Susan M. Ursel

The applicant local unions sought judicial review of decisions by the Ontario Labour Relations Board finding that the international union had just cause to merge them with another local.

The applicants challenged the Board's use of a consultation process rather than a full hearing, and its refusal to order production of a specific report.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's choice of process was within reasonable expectations given its expertise.

Although the Court criticized the Board's failure to order production of the report, it declined to quash the decision, finding the merger was supported by an independent expert's unqualified recommendation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a former teacher, filed a human rights application against her union and several of its representatives, alleging discrimination based on disability and reprisal.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that most of the allegations were filed outside the one-year limitation period without a good faith explanation for the delay.

The remaining timely allegations, which primarily concerned the union's withdrawal of a termination grievance and alleged manipulation of long-term disability benefits, were dismissed because the applicant failed to point to any evidence linking the union's actions to her disability or establishing an intention to reprise.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The individual respondents in a human rights application requested an order for further particulars, arguing that the applicant's allegations were framed in general terms.

The applicant opposed the request, believing that the Tribunal's acceptance of his application precluded such a request.

The Tribunal granted the request, noting that the respondents are entitled to know precisely what is alleged against them to prepare their case, and ordered the applicant to provide the requested particulars.

Two related class proceedings alleged that employees transferred from municipal home‑care providers to Community Care Access Centres suffered pension losses when their OMERS or VON pensions were replaced with HOOPP after a government restructuring of home‑care services.

The plaintiffs advanced claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contractual undertaking against the province.

Following mediation and negotiations, the parties reached a settlement providing $6.5 million for class members, along with amounts for class counsel fees and administration.

The court reviewed the settlement under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and considered the risks of establishing liability and damages, the complexity of actuarial loss calculations, and the absence of objections from class members.

The settlement and proposed class counsel fees were found to fall within a reasonable range and to be in the best interests of the class.

The applicant, a teacher, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability after her employment was terminated pursuant to a long-term disability guideline negotiated between the school board and the union.

The respondents sought to dismiss the application for delay, as it was filed more than four years after the termination.

The Tribunal found that the termination was the last incident of alleged discrimination and rejected the applicant's argument that the discrimination was ongoing.

The Tribunal also found that the delay was not incurred in good faith, as the applicant's efforts to pursue her rights through the union grievance process did not justify the delay.

The application was dismissed as untimely.

A school board sought court approval of a proposed methodology to distribute approximately $1.7 million received following the windup of a group insurance trust.

The plan allocated a portion to future benefit premium reserves and distributed the remainder to non‑union employees enrolled in the insurance policies as of June 30, 2006, using a banding system based on years of participation.

An objector representing former employees argued that excluding individuals who ceased enrollment before that date was unreasonable because they had contributed premiums to the trust.

The court held that the board had broad discretion under the court‑approved trust windup terms and that basing distribution on enrollment as of June 30, 2006 was rational because that same metric determined the board’s share of the surplus.

The court also found it reasonable to consider administrative costs and data limitations in designing the methodology.

The proposed distribution methodology was approved.

The complainant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found it was an abuse of process to relitigate the delisting of sex reassignment surgery (SRS) as an insured service.

The original decision applied the ruling in Hogan, which denied accommodation to individuals who began transitioning after SRS was delisted.

The complainant argued the decision was factually inaccurate, inconsistent with Hogan, and contrary to the public interest.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding the complainant commenced her transition after the delisting and was therefore not entitled to accommodation under Hogan.

The Tribunal also held that relitigating the issue on the same evidence and legal theory was an abuse of process.

The complainant, a City of Toronto employee, alleged that he experienced workplace harassment and discrimination based on his ancestry, ethnic origin, and perceived Muslim creed, and that the employer failed to investigate his complaints.

He also alleged reprisal for filing a human rights complaint.

The Tribunal found the complainant's evidence to be unreliable and preferred the evidence of the respondents.

While one respondent admitted to using an isolated racial slur, the Tribunal found the employer's response—a verbal warning—was reasonable and did not constitute a Code violation.

The Tribunal also accepted the employer's non-discriminatory explanations for the alleged reprisals and found the employer's investigation of the formal complaint was adequate.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding that its collective agreement with the school board did not meet the definition of 'Collective Agreement' under a trust agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the affiliated union was bound by the collective agreement under the Labour Relations Act, which satisfied the trust agreement's definition.

The collective agreement therefore governed the payments into the trust.

The applicant, a self-represented employee of the respondent police association, applied to the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal seeking a compensation adjustment.

She argued that two executive positions (Administrator and Executive Officer) should be included as male comparators in the proportional value (PV) analysis.

The Tribunal found that the executive positions were not 'representative male job classes' under the Pay Equity Act because their compensation was anomalous, pegged to an external referent (police constable salaries), and not reflective of the employer's overall compensation practices.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, concluding that even if the applicant's job were re-evaluated at the maximum points, no pay equity adjustment would be required based on the appropriate male wage line.

