29 total
Appeal of specific performance order for real estate transactions dismissed; trial judge's factual findings upheld.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering specific performance and purchase price abatements for two real estate transactions.
The trial judge found the appellant vendors were not ready to close, failed to bargain in good faith, and committed an anticipatory breach, while the respondent purchasers were ready, willing, and able to perform.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his interpretation of the abatement clauses.
Rule 11 order to continue proceedings is procedural and cannot revive claims expunged by a vesting order.
The respondent had a claim against a company that went into receivership.
A vesting order transferred the debtor's assets to the appellant, expunging the respondent's claim against those assets.
The appellant obtained an Order to Continue the proceedings under Rule 11 to pursue a counterclaim against the respondent.
The motion judge varied the Rule 11 order to allow the respondent to pursue its original claim against the appellant as a stand-alone claim.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a Rule 11 order is purely procedural and cannot create substantive rights that were expunged by the vesting order.
The respondent was limited to asserting its claim by way of set-off against the appellant's counterclaim.
Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the order was not made under section 102.
The appellants appealed paragraph 4(d) of an order made by the Superior Court of Justice.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the issue of jurisdiction, finding that the order was not made under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act.
Costs were fixed at $7,000 all inclusive.
Issue estoppel precludes relitigating claims dismissed at a default trial even after the default judgment is set aside.
The appellant appealed an order allowing the respondents to proceed to trial on all claims after a default judgment was set aside.
At the initial trial, the judge dismissed the respondents' claims for interference with contractual and economic relations but granted an injunction and damages for false and misleading advertising.
The Court of Appeal held that issue estoppel precluded the respondents from relitigating the dismissed interference claims, even though the default judgment against the appellant was set aside.
However, the Court allowed the false and misleading advertising claims to proceed to trial for both an injunction and damages.
The appeal was allowed in part.
Appellants granted 30 days to elect to have Divisional Court costs assessed rather than fixed.
A supplementary endorsement was issued to clarify the disposition of costs in the Divisional Court.
The court amended its previous reasons to provide the appellants with the option to have the costs assessed on a party and party basis within thirty days.
If the option is not exercised, the respondent is entitled to recover the $20,000 in costs fixed by the Divisional Court.
Board could close the colleges without Senate approval.
Appeal from dismissal of an application for judicial review challenging a university board resolution authorizing closure and sale of two downtown colleges as part of a capital development and financial restructuring strategy.
The majority held that the impugned decision concerned management, property, revenues, expenditures, and facilities within the Board's authority under the Trent University Act, and did not amount to educational policy requiring Senate concurrence.
The majority also held the faculty-member appellants lacked standing to seek judicial review, rejecting both personal and public interest standing arguments.
The appeal on the merits was dismissed, but the costs order below was varied to permit assessment of the party-and-party costs awarded by the Divisional Court if the appellants elected that course.
A dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the closure decision engaged educational policy and required Senate approval.
Appeal dismissed; mortgage security interests in SkyDome rank in priority to SkyBox leasehold interest.
The appellant, DeGasperis Muzzo Corporation, appealed a judgment declaring that the mortgage security interests of Montreal Trust and Stadco in the SkyDome ranked in priority to its leasehold interest in a SkyBox suite.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the mortgage instruments were registered prior to the leasehold interest under the Land Titles Act, and that the appellant had agreed to subordinate its interest in the lease.
The cross-appeal was also dismissed.
Judicial review dismissed; university board of governors has exclusive jurisdiction over property and capital development.
The applicants sought judicial review to quash a resolution by the Trent University Board of Governors authorizing a capital development project that could involve closing or relocating two colleges.
The applicants argued the Board lacked jurisdiction without a concurring motion from the University Senate, which had passed a resolution opposing any change of location.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Trent University Act, the Board has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the university's property, revenues, and expenditures, while the Senate's jurisdiction is limited to educational policy.
Public inquiry commissioners may make findings of misconduct provided they do not determine civil or criminal liability.
The appellants sought judicial review to quash notices of potential findings of misconduct issued by the Commissioner of the Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada.
The appellants argued the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction by making findings that amounted to civil or criminal liability, and that the late delivery of the notices breached procedural fairness.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a commissioner may make findings of misconduct and evaluate facts according to standards of conduct, provided they do not amount to conclusions of legal liability.
The Court also found the procedural protections afforded to the parties were extensive and the timing of the notices was fair given the complexity of the inquiry.