Thomas R. Lederer

The plaintiff brought a civil action seeking her share of proceeds from the sale of a house purchased during a relationship with the defendant.

Although title to the property was registered in the name of a third party who agreed to hold it for them due to financing constraints, the evidence established that the parties jointly funded the purchase and mortgage payments.

The court found that the parties operated in a shared economic partnership and each held a 50% beneficial interest in the property.

The defendant received the sale proceeds but failed to prove deductions he claimed for renovation costs, credit card debts, and alleged expenditures on a property in Ghana.

Judgment was granted for half of the proven net proceeds.

A contractor sued a homeowner for unpaid renovation invoices totalling approximately $40,996.60 after deducting payments already received.

The homeowner counterclaimed alleging defective workmanship and sought the cost of demolishing and redoing the work.

The court found that the renovation contract lacked clarity regarding the scope of work, that the parties ignored key contractual procedures such as written change orders, and that the invoices did not reliably establish the work performed.

Evidence showed deficiencies in tile installation, but the homeowner failed to prove the cost of remediation with admissible or reliable evidence.

Because neither party established their claims on the balance of probabilities, both the action and the counterclaim were dismissed.

In a coverage dispute arising from a judgment against a trust company, the defendant insurers sought to introduce additional evidence shortly before the hearing of a summary judgment motion after changing counsel.

The court considered whether the evidentiary record could be reopened to permit new affidavits, discovery answers, and documentary material.

The court held that a late change of counsel does not entitle a party to revise litigation strategy or add evidence contrary to established timetables and prior procedural orders.

Absent a satisfactory explanation for failing to include the evidence earlier, leave should not be granted.

The court permitted only a publicly available judicial endorsement already agreed to by the parties and refused all other proposed additions to the record.

Following the dismissal of a motion to compel compliance with minutes of settlement in a trust accounting proceeding, the court considered costs.

The settlement had required the withdrawal of a professional misconduct complaint against a trustee who was also a lawyer.

The court held that requiring the withdrawal of a regulatory complaint as a condition of civil settlement was contrary to public policy.

Costs were therefore awarded to the successful responding party on a substantial indemnity basis, payable personally by the trustee who insisted on enforcing the improper settlement term.

Following dismissal of a civil action after a three‑day trial, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff conceded entitlement to costs but argued that the amount claimed—approximately two‑thirds of the defendant’s actual legal fees—was excessive and proposed a lower award based on a percentage of actual costs.

The court held that costs awards are discretionary and not determined by applying a strict formula.

After reviewing the hours spent, allocation between counsel and clerks, and the rates charged, the court found the claimed amounts reasonable despite the issues being relatively straightforward.

The court awarded the full amount of costs requested by the defendant.

Following a successful motion striking the statement of claim against a corporate director, the individual defendant sought costs.

The underlying motion held that directing corporate acts leading to breach of contract is insufficient to establish personal liability unless the director acted without bona fides and outside authority.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the result was mixed because leave to amend had been granted.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale as the moving parties were the successful parties and the amount sought was reasonable.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a slip-and-fall claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that the injury initially appeared de minimus and was not discovered until later when an x-ray revealed a fracture.

The court held that the plaintiff experienced pain and swelling immediately after the incident and sought medical treatment within days, which was sufficient to trigger discoverability.

Applying the principles governing summary judgment and the "full appreciation test", the court found the issue suitable for determination on the motion record.

The alleged injury was not trivial and the limitation period began when the accident occurred.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s insurance claim following an alleged vehicle theft.

The insurer argued that the plaintiff had made false statements regarding the purchase price and odometer reading of the vehicle, relying on s. 233(1) of the Insurance Act to assert that the claim was forfeited due to fraud and misrepresentation.

The court held that the motion was an inappropriate use of summary judgment in a simplified procedure action under Rule 76 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The case involved credibility issues and hearsay evidence that required assessment through viva voce evidence and cross-examination.

The court determined that the matter should proceed to a summary trial to properly evaluate the evidence and dismissed the motion.

The applicant, an orthodontist, was defrauded of $450,000 by his lawyer under the guise of short-term bridge financing.

The lawyer used the funds to pay off other clients, the respondents, whose trust funds he had also misappropriated.

The applicant brought an action against the respondents seeking the return of the funds, arguing they received the money knowing or being wilfully blind to the fraud.

The court found that the respondents and their lawyer had no duty to inquire about the source of the funds when they received them, as they believed it was a bona fide repayment of a loan.

The action was dismissed.

Following a successful defence motion for summary judgment dismissing a claim for delay, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $42,000.

The court accepted that elevated costs were justified due to the plaintiff’s nearly twenty‑year failure to advance the litigation.

However, the court found the defendants’ bill of costs inadequately detailed and the claimed amount excessive.

Balancing the plaintiff’s unexplained delay against the insufficient cost justification, the court fixed a reduced substantial indemnity award.

