Woollcombe

The two accused were jointly charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Trinidad and Tobago with over 4.9 kilograms of cocaine concealed in their luggage.

Both accused testified that they believed they were smuggling money, jewellery, or documents for a friend, and had been repeatedly assured that no drugs were involved.

The court found that while the accused's evidence was troubling and not entirely believable, it raised a reasonable doubt as to their actual knowledge.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness, as the accused had made some inquiries that lowered their suspicions, and the court was not convinced they deliberately refrained from further inquiries to remain ignorant.

Both accused were acquitted.

The self-represented plaintiff, a tenant of the defendant, brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendant's property to prevent its impending sale.

The plaintiff claimed an entitlement to a portion of the sale proceeds based on an alleged agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages did not constitute a proprietary interest in the land, which is a prerequisite for a CPL.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $17,606.64 due to the plaintiff's strategic attempt to thwart the sale.

The plaintiffs were involved in two motor vehicle accidents, one in Georgia and one in Ontario.

They commenced a single action in Ontario against all defendants.

The defendants involved in the Georgia accident, who resided in the United States, brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action against them for lack of jurisdiction.

The court found that none of the presumptive connecting factors from Van Breda applied to the Georgia defendants.

The court declined to recognize a new connecting factor based solely on the presence of an Ontario co-defendant for a separate accident.

The action against the Georgia defendants was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for an 'over 80' offence.

The trial judge had excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding two breaches of s. 10(b) because the police did not allow the respondent to call a police officer friend to get a lawyer's name, and because the police told him he could call his own lawyer, duty counsel, or no lawyer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the trial judge erred in law.

The police had no obligation to facilitate a call to a third party when the detainee did not explain the reason, and the information provided about the right to counsel was not misleading.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

During a trial for second degree murder, the Crown brought a motion to admit a bloodstain pattern analysis expert report as an exhibit to go to the jury.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing it would be prejudicial and redundant.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect, concluding that the report should not be filed as an exhibit because it only captured the expert's examination-in-chief, contained unaddressed photographs, and risked over-emphasizing the expert's opinion.

However, the court permitted the glossary from the report to be admitted.

The Crown brought a motion to determine the admissibility of crime scene and autopsy photographs in a second degree murder trial.

The defence objected to several photographs on the basis of relevance, redundancy, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the test of whether the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court admitted most of the photographs, finding them probative of the deceased's position, the extent of her injuries, and the amount of blood, but required the Crown to edit certain photographs to protect the deceased's dignity and minimize prejudice.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to adduce hearsay statements made by the deceased to a co-worker shortly before her death.

The deceased allegedly stated her intention to end her relationship with the accused.

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth under both the 'present intentions/state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach to hearsay, finding them relevant to motive and self-defence, and sufficiently reliable.

The plaintiff brought a motion for the penalty phase of a civil contempt proceeding against the individual defendant and a third party (his spouse) for failing to comply with orders to produce documents and attend examinations in aid of execution.

The respondents sought an adjournment pending a motion to set aside the underlying default judgment, arguing the individual defendant lacked capacity due to a brain injury.

The court refused the adjournment.

Recognizing the individual defendant's severe brain injury and lack of capacity, the court declined to impose a penalty on him.

However, the court found the third party's non-compliance was wilful and motivated by personal financial gain.

The court sentenced the third party to 12 days in jail, to be served intermittently, followed by probation and a further 30 days to purge her contempt.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the appointment of a Therapeutic Reunification Therapist for his 13-year-old daughter, whom he had not seen for four months.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing that therapy should wait until an ongoing section 30 assessment was completed.

The court granted the motion, finding that immediate intervention was necessary to prevent long-lasting damage to the father-daughter relationship and that the therapist's involvement would assist the assessor.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault against his former domestic partner.

The court found as fact that the offender engaged in non-consensual digital penetration, forced fellatio, and attempted intercourse.

The offender, a permanent resident and pastor, faced deportation without a right of appeal if sentenced to more than six months.

