Alex Cornelius

During a murder trial, the defense requested a voir dire regarding an in-dock identification made by a witness, Margaret Warner, to Cst.

Melo, and a potential breach of a witness exclusion order.

The court declined to continue the inquiry into the in-dock identification, finding it lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial, thus excluding it from trial.

The court also found no breach of the witness exclusion order by Cst.

Melo but modified the order to remove Cst.

Melo's exemption due to concerns about witness contact regarding identification.

This endorsement addresses two evidentiary issues during a first-degree murder trial: the admissibility of composite sketches and the proper conduct of examination-in-chief of a critical Crown witness.

The court ruled the composite sketches inadmissible due to low probative value, misleading potential, and prejudicial effect, and prohibited their use by both the Crown and co-accused.

Regarding the examination-in-chief, the court found the Crown's questions were not leading or a disguised impeachment, but cautioned against overly broad questions that merely ask if video evidence matches recollection.

This endorsement addresses the admissibility of identification evidence from a lay witness, Margaret Warner, during a first-degree murder trial.

The accused sought to prohibit the Crown from leading evidence where Ms. Warner identified individuals in surveillance video as the same individuals she observed at the scene of the shooting.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Ms. Warner's observations, even if considered opinion, were admissible as lay opinion evidence due to her unique position to assist the trier of fact through personal observation.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence constituted an inadmissible 'in-dock identification', noting that Ms. Warner was not identifying the accused but rather comparing individuals in the video to those she observed at the scene.

Deficiencies in the evidence were deemed suitable for cross-examination and potential limiting instructions to the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of the deceased, Dwayne Thompson, taken at the coroner's office, through Sgt. Raymond Linton, who was not present at the autopsy.

The accused objected, arguing the Crown reneged on an agreement not to introduce autopsy photographs through Sgt. Linton and that the photograph was prejudicial.

The court ruled the photograph admissible, clarifying it was not an "autopsy photograph" in the agreed-upon sense, and that its probative value, particularly in authenticating paper bags placed on the deceased's hands at the scene, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also issued directives for future disclosure of electronic evidence to prevent similar misunderstandings.

The Crown sought to admit a modified summary of cellphone records, replacing phone numbers with the names of the accused, to simplify evidence for the jury.

The accused objected, arguing identity and phone number association were disputed, making the summary prejudicial.

The court ruled that while summaries are generally admissible to clarify evidence, the proposed modified summary was inadmissible as evidence because replacing phone numbers with accused names on a disputed issue of identity would be unfairly prejudicial and amount to impermissible advocacy, potentially misleading the jury.

The Crown could use the summary as an aid in closing arguments but not as evidence.

This endorsement addresses several pre-trial procedural issues in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

The court provides directions on the order of peremptory challenges, the procedure for challenging jurors for cause, disclosure of electronic records and aids (Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoints, maps), and the examination of a key witness, Cassandra Hudson.

The court also sets out non-sitting dates and addresses miscellaneous requests regarding nourishment and clothing exchanges for the accused.

Key rulings include declining to prohibit Crown counsel from preparing a witness and denying a request to videotape witness testimony for discovery purposes.

This endorsement addresses numerous pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

Key rulings include denying the Crown's application for prisoner restraints, dismissing defence applications for accused to sit at counsel table and for an immediate opening statement after the Crown.

The court granted internet access for counsel, denied a challenge to the jury array based on an erroneous questionnaire but outlined vetting procedures, permitted a race-based challenge for cause with specific questions, ordered a 14-member jury with two alternates, and granted the exclusion of unsworn jurors during selection.

Further, the court dismissed an application to exclude cell phone numbers provided to probation officers, granted the introduction of alternate suspect evidence, permitted eyewitness identification evidence regarding males on video, allowed evidence of post-offence conduct (haircut change, phone number changes), and dismissed an application to exclude evidence due to a lost police interview, offering alternative remedies.

An application to admit discreditable conduct evidence against one accused was dismissed, while the Crown was permitted to call a detective multiple times with prior notice.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting during a struggle in a hotel room.

The sentencing judge considered competing theories regarding who brought the firearm and whether the killing occurred during a robbery, self‑defence, or provocation.

The court found it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender brought the gun to commit a robbery, concluding instead that the deceased likely brought the firearm and that the offender gained control of it during an ambush and struggle.

While the killing was unlawful, the offender lacked the state of mind for murder.

Balancing denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, the offender’s youth and background, and aggravating factors including a prior record and probation status, the court imposed an eight‑year penitentiary sentence with credit for pre‑trial custody.