Susan E. Healey

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action on a summary judgment motion, the defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs did not file costs submissions.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering factors such as the defendants’ complete success, the plaintiffs’ repeated litigation of the same cause of action, and the reasonableness of the defendants’ bill of costs.

The court found the fees and disbursements reasonable and within the plaintiffs’ expectations given prior similar awards.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiffs.

Following a motion seeking to declare the plaintiffs vexatious litigants under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court addressed costs.

Although the moving party did not obtain the primary relief of a vexatious litigant declaration, it obtained alternative relief staying any new proceedings until prior cost orders were satisfied.

The court reviewed the governing discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering the complexity of the motion, the parties’ litigation history, and the reasonableness of the claimed fees.

The court found the fees and disbursements reasonable and within the expected range for such a motion.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving party.

The applicant constructed two multi-unit residential buildings and sought to rent each unit to up to seven students.

The City opposed, arguing that renting to more than four students would classify the units as 'boarding, lodging or rooming houses', which were not permitted in the zone, and would violate the Building Code.

The applicant sought declarations that the project was a 'stacked townhouse' and could legally rent to seven occupants per unit.

The court found that the students living together constituted a 'single household unit' and therefore the units were 'dwelling units' rather than boarding houses under both the zoning by-law and the Building Code.

The court granted the applicant's declarations and ordered the City to issue a final occupancy permit without conditions on the number of occupants.

Following a family law trial, the court issued an addendum addressing claims for special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The respondent sought contribution from the applicant for numerous health care treatments, therapies, diets, supplements, private schooling, and other expenses relating primarily to a child diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.

The court held that most claimed expenses were unsupported by reliable evidence establishing that they were necessary and reasonable within the meaning of s. 7, particularly where documentation was hearsay or lacked expert qualification.

Only intensive behavioural intervention therapy was accepted as potentially necessary, but insufficient evidence was provided regarding the amount of government funding and remaining costs.

The respondent’s entire claim for s. 7 expenses since separation was therefore dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion and multiple related motions in a civil action alleging defamation and several other torts, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

Most of the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed on summary judgment except for defamation, and the court found that the plaintiff’s pleadings were vague and unsupported by evidence.

The court also considered the plaintiff’s litigation conduct, including verbose and inflammatory materials, unnecessary motions, and personal attacks against opposing counsel.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis for the defendants’ summary judgment motion and on a full indemnity basis for certain motions brought by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff also received limited partial indemnity costs for earlier attendances, which were set off against the larger amounts owed to the defendants.

The moving party sought to set aside an ex parte order permitting the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to add the moving party, a former estate solicitor, as a defendant.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts on the ex parte motion, including prior proceedings, the involvement of other counsel, and facts relevant to the limitation period.

The court also determined that any claim against the solicitor was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiffs discovered the material facts giving rise to the claim no later than November 25, 2009.

As the two‑year limitation period had expired before the solicitor was added as a defendant, the proposed claim constituted an untenable plea.

The ex parte order was therefore set aside and costs were awarded to the moving party.

Following a family law trial, the court determined the appropriate costs award between the parties.

The applicant sought partial indemnity costs after achieving substantial success at trial and having made a settlement offer that came close to the final result.

Although the offer did not strictly meet the criteria under Family Law Rules r. 18(14) for enhanced costs, the court considered it under r. 24(11) along with the respondent’s less favourable settlement positions and his failure to provide timely documentary disclosure.

The court found the applicant had been prejudiced by the respondent’s late disclosure, particularly regarding documents related to a personal injury settlement relevant to equalization.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed after adjusting counsel’s hourly rate to the appropriate partial indemnity level.

Following a successful motion by certain defendants to enforce a settlement agreement, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving defendants sought full indemnity costs, arguing that the plaintiffs’ conduct throughout the proceeding justified such an award.

The court held that the plaintiffs acted unreasonably in refusing to acknowledge a binding settlement even after obtaining legal advice, which unnecessarily required the motion.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered substantial indemnity costs rather than full indemnity.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the successful moving defendants.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' third action against the municipality and its employee regarding a property standards order.

At the outset, the self-represented plaintiffs brought an oral motion for the judge to recuse herself based on a prior ruling in a different action, which was dismissed as there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims of fraud, misfeasance, and negligence were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as they arose from the same factual matrix as two previously dismissed actions.

Furthermore, the claims against the municipal employee were barred by statutory immunity, and the entire action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The municipality brought a motion under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to have the respondents declared vexatious litigants after they commenced three successive actions arising from the same dispute and repeatedly pursued unsuccessful appeals and motions.

The record showed that the earlier actions had been dismissed on summary judgment and were barred by res judicata and limitation periods, and that numerous unpaid cost orders remained outstanding.

Although the court found many indicators of vexatious conduct, including repeated relitigation of decided issues and failure to pay costs, it declined to formally declare the respondents vexatious litigants due to their sincerity and self-represented status.

