the appellant gave informed consent to the surgery and failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The court also held the hospital was not vicariously liable for the surgeon, who was not an employee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims against the respondent physicians and hospital arising from her involuntary committal in a psychiatric wing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment solely because the appellant failed to provide an expert opinion establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's claims included allegations of failure to follow statutory procedures under the Mental Health Act, which do not necessarily require expert medical opinion to be established.

The self-represented appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error, unreasonableness, or miscarriage of justice in the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat.

The court noted that the appellant's request for an outpatient assessment could be raised at her next annual review.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to amend their Statement of Defence and Crossclaim in a medical malpractice action.

The appellants sought to plead that the defendant nurse was an employee of the respondent hospital, contrary to their earlier position and discovery evidence that she was an independent contractor supplied by an agency.

The Divisional Court upheld the master's decision, finding that although the master erred in applying Rule 51.05 to a discovery admission, the amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice to the hospital, which had relied on the appellants' initial position in conducting discoveries and retaining an expert.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was admitted to a hospital as an involuntary patient for a psychiatric assessment and released the following day.

More than two years later, she commenced an action alleging unlawful detention and sought to add the assessing physician as a defendant.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellant knew or ought to have known the material facts shortly after her release, and confirmed that limitation periods of general application apply to claims for personal remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.