Stephen Longo

The appellants applied for the cancellation and refund of $203,145.85 charged by the City of Vaughan in 2005 to recover a shortfall in property taxes from 2003 and 2004.

The appellants argued the charge constituted an overcharge due to a gross or manifest clerical error under section 334 of the Municipal Act.

The Assessment Review Board dismissed the application, finding that the City's deliberate request to recover the undercharge based on its legal interpretation of section 331 was not an inadvertent clerical or factual mistake on the 2005 tax roll that the Board had the authority to correct.

The appellant, Mondelez Canada Inc., failed to serve a Statement of Issues in its property assessment appeals, in default of a previous Board Order and the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

The Assessment Review Board issued an Order with Notice of Intent to Dismiss, requiring the appellant to serve the Statement of Issues by a peremptory date.

If the appellant fails to comply, the appeals will be dismissed without further notice pursuant to section 8.2 of the Assessment Review Board Act.

The taxpayer brought a motion to cancel the reinstatement of its property assessment appeal, arguing that MPAC's Special Notice requesting a higher assessment was invalid because it was served by email without consent.

The Assessment Review Board found that the mandatory language of its Rules required consent for email service, which was not obtained.

The Board declined to use its discretion to validate the service, noting the significant prejudice to the taxpayer of a potentially doubled assessment.

The Board ordered the reinstated appeal cancelled.

The appellant property assessment corporation appealed a decision declaring a student residence located on a college campus exempt from property taxation.

The college had entered into a 99-year land lease with a private developer to construct and operate the residence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding the college was the tenant of the land.

The Court held that the private developer was the tenant and paramount occupier of the land, making it liable for property taxes under the Assessment Act, and that the college lost its specific tax exemption when it ceased to solely occupy the land.

A charitable organization applied for a declaration that premises it occupied under leases were exempt from municipal property taxation under s. 10 of its incorporating statute.

The applicant argued that the statutory phrase “buildings, lands, equipment and undertaking of” the association extended to leased premises used for its charitable activities.

The respondents contended that the exemption applied only to property owned by the organization.

The court applied principles of statutory interpretation and held that the phrase “lands of the association” refers to land owned by the association, not leasehold interests.

Because the properties at issue were leased rather than owned, the exemption did not apply.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessment of its rail yard.

The applicant argued the Board erred in law by failing to find a nearby rail yard was a comparable property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the 'all points of comparison' test and made no overriding or palpable factual error in concluding the two rail yards were not comparable due to significant differences in size, building area, and daily train traffic.

Following a successful application, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs payable by the unsuccessful party.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs relying on a lease provision and a prior offer to settle, while the respondent argued for a more limited award based on reasonable fees and proportionality.

The court found the lease provision ambiguous regarding the applicable scale of costs and applied ordinary principles governing the court’s discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01.

Considering proportionality, the comparative bills of costs, and the necessity of expert evidence, the court fixed a mid-point between the parties’ proposed figures.

Interest on reimbursements was ordered at the Courts of Justice Act rate rather than the lease’s designated interest rate.

A commercial tenant sought declarations regarding the proper method for allocating property taxes under a shopping plaza lease and the proper allocation of tax shortfalls arising from statutory tax-capping rules between 2001 and 2008.

The court interpreted the lease to require use of MPAC valuation records (“working papers”) as the primary method of allocating property taxes rather than a proportionate-share-by-square-footage approach.

The court also addressed the landlord’s allocation of tax shortfall created by legislative caps, holding that the landlord’s historical allocation was arbitrary and lacked a principled basis.

Preferring the methodology of the tenant’s expert, the court held that shortfall should be allocated proportionately among eligible tenants, including uncapped shortfall tenants.

The tenant was therefore entitled to recalculation of taxes and potential refunds or credits based on the correct methodology.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent tenant's property taxes should be calculated on a proportionate share basis.

The lease provided that if separate assessments were unavailable, the parties must use reasonable efforts to obtain sufficient official information to determine what the separate assessment would have been.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) valuation records constituted sufficient official information for this purpose.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that premises occupied by the Hospital for Sick Children Foundation were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings that the Foundation was a tenant under the Assessment Act and that there was no shared patrimony between the Hospital and the Foundation that would extend the hospital's tax exemption to the Foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of an application seeking interpretation of a commercial lease concerning the calculation of property taxes, the successful respondent sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $75,000.

The applicant argued the amount was disproportionate to the approximately $160,000 in dispute and the relatively limited complexity of the proceeding.

The court applied the principles governing reasonable expectations of the losing party under the Boucher line of authorities and assessed the reasonableness of the time spent by counsel and the claimed disbursements.

Finding the claimed hours and overall expenditures excessive for an application hearing lasting less than a day, the court reduced the recoverable costs.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board, which classified their properties offering extended stay accommodations as hotels under s. 17(2) of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court applied the test for leave to appeal, finding that while the question of law was important, there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's interpretation.

The plain language of the statute clearly caught the subject properties within the definition of a hotel.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The landlord sought a declaration that the tenant’s share of property taxes under a commercial lease should be calculated on a proportionate share basis following the elimination of separate tenant assessments under amendments to the Assessment Act.

The tenant argued that the lease required the parties to determine what a separate assessment would have been using official information from MPAC valuation records.

The court interpreted the lease according to the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting and held that MPAC valuation records constituted sufficient official information to estimate a separate assessment.

Because the lease contemplated this scenario, the tenant’s taxes were properly calculated using the assessed value approach rather than proportionate share.

The landlord’s application for a declaration was dismissed.

The applicants, a public hospital and its foundation, applied for a property tax exemption for the foundation's offices, arguing they shared an identity or patrimony with the hospital.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the foundation was a separate corporate entity with its own governance, objects, and funding, and did not share a sufficient identity or patrimony with the hospital to qualify for the public hospital exemption under the Assessment Act.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision declaring that properties leased by the Crown to non-profit Harbour Authorities for nominal rent were exempt from property taxation.

MPAC argued the Harbour Authorities paid valuable consideration through services and maintenance obligations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the services did not constitute a profit to the Crown.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Harbour Authorities shared an identity of patrimony with the Crown, entitling them to the same tax exemption.