William Grantley Woodward

In supplemental reasons following an earlier decision, the court addressed the priority of payment and subrogation rights between OPCF 44R insurers and an umbrella policy (PULP) insurer, following the Court of Appeal's decision in Rodriguez-Vergara v. Lamoureux.

The court held that the at-fault drivers' automobile policy is primary, followed by the respective OPCF 44R endorsements, and finally the PULP.

The court also held that the OPCF 44R insurers have no right of subrogation against the umbrella insurer, and their subrogation rights against the at-fault drivers directly are limited to the amount by which their payment exceeds the combined automobile and excess policy limits.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident in South Carolina caused by an underinsured motorist.

The plaintiff settled his claim for $143,500, funded by TD Insurance, subject to a determination of liability between TD and Allstate Insurance.

TD brought a motion for summary judgment arguing Allstate was solely liable under its OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court found the plaintiff met the definition of an 'insured person' under the Allstate corporate policy because he was an employee provided with a regular use vehicle, and the 44R endorsement provided differently than the OAP-1 exclusions.

Consequently, the plaintiff was excluded from coverage under the TD policy.

Allstate was ordered to reimburse TD for the settlement amount plus costs.

Eight consolidated actions arising from a motor vehicle accident on November 30, 2021, in London, Ontario, in which the defendant driver failed to stop at a red light and struck members of the London 120th Brownies, killing one child and injuring several others.

The court determined whether the defendants' personal liability umbrella policy constituted a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act and the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court held that the umbrella policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy and therefore the defendants were inadequately insured motorists.

The plaintiffs were entitled to access their own OPCF 44R coverage, with the aggregate available insurance limits of $2.3 million to be divided pro rata among all eligible claimants.

The appellant sought to set aside a settlement agreement for statutory accident benefits reached in 2016, arguing he lacked the capacity to enter into the contract.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption of capacity.

On appeal and judicial review, the Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding no errors of law in the capacity analysis and concluding the decision was reasonable.

The court also rejected arguments that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by excluding a retrospective expert capacity report.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff husband to answer questions on discovery regarding the injuries sustained by his co-plaintiff wife in a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff had refused to answer, arguing they were 'witness questions' outside the scope of issues between him and the defendant.

The court allowed the motion, adopting the expansive approach to discovery that requires a party to answer any proper question relevant to any matter in issue in the action, not just issues between the examining party and the party being examined.

The defendant Bradley Gray moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss all claims and cross-claims against him arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs, Braden Moxam and Lisa Moxam, did not participate in the motion.

The co-defendants, John and Colleen Anderson, opposed the motion, having filed a cross-claim alleging Gray's negligence.

The court applied the enhanced powers under the Rules of Civil Procedure, as clarified by Hryniak v. Mauldin, to weigh evidence and evaluate credibility.

The court found that Gray, as the dominant driver, had acted reasonably and could not have avoided the collision caused by Anderson's failure to obey a stop sign.

Gray's motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing all claims and cross-claims against him.

This motion in a negligence action addressed the defendant's request for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend medical assessments, complete questionnaires, and sign consent forms, as well as to adjourn pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff had refused to comply, relying on prior case law.

The court vacated the pre-trial and trial dates due to non-compliance with Rule 53.03(2.2) regarding expert report schedules.

The court ordered the plaintiff to sign consent forms and complete questionnaires, finding that section 105(5) of the Courts of Justice Act mandates answering relevant questions and that the court has inherent jurisdiction to control the discovery process, distinguishing prior cases that suggested a complete code.

The motion for the assessments themselves was adjourned as premature.

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment order that found the respondents (an adult son, his wife, and their daughter) were covered under the homeowner's policy of the named insured (their mother/mother-in-law) as relatives "living in the same household." The named insured owned a house that served as her primary residence until she entered a nursing home, after which the respondents used it as a cottage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that "household" in insurance law refers to a type of community requiring intimacy, unity, and permanence, not merely physical residence.

The respondents maintained separate lives in the city and did not share a common life with the named insured meeting these requirements.

The respondents were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident in Minnesota caused by a state-owned truck operated by a state employee.

Due to Minnesota's statutory damage cap under the Tort Claims Act, they recovered only US$500,000 (inclusive of legal fees), despite damages exceeding that amount.

They sought the shortfall from their Canadian insurer under an underinsured motorist endorsement (OPCF 44R).

The insurer refused, arguing Minnesota was not "inadequately insured" and that legal fees were not recoverable.

The motion judge found in favor of the respondents on both issues.

On appeal, the court held that Minnesota was an inadequately insured motorist despite being self-insured and having statutory immunity, but reversed the finding that legal fees could be claimed as special damages.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in Minnesota and settled their claims there for $600,000.

