W. Danial Newton

The defendants, Cheadles LLP, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff, Walter Zanewycz, had sued his former lawyers for breach of contract, negligence, breach of trust, misrepresentation, and fraud, stemming from a solicitor-client relationship that ended in 2009.

The plaintiff alleged recent discovery of forgery.

The court found that the claims were statute-barred, that the plaintiff's assertions of recent discovery were contradictory to prior filings, and that the litigation was vexatious and an abuse of process, characterized by repeated attempts to re-litigate previously determined issues and persistent unsuccessful appeals.

The statement of claim was struck, and the defendants were awarded costs.

The Crown brought an application to admit a video-recorded statement of a deceased complainant into evidence at a trial for fraud and uttering forged documents.

The complainant, an elderly person who required personal support workers, alleged that the accused made unauthorized bank withdrawals.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that while the necessity requirement was met due to the complainant's death, threshold reliability was not established.

The court noted concerns with the complainant's memory, the leading nature of the interview questions, and a prior inconsistent complaint to police involving another worker.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, an Indigenous man with a significant criminal record including a prior manslaughter conviction, pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the beating death of the victim.

The court considered the brutal nature of the assault, the use of weapons, and the accused's callous disregard for the victim's life as aggravating factors.

Applying Gladue principles, the court acknowledged the accused's traumatic background but emphasized the need for denunciation, deterrence, and public protection.

The accused was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment, reduced to approximately 12 years after credit for pre-sentence custody.

J.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to mental disorder treatment.

Despite J.W.'s non-attendance and lack of engagement in the appeal process, the Superior Court of Justice proceeded with the appeal, admitting fresh evidence regarding J.W.'s hospital attendances and the respondent's efforts to contact her.

Applying appellate standards of review, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's factual findings and denied the appeal, upholding the incapacity finding.

J.G. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to mental disorder treatment.

Despite J.G.'s non-attendance and failure to advance the appeal, the Superior Court of Justice proceeded, admitting fresh evidence regarding J.G.'s post-discharge condition and the respondent's efforts to contact him.

Applying appellate standards of review, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's factual findings regarding J.G.'s mania and grandiosity preventing him from appreciating his condition or treatment consequences.

The appeal was denied.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review and revealed reliance on impermissible stereotypical thinking about how victims of domestic abuse behave.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge's sparse reasons frustrated meaningful appellate review and that the comment regarding the complainant's failure to report the "gravamen of the offence" to officers could reflect an impermissible stereotypical inference.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal quashed, and a new trial ordered.

W.S., a 20-year-old with significant mental health issues, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found her incapable of managing property.

The Board's finding was based on her inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of acquiring alcohol, leading to self-harm.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board committed an error of law by characterizing the decision to acquire alcohol as a decision in property management without other evidence of property management issues, and that the physician's assertion of W.S. "repeatedly running out of money" was uncorroborated.

The court emphasized that capacity to manage property must relate to financial matters, not solely to control behavior unrelated to property.

The Board's finding of incapacity was set aside.

The plaintiff, Walter Zanewycz, brought a motion for recusal of Justice Newton, arguing a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the judge's prior involvement in related proceedings and alleged knowledge of certain facts.

The court reviewed the history of litigation between Zanewycz and his former lawyers, Cheadles LLP and William G. Shanks, which included account assessments, creditor relief actions, and applications.

Applying the test for reasonable apprehension of bias from Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, the court found no realistic basis for the claim, concluding that an informed person would not perceive bias.

The motion for recusal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and kidnapping, applied for judicial interim release.

The accused surrendered to police and admitted to driving the vehicle involved but denied knowledge of the murder.

The court found that the primary and secondary grounds for detention were not met due to the accused's lack of a criminal record and the strength of the proposed sureties.

On the tertiary ground, the court held that a properly informed reasonable person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were released on a strict plan.

Bail was granted with stringent conditions, including house arrest, GPS ankle monitoring, and significant financial pledges from three sureties.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting judgment to the respondent bank for a defaulted vehicle loan and dismissing his defendant's claim.

The appellant argued he thought he was only co-signing for a friend and challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction over a contract signed in Saskatchewan.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that Ontario had jurisdiction over the appellant, that there was valid consideration, and that no misrepresentations were made by the bank or dealership.

However, the court remitted the matter back to the trial judge solely to provide reasons for dismissing the defendant's claim against the bank.

