Anida Chiodo

The appellant appealed her conviction for robbery arising from a drug transaction where the complainant was stabbed multiple times.

At trial, there was conflicting evidence regarding who was buying and selling the drugs, and what type of drugs were involved.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make specific findings of fact regarding what was stolen, which was necessary as the Crown had particularized the charge as stealing money.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not address the charge as particularized.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for his participation in a robbery where a co-assailant shot and killed the victim.

The trial judge sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment, treating the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor despite the mandatory minimum under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation and held that his failure to cooperate with police was not an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the sentence to six years' imprisonment, balancing the aggravating circumstances of the robbery with the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitative efforts.

The young person appealed findings of guilt for robbery, weapons dangerous, and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the robbery conviction, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable based on the appellant's proximity to the robbery, flight from police, and recent possession of stolen property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to apply the Kienapple principle, staying the findings of guilt for weapons dangerous and possession of stolen property to avoid multiple convictions.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and three years' probation imposed on a 20-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a dwelling house.

The offender set fire to a carport over a drug debt, which spread to an attached home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred a causal link between the offender's mental health issues and the offence, and correctly weighed mitigating factors including his youth, guilty plea, and rehabilitation prospects.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following his participation in a prison riot where he severely injured an unconscious inmate.

He was sentenced to seven and one-half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity, given the lighter sentences imposed on co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity was justified because the appellant's participation was of significantly greater gravity and moral blameworthiness than that of the other participants.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years less a day for aiding and abetting by renting a car used in the offence.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences from circumstantial evidence were reasonable.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred in treating the home invasion aspect as an aggravating factor when there was no evidence the appellant knew it would involve a home invasion.

The sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of his estranged wife.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting gunshot residue (GSR) evidence found on his hands and clothing, claiming it was obtained following an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention in violation of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

He also argued the GSR evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of his post-arrest statements to police.

The Court of Appeal found that while the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, the GSR evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also found no error in the admission of the GSR evidence on a probative value/prejudicial effect analysis, and concluded the jury instructions regarding the appellant's statements did not prejudice him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for assault with a weapon and breach of probation, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant argued that counsel failed to properly advise him about the decision not to testify and inadequately cross‑examined Crown witnesses.

Fresh evidence was admitted including affidavits from the appellant and trial counsel, 911 recordings, and the appellant’s criminal record.

The court applied the three‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel and found the appellant failed to establish incompetence or resulting miscarriage of justice.

Trial counsel’s tactical decisions regarding testimony and cross‑examination were within the range of reasonable professional judgment, and there was no reasonable probability the verdict would have differed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual interference, seeking to strike his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant argued his plea was not voluntary or fully informed due to inadequate legal advice regarding the use of facts on sentencing, the status of a co-accused, and the Crown's disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the plea was voluntary, fully informed, and that trial counsel provided effective assistance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed convictions for importing opium and possession of opium for the purpose of trafficking arising from a shipment of hydraulic jacks containing concealed narcotics.

The court accepted the respondent’s concession that the trial judge erred by admitting impermissible police opinion evidence and by failing to provide an adequate circumstantial evidence instruction on the standard of proof.

The court also held that additional police opinion evidence about the appellant’s interview demeanour was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

Although the verdict was not unreasonable on the evidentiary record, the cumulative unfairness required the convictions to be set aside and a new trial ordered.

In a joint murder appeal arising from a planned street robbery and fatal stabbing, the court held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that they could treat a co-accused's explanatory statements as adoptive admissions by silence against the appellants.

The record did not establish the factual context necessary to support an inference that either appellant could reasonably have been expected to respond, particularly where the statements were non-accusatory and related primarily to the declarant's own state of mind.

The court further held that, even if the evidence were capable of supporting adoption by silence, the jury charge lacked the necessary caution and analytical guidance.

One appellant received a new trial on first degree murder, while the other had his conviction set aside and a manslaughter conviction substituted.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing a certiorari application arising from a preliminary inquiry committal in a homicide prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her limited jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences reasonably available on the evidence and by preferring the inference favourable to the appellants.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence was incapable of placing one appellant within the scheme to do violence, holding that any relative weakness in the evidence was irrelevant at the committal stage.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a robbery during which the victim was shot and killed.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the evidence of the appellant's teacher, who testified the appellant confessed to being present but not the shooter.

The trial judge admitted two photographs of the appellant taken at the time of his arrest to show his appearance at the time of the offence, as his appearance had changed significantly by trial.

The Court of Appeal held that while the photographs were admissible, the trial judge's jury instruction on their use was confusing and effectively invited the jury to treat an in-court, single photo lineup as circumstantial evidence of identity.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that he did not receive a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly curtailed defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her previous lies about her age, admitted highly prejudicial hearsay evidence, and failed to adequately instruct the jury on the mistake of age defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her sentence, arguing it was harsh and excessive.

The sentencing judge had imposed a custodial sentence and a lifetime driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's appalling record for related offences and the danger she posed to the public.

However, the Court held that under s. 259(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, the driving prohibition had to be limited to three years.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the driving prohibition to three years, and dismissed in all other respects.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence of a police officer who identified him from a store video.

The officer had interacted with the appellant on the night of his arrest, taking photos and paying attention to his features.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the officer's prior acquaintance with the appellant, though not lengthy, was sufficient for admissibility, with its duration going to weight.

The court also found no unfairness regarding the photos and noted that minor inconsistencies in the officers' evidence were matters for the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and theft after hijacking a tractor-trailer of frozen chickens and shooting the driver.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cell phone propagation maps and test calls, and in his jury instructions regarding the W. (D.) framework and the distinction between disbelief and fabrication of an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

At trial, the accused advanced an alternate suspect defence and claimed the police investigation was inadequate.

The trial judge excluded the Crown's proposed rebuttal evidence from the alternate suspect, instructed the jury that they must acquit if they could not decide which of the two men committed the murder, and repeatedly warned the jury about wrongful convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the rebuttal evidence, in giving the co-principal instruction where there was evidence of joint participation, and in repeatedly referencing miscarriages of justice in the jury charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed a 25-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to two years less a day, less pre-trial custody, taking into account immigration ramifications that were not before the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal identified two fundamental errors of law: the trial judge failed to take the verdict from the jury on both counts after the appellant was placed in their charge, and failed to direct the jury on the included offence of simple possession.

Applying the principle from R. v. Haughton, the Court found that the failure to leave the included offence with the jury may have affected the verdict.

As the Crown did not seek a new trial on the full offence and the appellant conceded guilt for simple possession, the Court substituted a conviction for simple possession with a sentence of time served, and quashed the conviction on the second count.