J. Bogle

The moving parties, including the Crown and two police officers, sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' actions for negligent investigation, intentional infliction of mental harm, and civil conspiracy.

The plaintiffs' claims arose from a police investigation into alleged sexual assaults by two minor plaintiffs, which resulted in criminal charges that were later stayed after the minors completed counselling.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the criminal proceedings were not terminated in favour of the plaintiffs, the police had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges, and there was no evidence supporting the other tort claims.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against the moving parties were dismissed.

The applicants, charged with multiple drug trafficking offences, brought an application under s 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 39 months.

The court applied the Morin framework, attributing much of the delay to inherent time requirements and defence actions, calculating institutional delay at just over 16 months.

Finding minimal prejudice to the applicants' liberty and fair trial rights, the court concluded the balance favoured society's interest in a trial on the merits and dismissed the stay application.

The accused was sentenced after being convicted at trial of multiple firearms offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a firearm without a licence, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of firearms contrary to a prohibition order while on parole.

The court emphasized the offender’s extensive criminal record spanning nearly two decades, prior firearms offences, and the fact that the offences were committed while on parole for armed robbery.

The court rejected enhanced credit for pre-trial custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, finding the offender had not demonstrated likely loss of early parole as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Summers.

Denunciation and specific deterrence were treated as paramount objectives for firearms offences.

A global sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment was imposed, less credit for 278 days of pre-trial custody, together with DNA, lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture orders.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and assaulting a police officer.

Police approached the accused in a hotel lobby after receiving a tip that he possessed a large quantity of drugs.

The accused dropped a shopping bag containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine, pushed an officer, and attempted to flee before being subdued with a taser.

At trial the accused denied knowledge of the drugs and denied pushing the officer, claiming he was unknowingly carrying the bag for acquaintances.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence as inherently improbable and inconsistent, accepted the police officers’ testimony, and inferred knowledge of the drugs from the circumstances and the accused’s conduct.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from his cellular phone following his arrest.

Police seized the phone from a relative in the parking lot of the police detachment shortly after the accused surrendered and conducted a cursory search of text messages without a warrant.

The court held that the seizure and search were lawful as searches incidental to arrest, given the temporal and geographic proximity to the arrest and reasonable grounds to believe the phone contained evidence of the offence.

The search was limited and focused on relevant messages.

In the alternative, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) following the Grant framework.

In a voir dire during a criminal prosecution for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought a ruling that the accused’s videotaped police statement was voluntary and admissible.

The defence argued the statement was improperly induced because police referenced the accused’s family being in trouble due to the intercepted drug package.

Applying the confessions rule and the contextual approach from leading Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court considered whether police conduct amounted to a threat or promise capable of overbearing the accused’s will.

The court found no quid pro quo or inducement linking the accused’s cooperation to leniency for himself or his family.

The videotaped statement was therefore found to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.