Stephen J. Wojciechowski

The defendants brought a motion to address two issues: the admissibility of opinions in two plaintiff expert reports (Miyanji and Levin) and the admissibility of evidence from five lay witnesses.

The court ruled that portions of the Miyanji and Levin reports that did not respond to specific "Defence Expert Reports" or introduced new standard of care issues were inadmissible due to late service and lack of reasonable explanation.

The motion to exclude the lay witnesses was dismissed as premature, with the court stating that the admissibility of their evidence, particularly any opinion evidence, should be assessed at the time it is tendered at trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking several orders before trial, including dismissal of claims against certain defendants, leave to amend their statement of claim, preliminary determination of jury questions, and exclusion of expert evidence.

The court granted the dismissal of claims against the "Released Defendants" without costs, as it was previously agreed upon.

Leave was granted to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, as the proposed amendments were extensive and did not remove admissions.

The court also determined the format for jury questions, largely adopting the plaintiffs' approach for damages and requiring explanations for answers, emphasizing standard of care and "but for" causation.

The issue of expert evidence was adjourned to a later date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence from fifteen expert reports served late in a medical malpractice action.

The court considered the admissibility under Rule 53.08, assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late service and if granting leave would cause irreparable prejudice or undue delay.

The court allowed some reports as supplementary or responding reports, finding a general reasonable explanation for delay due to discovery issues and prior party understanding.

However, it excluded a vocational report that introduced new scenarios without prior notice and a neuropsychological report, reiterating a previous ruling that no neuropsychological impairment issue was pleaded or supported by evidence, and its introduction would cause significant prejudice and necessitate trial adjournment.

The applicant sought to be appointed as the estate trustee for the deceased intestate under section 29 of the Estates Act, bypassing the standard Rule 74 process.

The applicant argued urgency, alleging that unknown occupants were residing in the deceased's property and possibly engaging in illegal activities.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence of urgency was based on hearsay and double hearsay, and did not establish the 'special circumstances' required under subsection 29(3) of the Estates Act.

The applicant was directed to apply for appointment through the standard Rule 74 process.