They subsequently sued their Ontario insurer under the OPCF-44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement for under-insurance.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their pleadings and to determine questions of law under Rule 21 regarding whether the Minnesota defendants were underinsured and whether legal fees from the Minnesota action could be claimed as special damages.

The court held that the Minnesota defendants were underinsured with respect to one plaintiff whose settlement reached the foreign statutory limit, but not for the other plaintiff who settled below the limit.

The court further held that the legal fees incurred in the foreign action could be claimed as special damages by the eligible plaintiff.

In an addendum to a trial judgment, the court corrected a calculation error in the damages award based on the jury's decision.

With the agreement of counsel, the court recalculated the award by applying a 20 percent reduction for contributory negligence to the pecuniary damages, and applying the statutory deductible followed by the contributory negligence reduction to the non-pecuniary damages.

The total judgment was amended to $136,483.20.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was awarded $160,480 after a 20% deduction for contributory negligence, the court determined the costs of the action.

One of the plaintiffs abandoned her claim on the eve of trial.

The court declined to award costs directly against the abandoning plaintiff but reduced the successful plaintiff's costs to reflect the shared representation.

The successful plaintiff was awarded $72,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, with a deduction for an insurance premium disbursement.

Two appeals were heard together regarding whether the equitable doctrine of laches can defeat a first party insurer's loss-transfer claim under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

In both cases, the first party insurers delayed several years before requesting indemnification from the second party insurers.

The Court of Appeal held that the defence of laches cannot be invoked against a statutory loss-transfer claim, as it is a claim for legal relief subject to the Limitations Act, 2002, which no longer contains a laches-saving provision.

Furthermore, even if laches were available, the second party insurers failed to demonstrate acquiescence or actual prejudice.

Lombard's appeal was dismissed and TD's appeal was allowed.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident caused by the defendant’s negligence, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial partial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued that settlement offers should shift costs after a certain date under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the defendant’s offers did not comply with the formal requirements of Rule 49.10 and declined to give them the requested cost consequences.

Applying the general rule that costs follow the event and considering the factors in Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs for the action.

The appellants appealed a jury's damages assessment arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The jury awarded $40,000 in general damages (reduced to $10,000 after a statutory deduction) and zero dollars for other claims, despite the appellants claiming over $50,000.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction, as section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act directs appeals to the Divisional Court when the amount ordered to be paid, or the amount assessed for a dismissed claim, is under $50,000.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision where liability was admitted and damages remained in issue, the plaintiff moved to exclude evidence from experts who prepared accident benefits reports for the plaintiff’s insurer.

The plaintiff argued the reports were irrelevant, non-compliant with Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudicial to trial fairness, and duplicative.

The court held that although the experts had not signed the Form 53 acknowledgement required under Rule 53.03(2.1), the rule applied even to experts retained by non-parties and the non‑compliance could be cured by granting leave subject to obtaining the acknowledgement.

The court found portions of the reports remained relevant to the plaintiff’s cognitive, emotional, and physical condition at an intermediate stage following the accident, though opinions on employability were excluded as no longer relevant.

The motion to exclude the expert evidence was dismissed, subject to conditions.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences where the plaintiffs obtained a judgment significantly less favourable than the defendant’s Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiffs recovered limited damages after the statutory deductible reduced the award.

The court considered whether Rule 76 simplified procedure should have been used and concluded it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to proceed under the ordinary procedure due to the complexity of the case and expert evidence.

Applying Rule 49.10(2), the plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the defendant’s offer, and the defendant was awarded partial indemnity costs thereafter.

Substantial indemnity costs were refused because there was no reprehensible conduct.

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident and held an insurance policy with a $1 million family protection coverage limit (OPCF 44R).

The tortfeasor also had a $1 million insurance limit.

Because the tortfeasor's limit might be apportioned among four injured parties, the appellants sought to access their underinsurance coverage to make up any shortfall.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the claim against the insurer, confirming that underinsurance coverage is not triggered when the tortfeasor's policy limit equals the family protection coverage limit, regardless of the number of claimants.

The appellant insurer appealed a Rule 21 motion decision which held that an exclusion clause in an insurance policy did not apply to the increased costs of repairing fire damage necessitated by building code and by-law compliance.

The appellant argued the question was hypothetical, contingent on disputed facts, and raised a novel point of law requiring a full record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to make the disposition on the record before him and the point of law was not novel.

The appellant was involved in a minor rear-end collision and subsequently claimed disabling chronic pain.

At trial, the jury initially awarded zero for general damages, explaining they believed an insurance settlement had already compensated the appellant.

The trial judge instructed them to reconsider only general damages, which they reassessed at $50,000.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge should have instructed the jury to reconsider all heads of damage and that the overall assessment was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable given the conflicting evidence on the cause and extent of the injuries.