Wesley Douglas Beatty

The accused, a personal support worker, was charged with two counts of sexual assault and one count of forcible confinement against two co-workers.

The allegations involved unwanted touching, kissing, and confinement in a patient's room and a shower room.

The accused denied the non-consensual nature of the interactions, claiming one relationship was consensual and denying the specific allegations of the other complainant.

The court applied the W.(D). framework and found that the accused's evidence, along with inconsistencies in the complainants' testimonies, raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also found the alleged confinement was not for a significant period of time.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexually touching a child on three or four occasions when she was approximately 11 years old.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the complainant's breasts, buttocks, and vagina under her clothing while she was intoxicated at a firepit and subsequently in the basement and bedroom of the family home.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge found both witnesses credible but identified significant implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, including that she would not be wearing underwear at age 11 and that each alleged incident would follow an identical pattern.

Finding these implausibilities created a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code for allegedly touching a child under the age of 14 for a sexual purpose during a family gathering at a cottage on Wasauksing First Nation territory in July 2008.

The complainant, now an adult, testified that the accused entered the bedroom where she was sleeping and sexually assaulted her.

The defence presented evidence suggesting the accused was at a campfire with other family members and did not have the opportunity to commit the alleged offence.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence could not be wholly rejected, the Crown failed to meet the high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt when considering the totality of the evidence, including significant inconsistencies between witnesses and credibility concerns.

The accused was acquitted.

Mitchel Yearley brought an application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on one count of aggravated assault, arguing that the preliminary hearing judge exceeded jurisdiction due to insufficient evidence on identity and denied natural justice by not allowing submissions on committal.

The court found that the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to provide sufficient reasons for committal and that the in-dock identification alone was insufficient evidence for committal.

The application was granted, and the committal order was quashed.

The applicant, a 19-year-old Black man, sought a bail review after being detained on firearms and drug charges arising from a traffic stop.

The reviewing judge found the justice of the peace erred in law by failing to consider s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code regarding vulnerable populations when assessing the applicant's initial provision of a false name, and by relying on inappropriate racial stereotypes.

The judge also found the justice of the peace made unsupported inferences about the applicant's involvement in a criminal enterprise.

Finding a material change in circumstances due to a new surety plan and the death of the applicant's grandmother from COVID-19, the judge conducted an independent review and granted release on strict house arrest conditions.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to supply a breath sample contrary to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle stop on June 3, 2016.

The Crown alleged the accused willfully failed to provide a suitable breath sample after more than 20 attempts over three breath sequences.

The defence raised three issues: whether the Crown proved willful failure beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, and the consequences of two breath demands.

The court found the Crown proved each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused.

Following a jury trial, the accused was found guilty of criminal negligence causing death and two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily injury after his vehicle drifted into oncoming traffic.

He also pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine.

The jury acquitted him of impaired driving charges.

The sentencing judge applied the Ferguson principles to determine the facts consistent with the jury's verdict, rejecting the defence theory of syncope and finding the accused's decision to drive with methamphetamine in his system to be an aggravating factor.

The accused was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, a $650 fine, and a 3-year driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of theft under $5,000 and his 90-day intermittent sentence.

The charges arose from missing funds at ATMs the appellant maintained.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his failure to deny the theft and his reimbursement of the missing funds.

The Superior Court of Justice found no overriding and palpable error in the trial judge's credibility findings or application of the W.(D.) framework.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision finding that the accused's Charter rights were violated due to an unlawful traffic stop and detention.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors.

The evidence showed the police merely followed the accused to his destination without stopping him, and the accused was not detained until the police smelled alcohol and formed grounds for a roadside screening demand.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and two counts of breach of undertaking.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to properly apply the objective test for criminal harassment, as there was no evidence of prior misconduct to support the reasonableness of the complainant's fear.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in finding the appellant breached his undertaking by attending the hallway landing outside the complainant's apartment, as the undertaking strictly prohibited attendance at the apartment itself.

A new trial was ordered for these charges.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence for a separate breach of undertaking conviction, imposing a suspended sentence and 12 months' probation.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision in Magnetawan, Ontario on April 25, 2016.