Instead, the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to impose a conditional stay on any future proceedings against the municipality related to the same property until all outstanding cost orders are paid.

The respondents sued the appellant tour operator in Small Claims Court for a ruined vacation after experiencing unacceptable service at a resort in Cuba.

The Deputy Judge awarded damages, finding the appellant breached a duty to supervise its third-party supplier and could not rely on an exclusionary clause.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice set aside the judgment, holding that a tour operator's common law duty is limited to exercising due care in selecting a competent supplier, not supervising them.

The court also found the exclusionary clause was unambiguous and enforceable.

The appellant tour operator appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding damages to the respondents for a ruined vacation at a Cuban resort.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge erred in law by imposing a duty on the tour operator to supervise its third-party suppliers.

The court held that a tour operator's duty is limited to exercising due care in selecting competent suppliers.

Furthermore, the Deputy Judge erred in applying contra proferentem to invalidate an unambiguous exclusionary clause limiting the tour operator's liability for the acts of third parties.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for a deficiency balance following the repossession and sale of a vehicle.

The Deputy Judge had dismissed the claim on the basis that the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief under Part V of the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the Small Claims Court is a branch of the Superior Court of Justice and has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims involving the PPSA within its monetary limits.

The court also admitted fresh evidence regarding the Notice of Sale and granted judgment for the appellant for the deficiency balance.

The applicant and respondent separated after a 23-year marriage.

The court determined the appropriate quantum of retroactive and ongoing spousal support, taking into account the parties' respective incomes and the respondent's failure to prove the applicant was intentionally under-employed.

The court also calculated the equalization of net family properties, addressing disputes over the valuation of vehicles, notional tax rates on RRSPs, and deductions for pre-marriage assets.

The applicant was ordered to pay an equalization payment, while the respondent was ordered to pay ongoing spousal support and retroactive support arrears.

An insurer moved under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to withdraw admissions in its statement of defence that the plaintiff was entitled to statutory accident benefits.

After discovery evidence suggested there may have been no collision between the insured vehicle and a school bus, the insurer sought to deny that a motor vehicle accident occurred and to dispute coverage under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Applying the three-part test for withdrawal of admissions, the court found that the proposed amendment raised a triable issue, that the insurer provided a reasonable explanation for the change in position based on new discovery evidence, and that any alleged prejudice to the plaintiff was speculative.

The court also rejected an argument that the insurer was estopped from denying entitlement due to past benefit payments.

Leave to amend the statement of defence was granted.

Costs decision following a motion in a family law proceeding concerning property claims, disclosure, and child support.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs alleging the applicant’s bankruptcy was a tactical attempt to defeat property claims, but the court found insufficient evidence to reach that conclusion.

The court noted that the respondent achieved the vast majority of the relief sought on the motion and that the motion was necessary to obtain reasonable disclosure and child support.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the applicant and additional costs against added respondents who failed to participate in the motion.

The costs were ordered as an incident of child support and enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.

During a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act, the society brought a mid‑trial motion seeking to admit documents from another society’s file relating to a prior protection proceeding involving a different child of the respondent.

The court considered whether the documents qualified as business records under s. 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act.

Documents containing summaries of anonymous allegations and an agreed statement of facts from the earlier proceeding were excluded because they contained prejudicial hearsay and lacked reliability.

However, assessment and service plan documents prepared by a caseworker in the ordinary course of child protection work were admitted as business records.

The excluded materials could still be used for cross‑examination of the respondent.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship without access for two young children due to the mother's chronic cocaine addiction.

Despite completing a rehabilitation program and demonstrating good parenting skills during supervised access, the mother continued to relapse and use cocaine, as evidenced by multiple hair follicle and urine tests.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm from the mother's substance abuse and lifestyle.

Concluding that the mother could not control her addiction in the foreseeable future, the court ordered Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption.

The moving defendants sought judgment under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce a settlement allegedly accepted by the self-represented plaintiffs in a long‑running right‑of‑way dispute.

The plaintiffs had emailed questions about the offer and later returned a signed acceptance selecting one of two settlement options concerning the right‑of‑way location.

They later argued no agreement had been reached because their earlier email raised unresolved issues about the road location and user fees.

The court held that the earlier email constituted a request for clarification rather than a counter‑offer and that the signed document and confirming email amounted to unequivocal acceptance within the time limit.

Judgment was granted in accordance with the settlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking over $83,000 related to a failed restaurant venture, or alternatively $30,000 based on a promissory note signed by the defendants.

The court found that while the broader monetary claims and allegations of fraudulent conveyance involved contentious factual issues requiring a trial, there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the promissory note.

The defendants failed to establish duress or ambiguity in the note.

The court granted partial summary judgment for $28,800 under the promissory note and dismissed the requests for an injunction and declaration of fraudulent conveyance.