The Tribunal also dismissed the applicant's allegations of bias against the Vice-Chair.

The employer and the union filed applications challenging a Review Officer Order regarding the calculation of the job rate for a male comparator job class under the Pay Equity Act.

The parties disagreed on how to convert the annual salary and vacation benefit of the male comparator (Computer Technician) to an hourly rate for comparison with the female job class (ESL Instructor).

The Tribunal rejected both the union's position (which assumed all comparators received maximum vacation) and the employer's position (which ignored the value of the vacation benefit).

The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the parties to calculate the total hourly compensation by properly valuing the vacation benefit based on years of service.

The individual respondents, supported by the corporate respondent school board, requested to be removed as parties to a human rights complaint alleging systemic discrimination on the grounds of race and disability.

The complainant opposed the request, arguing the individuals should be held personally accountable.

The Tribunal granted the request, applying the Persaud factors.

The Tribunal found that the corporate respondent had assumed liability for the employees' conduct, was in the best position to remedy the alleged systemic discrimination, and that removing the individuals would not prejudice the complainant's right to a full hearing or the availability of remedies.

The Member, a high school teacher, pleaded no contest to allegations of professional misconduct arising from inappropriate classroom behaviour, including engaging in inappropriate topics of discussion and failing to maintain appropriate boundaries with students.

The Discipline Committee accepted the agreed statement of facts and found the Member guilty of professional misconduct.

The Committee ordered the Member to receive counselling and complete a course on maintaining appropriate boundaries with students.

The complainant, a student with disabilities, filed a human rights complaint alleging the school board and several individuals failed to accommodate his needs.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed three preliminary issues.

The Tribunal denied the complainant's request to add another teacher as a personal respondent, finding no meaningful procedural or substantive benefit.

The Tribunal also dismissed the respondents' objection to the scope of the Commission's statement of facts, ruling that the new allegations formed part of the continuum of events related to the alleged failure to accommodate.

Finally, the Tribunal granted the complainant's request to file his own statement of facts, issues, and remedy, as the respondents demonstrated no prejudice.

The complainants alleged that Ontario discriminated against them on the basis of sex and disability by de-listing sex reassignment surgery as an insured service under OHIP.

The Tribunal found that Gender Identity Disorder is a disability and that the de-listing had a disproportionate adverse impact on three of the complainants who had already begun their transition program at the CAMH Gender Identity Clinic.

The Tribunal ordered Ontario to fund the surgery for these three complainants as an interim remedy, finding that the grandparenting provision in the amending regulation was not a reasonable accommodation.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to compel the Respondent to produce certain documents over which the Respondent claimed solicitor-client privilege.

The Tribunal first determined that the Respondent's description of the documents was insufficient to establish privilege and ordered the documents to be produced for inspection by the Tribunal.

After inspecting the documents, the majority of the Tribunal found that legal advice privilege attached to some of the documents, as they were part of the continuum of communication between government officials and legal counsel regarding the de-listing of sex re-assignment surgery.

However, the Tribunal ordered the production of other documents or portions thereof where privilege was not established or had been waived.

A partial dissent would have ordered full production of two specific documents, finding that privilege had been waived.

The complainant, a TTC employee diagnosed with narcolepsy, was forced to transfer from the Transportation Division to the Maintenance Division due to his disability.

Under the collective agreement, he lost all his accrued seniority upon transfer.

The TTC agreed to accommodate him by restoring his full seniority, but the Union refused, arguing it would violate the collective agreement and cause undue hardship.

The Board of Inquiry found that the seniority provisions discriminated against disabled workers and that the Union failed to prove undue hardship.

The Union was ordered to grant the complainant full seniority, cease applying the discriminatory provision, and pay $22,000 in damages for mental anguish.

The respondent Union brought a motion to add the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) as a party to a human rights complaint alleging discrimination with respect to union membership because of handicap.

The complainant and the TTC had previously entered into a settlement agreement regarding a separate complaint against the TTC.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that adding the TTC would undermine the settlement agreement and that the Union would not be prejudiced by the TTC's absence, as no joint and several remedies were being sought.

The Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113 brought a motion to add the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) as a party to a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on handicap.

The complainant had previously settled his separate complaint against the TTC.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that adding the TTC would undermine the settlement and that the Union would not be prejudiced by the TTC's absence, as no joint and several remedies were being sought.

The respondent union brought a motion to dismiss or stay a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap.

The complainant, a transit operator diagnosed with narcolepsy, was transferred to a maintenance position but lost his accumulated seniority due to the collective agreement's lack of system-wide seniority.

The union argued the complaint failed to disclose a prima facie case, was an abuse of process, and improperly expanded the issues.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the complaint clearly raised the issue of whether the loss of seniority upon disability-related transfer constituted adverse discrimination, establishing a prima facie case.

The Board also held that it had jurisdiction to make orders affecting future practices and other union members.