The applicant, an OSPCA officer, sought to quash an information laid by the respondent for a peace bond under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had sought the peace bond after the applicant and other officers executed a warrant, seized animals, and issued compliance orders, alleging the applicant threatened him with financial ruin.

The Superior Court found the Justice of the Peace committed a jurisdictional error by issuing process, as the respondent's fears arose from the lawful consequences of unlawful behaviour, not a reasonable fear of personal injury or property damage.

The application was granted, the information was quashed, and the Ontario Court of Justice was prohibited from adjudicating further proceedings.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical sexual offence charges arising from allegations made decades after the alleged events, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and general principles governing credibility, reliability, delayed disclosure, and the avoidance of sexual assault myths, the court found significant concerns with the reliability of the complainants' memories and with aspects of their credibility.

The court accepted the accused's evidence where it conflicted with the complainants' evidence and, in any event, held that the record left a reasonable doubt.

All counts on the indictment were dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown alleged a strong circumstantial case involving a fatal stabbing related to the drug trade.

The court found that the accused met his onus under the primary and secondary grounds due to his lack of a criminal record and the strength of the proposed sureties.

On the tertiary ground, the court balanced the gravity of the offence against the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the strict release plan, concluding that a reasonable person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were released.

The application was granted, and the accused was released on strict conditions, including house arrest and significant financial pledges from his sureties.

The accused, charged with fraud and using forged documents, applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Crown's conduct in adjourning a preliminary inquiry, the subsequent death of the complainant, and the Crown's decision to prefer a direct indictment constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's decisions were reasonable in the circumstances, particularly given the complainant's death and the need to address delay issues, and did not compromise trial fairness.

The accused was charged with break and enter, sexual assault, and breach of probation following a night of heavy drinking and drug use with the complainant and others.

The complainant alleged she woke up partially undressed and believed the accused had assaulted her while she was passed out, though she admitted to severe memory loss.

The accused testified that they had consensual sexual intercourse.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to extreme intoxication, memory loss, and inconsistencies in her statements about being choked.

Furthermore, DNA from an unknown male was found on the complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

This motion addressed multiple issues in a high-conflict separation, including the determination of children of the marriage, temporary custody and parenting schedule, temporary child support and section 7 expenses, sale of the matrimonial home, and continuation of a restraining order.

The court found the father stood in the position of parent for the non-biological children, granted the mother temporary decision-making authority, and ordered a week-on/week-off parenting schedule.

Child support was set based on equivalent incomes, and the matrimonial home was ordered for sale.

The existing restraining order against the father was continued, with communication restricted to My Family Wizard for parenting matters.

The father and mother brought motions regarding temporary parenting arrangements for their two children.

Both parents consented to joint custody and agreed on each other's parenting ability.

The father sought an order for a s. 30 assessment under the Children's Law Reform Act and counselling for one child.

The mother opposed the assessment and increased access, arguing the current 10-4 schedule was the status quo.

The court found the 10-4 schedule was unilaterally imposed and not the true status quo.

The court ordered temporary joint custody with equal parenting time on a "week on/week off" schedule and a s. 30 assessment, but declined to order counselling given ongoing play therapy.

The accused, L.E., facing charges of historic sexual assault, applied under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code for a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning alleged prior sexual activity of one of the complainants, L.S., with other children.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to the reliability of the complainant's memories, not to support the "twin myths." The Crown conceded the evidence did not trigger the "twin myths" but argued it was inadmissible under the "collateral fact rule." The court granted the s. 278.93 application, finding that the formal requirements were met and the evidence was capable of being admissible under s. 276(2), and ordered a s. 278.94 hearing to address relevance, probative value, and the collateral fact rule.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that shares transferred from her mother to her sister were not a gift and formed part of the mother's estate, bringing a motion for summary judgment based on presumptions of resulting trust and undue influence.

The court found the action was not statute-barred and that the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of the mother's intent to gift.

However, the presumption of undue influence was found to apply due to the confidential relationship and lack of informed consent regarding the shares' true value, necessitating a mini-trial on this issue.

This decision addresses an application under sections 276 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The accused sought to adduce evidence of prior consensual penetrative intercourse with the complainant to explain the presence of his DNA, and evidence of other male DNA found on the complainant to suggest an alternative perpetrator.

The court ruled that both types of evidence were admissible, with limitations, as they were relevant to issues at trial and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, after considering the factors in subsection 276(3).