Unit owners and the condominium corporation brought an application seeking declarations confirming the validity of a turnover meeting and compelling the declarant to comply with statutory obligations under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The applicants alleged the declarant failed to hold required owner meetings, transfer control of the board, maintain building operations, and deliver mandatory records and financial information.

The court found the declarant had not complied with statutory duties and had failed to provide evidence supporting claims that it held proxies capable of altering the turnover meeting outcome.

The court confirmed the validity of the September 7, 2011 turnover meeting, recognized the elected board, and ordered the declarant to deliver statutory documents, records, and funds and to provide a full accounting of monies collected for condominium operations.

The successful appellants sought costs following summary judgment motions in land transfer tax appeals.

They requested over $260,000 and argued that costs should also include work performed for additional related appeals and disputes that had been held in abeyance, as well as elevated costs based on a purported Rule 49 settlement offer.

The court declined to award costs for the additional appeals and related disputes because they were not before the court and there was no evidentiary basis to assess the work performed.

The court also held that the settlement proposal was not a valid Rule 49 offer because it addressed matters beyond the proceedings before the court and therefore did not justify elevated costs.

The parties were directed to attempt to agree on the remaining costs or provide further submissions limited to the four appeals heard.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction compelling a hotel operator to continue managing and branding a hotel under a particular brand pending determination of a permanent injunction application.

They argued the lease required continued operation of the hotel using the brand and associated operational infrastructure despite expiry of the hotel management agreement.

The court applied the RJR‑MacDonald test and held that the lease provisions did not clearly impose an obligation requiring the operator to continue providing the full operational benefits of the brand.

The alleged harm, primarily reduced participation rent and potential reputational impacts, was found to be quantifiable and compensable in damages.

The balance of convenience favoured the operator, which would otherwise be compelled to operate a business relationship it no longer wished to maintain.

The appellants appealed two decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission regarding their involvement in a collapsed investment structure.

The first appeal argued that televised comments by the Commission's Chair created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed this appeal, finding that the Chair was acting within his statutory authority and that the Commission's structure adequately separated investigative and adjudicative functions.

The second appeal challenged the Commission's findings on the merits, alleging breaches of procedural fairness, misapplication of rules, and errors in finding the appellants were the directing minds who misled staff.

The court dismissed the second appeal, finding the procedures fair and the factual conclusions reasonable.

The appellant, a city councillor, appealed a declaration that he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by failing to disclose a pecuniary interest in a municipal tax sale.

The appellant had expressed interest in bidding on a property and arranged to view it before formally submitting a bid through his corporation.

He did not declare his interest at council meetings where the property's sale was discussed prior to his bid submission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's pecuniary interest crystallized when he first became interested in purchasing the property, not when he submitted the bid.

The court found the saving provision for inadvertence or error in judgment did not apply and upheld the four-year disqualification from city council.

The College of Nurses of Ontario sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which refused to dismiss a human rights complaint filed by a nurse.

The nurse alleged discrimination based on disability after the College's Registration Committee imposed conditions on her certificates of registration.

The Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) had previously reviewed and upheld the conditions, finding they reasonably accommodated her disability while protecting the public.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code by failing to defer to HPARB's specialized public protection mandate and by improperly assessing the adequacy of HPARB's reasons rather than whether the substance of the complaint was appropriately dealt with.

The applicant sought judicial review of a permit issued by the Minister of Natural Resources under the Endangered Species Act, which allowed for the disturbance of species at risk during the construction of a new bridge and parkway.

The applicant argued the Minister failed to apply the precautionary principle, improperly consulted experts, ignored relevant information, and was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision was a matter of public policy entitled to broad deference, the statutory requirements for consultation and opinion-forming were met, and there was no reasonable apprehension of bias given the Minister's political and legislative functions.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding the respondent to be a person with a disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal committed a reversible error by relying on social and external factors—such as the respondent's lack of education, her husband's unemployment, and her childcare responsibilities—rather than her medical impairments to conclude she was substantially restricted in her ability to function in a workplace.

The Court also found the Tribunal's reasons to be inadequate.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.

The applicant City sought judicial review of an arbitration award regarding the promotion rights of a firefighter.

The arbitrator had ruled that the firefighter was not qualified for promotion to Lieutenant because he did not have fifteen years of continuous service in the Fire Fighting Division, interpreting 'service' as synonymous with 'seniority'.

The Divisional Court quashed the award, finding the arbitrator's interpretation unreasonable.

The Court held that the collective agreement clearly distinguished between 'service' and 'seniority', and the arbitrator improperly inserted the word 'continuous' into the provision, contrary to the parties' expressed intent.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment that dismissed her claim and awarded the respondent brokerage $10,000 for a deficit in her margin account.

The appellant argued the brokerage improperly liquidated her account before the deadline provided in a margin call e-mail.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the account agreement expressly permitted the brokerage to liquidate the account without notice to protect its financial position, and this contractual right prevailed over the e-mail.