The Crown's evidence established the collision, the accused's impairment, and breath test results of 137 mg and 146 mg respectively.

However, the Crown conceded that the first breath sample was taken outside the two-hour statutory window required by the Criminal Code.

Without expert toxicology evidence to perform retrograde extrapolation, the court found the Crown had not proven all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The court sentenced the offender after convictions on 36 counts of fraud and theft committed over approximately 10 years through a small business in a rural community.

The offences involved substantial financial loss, repeated breaches of trust, and exploitation of personal and commercial relationships with friends, family members, and customers.

Applying denunciation and general deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives for major fraud, the court found few mitigating factors, noted the offender's lack of remorse and continued denial, and rejected rehabilitation as a significant consideration.

A sentence of four years' imprisonment concurrent on all counts was imposed, together with a free-standing restitution order.

The accused was charged with attempting to obstruct justice by assisting in a scheme to fabricate a confession to a large marijuana grow operation discovered by police.

A witness testified that he had been promised payment to falsely confess to operating the grow operation and that the accused drove him to the property to familiarize him with the location before the confession.

The accused denied involvement and challenged the credibility of the witness.

The court assessed credibility, finding the witness’s testimony internally consistent and corroborated by phone records, photographs, and other evidence.

The court rejected the defence evidence and concluded the Crown had proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought review of a detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after bail was denied on secondary grounds.

He argued the justice of the peace misapplied the Gladue principles and presented a new release plan involving multiple sureties and structured cultural and community activities.

The reviewing judge found the justice of the peace had sufficient evidence regarding the applicant’s Indigenous background and properly considered Gladue factors when assessing detention.

The court further concluded the proposed bail plan lacked meaningful community support and that the proposed sureties minimized or denied the applicant’s extensive violent criminal history.

The application was therefore dismissed and the detention order maintained.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code after being convicted of sexual interference involving a minor family member and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment.

The court considered whether the appeal was not frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The applicant raised several grounds of appeal, including an arguable issue regarding whether sexual interference is an included offence under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the third ground raised a viable issue on appeal and that the applicant had previously complied with bail conditions and posed no significant public interest risk.

Judicial interim release pending appeal was therefore granted with conditions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified under s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code after riding an electric power‑assisted bicycle while subject to a court‑ordered driving prohibition.

The court considered whether an e‑bike constitutes a “motor vehicle” within the Criminal Code definition and whether the accused could rely on officially induced error or lack of mens rea based on police encounters, advice from a salesperson, and his own research.

The court held that an e‑bike propelled by battery power is a vehicle propelled by means other than muscular power and therefore qualifies as a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code.

The evidence did not establish that police conduct induced the accused to believe his conduct was lawful, nor that he lacked the requisite intent.

The accused was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.

The Crown brought a summary conviction appeal from a trial decision finding a breach of the accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter and excluding breath sample evidence.

The trial judge had concluded that police failed to take reasonable steps to facilitate contact with the accused’s preferred lawyer before administering breath tests.

The appellate judge found that the officer had taken reasonable steps, including attempting to contact the lawyer and arranging for duty counsel while awaiting a callback.

The accused agreed to speak with whichever lawyer returned the call first and did not diligently pursue counsel of choice.

The appeal court concluded there was no s. 10(b) breach and further held that, even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) applying the framework in Grant.

The accused, an Aboriginal offender, pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm after a single-vehicle collision that injured a passenger.

The Crown sought 75 days' incarceration, while the defence sought a six-month conditional sentence.

Applying the Gladue principles and considering the accused's lack of a prior record, steady employment, remorse, and the victim's support, the court imposed a six-month conditional sentence with house arrest and a two-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a 16-year-old complainant on March 2-3, 2012.

The trial examined whether the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with the complainant who was severely intoxicated.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, her friend, and a witness who observed the accused touching the complainant inappropriately while she was unconscious on the kitchen floor.

The court found that the accused engaged in sexual contact with the complainant both in the kitchen and later in his bedroom, when she was incapable of consenting due to extreme intoxication.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.