The court held that while immigration consequences are relevant, they cannot dominate the sentencing process.

The court sentenced the offender to 20 months' incarceration, finding a reformatory sentence appropriate given the gravity of the offence and the offender's lack of criminal record.

The applicants challenged the validity of a codicil and an amendment to a cohabitation agreement executed by their late father, arguing he lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence.

The court found that despite a diagnosis of mild dementia, the deceased had testamentary capacity and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the documents were not suspicious.

The codicil and amendment were declared valid.

However, the court found that the deceased's Life Income Fund (LIF) passed to his estate, not to the respondent spouse, based on the clear intentions expressed in the original cohabitation agreement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's mother did not adopt portions of her police statement regarding the complainant's sexual knowledge, in using an absence of evidence to corroborate the complainant, and in failing to analyze inconsistencies cumulatively.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or credibility assessment.

The offender was found guilty of two counts of possession of child pornography and challenged the constitutionality of the six-month mandatory minimum sentence under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court determined that a fit sentence for the offender was ten months' imprisonment, making the mandatory minimum not grossly disproportionate for him.

The court also rejected the argument that the mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate for a reasonably foreseeable offender.

The offender was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment, less sixty days' credit for time spent on house arrest bail, followed by two years of probation.

The offender, a 19-year-old first offender, was convicted of robbery, being disguised with intent, and dangerous driving following a home invasion where he and three others forced their way into an apartment while masked and armed with knives.

He later fled police, driving dangerously.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the home invasion against the offender's youth, lack of record, and supportive family.

The court imposed a total sentence of 3 years in custody, prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.

The plaintiffs, who held a second mortgage on a partially completed retirement home, sued the first mortgagee for damages, alleging an improvident sale of the property under a power of sale.

The property was sold at auction for $2,500,000, leaving no proceeds for the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the actual cost to complete the project was significantly higher than estimated in the appraisal, meaning the property actually sold for more than its true market value.

Furthermore, the court held that the defendant took reasonable precautions to market the property and obtain fair market value.

The defendant estate moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay.

The action was commenced in 2008 regarding treatment provided in 2006.

The plaintiffs failed to answer undertakings for years and did not move the action forward.

The defendant doctor died in 2015.

The court found the delay of almost nine years to be inordinate and inexcusable, rejecting the plaintiffs' explanation that family stress prevented them from pursuing the litigation.

The court concluded that the defendant would suffer substantial prejudice due to the doctor's death, as discovery transcripts could not adequately replace his viva voce evidence on the key issues of informed consent and negligence.

The action was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing 11.95 kilograms of heroin into Canada.

He acted as a courier, concealing the drugs in his suitcases.

The Crown sought a 20-year sentence, while the defence argued for 12 years, emphasizing the low purity of the heroin and the offender's status as a first-time federal offender.

The court applied the Sidhu range for heroin importation, rejecting the argument that low purity alone justified a sentence at the bottom of the range.

The offender was sentenced to 14.5 years in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, a teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of a nine-year-old student in a school portable.

The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of the child complainant's evidence, noting several inconsistencies and a fabricated sighting of the accused after his arrest.

Applying the principles for assessing children's evidence, the court found the complainant's testimony unreliable and the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $243,400 obtained by the plaintiffs for unpaid loans.

The defendant claimed he was never served with the statement of claim and only learned of the action later.

The court found the defendant was personally served, failed to act promptly, and did not present an arguable defence.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

The solicitor brought a motion to stay the assessment of his accounts pending the trial judge's decision in the underlying matrimonial matter, to restrict the assessment to his final account, and for production of certain documents from the client.

The court granted a temporary stay of the assessment until the trial judge released the substantive decision, finding that the assessment officer needed to know the results achieved to properly assess the accounts.

However, the court refused to restrict the assessment to the final account, concluding that all 37 prior accounts were interim, not final.

The court also dismissed the solicitor's request for production of the client's communications with another lawyer and her tax returns, finding them privileged and irrelevant.