Stephen Cavanagh

The plaintiffs sold a retirement home and alleged that their lawyer and the purchaser's lawyer failed to ensure $109,000 was held in trust for tax liabilities.

The defendant lawyers moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred.

The court granted the motions, finding the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and had knowledge of the material facts more than two years before commencing the action.

The court also dismissed the fraudulent misrepresentation claim due to a lack of evidence.

The defendants appealed and the plaintiffs cross-appealed a Master's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment regarding the expiry of a limitation period in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred, while the plaintiffs argued the limitation period had not expired due to discoverability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the Master's conclusion that the evidence on discoverability was unclear and intertwined with issues of severity, causation, and damages.

The court held that the limitation period issue could not be justly decided on a summary judgment motion and should be determined on a full evidentiary record at trial.

The defendant, Robert Gates, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action brought by the plaintiff, Melanie Gates, on the grounds that it was commenced after the expiration of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the claim, specifically when Melanie Gates knew or ought to have known that Robert Gates was a potential party at fault.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the limitation defence was left for adjudication at trial.

Mississippi River Power Corporation (MRPC) sued WSP Canada Inc. and other defendants following the failure of a penstock in a hydroelectric facility.

WSP Canada Inc. (collectively "Walker") moved for partial summary judgment to limit its liability to MRPC to $2,000,000, citing an insurance covenant in their professional services contract.

MRPC argued there were two distinct contracts or that the covenant did not apply to the construction phase.

Other defendants brought responding motions seeking to extend this liability limitation to them.

The court found there was one extended professional services contract, that the insurance covenant applied to limit Walker's professional liability to $2,000,000, and that the benefit of this limitation extended to the other defendants to prevent subverting the risk allocation and avoid injustice.

Partial summary judgment was granted, limiting the liability of Walker and the remaining defendants to MRPC to $2,000,000.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss a professional negligence action arising from a gas station purchase.

The plaintiffs, former shareholders of a bankrupt corporation, alleged their lawyer failed to update a TSSA certificate, leading to deficiencies.

The court found the plaintiffs' claims were personal, not corporate, and were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, as they were discovered in May 2008, but the action was commenced in December 2010.

The court also ruled that a nunc pro tunc order under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was invalid as it was sought after the limitation period expired, and that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle barred the plaintiffs' claims for loss of investments and income.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiffs' cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim on the grounds that it was struck out as outside the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

The claim was based solely on an alleged infringement of the Human Rights Code, which is prohibited under s. 46.1(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The motion judge found no alternative cause of action in the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but granted the appellant leave to bring a motion in Superior Court within 45 days to amend his statement of claim to bring it within the court's jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion by way of a special case to determine whether their corporate representative was required to answer questions on discovery based on personal knowledge acquired outside his capacity as an officer or employee of the defendants.

The representative had previously worked for a related non-party corporation.

The court held that the representative is not required to answer questions based on personal knowledge acquired in another capacity, as doing so would effectively allow discovery of a non-party without leave.

However, if the representative possesses personal knowledge that the corporate defendant would be required to disclose anyway, he should provide it for efficiency.

The Roman Catholic Corporation of the Episcopal Archdiocese of Ottawa brought a motion for reconsideration of an appeal that had been allowed on June 5, 2017.

The motion was dismissed on the grounds that it was not an exceptional case warranting reconsideration, and that the moving party was attempting to raise issues on the motion that could have been, but were not, raised on the original appeal.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, payable forthwith.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant Gene Simmons, the defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The self-represented plaintiff did not file responding submissions.

The court reviewed the costs outline, noting that while more time could have been assigned to junior counsel, the total amount claimed was reasonable.

The court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $5,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiffs sued the lawyer who represented the purchaser in a share sale, alleging he falsely stated that funds had been deposited in a trust account.

The lawyer and his firm moved to strike the claims against them.

The court struck the claim for negligent misrepresentation, finding that a lawyer owes no duty of care to an opposing party who is represented by their own counsel.

However, the court refused to strike the claim for intentional misrepresentation, finding the plaintiffs had pleaded all necessary elements.

The court also declined to strike a cross-claim for contribution by a co-defendant bank.

The appellant challenged the application judge's finding that the respondent's insurance policy was excess to the appellant's policy.

The appellant argued the application judge erroneously applied the Minnesota approach to determine policy priority.

The Court of Appeal found no error, as the application judge properly interpreted the policy terms to determine that the respondent's policy was specifically made excess to the appellant's.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

Fresh evidence indicated the underlying claim had been settled within the appellant's policy limits, rendering the cross-appeal issues moot.

The moving parties, former solicitors for the plaintiff, sought leave to intervene in three medical negligence actions.

The plaintiff had commenced a solicitor's negligence action against them for allegedly missing a limitation period.

The moving parties argued they had an interest in the medical actions because the outcome would affect their liability.

The court refused leave to intervene in the main medical actions, finding the solicitors had no involvement in the medical care and their participation could prejudice the existing parties.

However, the court granted them leave to intervene in the pending motion for judgment regarding the limitation issues.

Following a motion to consolidate 48 actions where the moving defendants were largely successful but the plaintiff successfully resisted consolidation of one action, the court determined costs.

Considering the divided success and a reasonable settlement offer made by the plaintiff, the court ordered the moving defendants to pay partial indemnity costs of $7,500 to the plaintiff and $5,522.91 to the successful co-defendant, Boston Pizza.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing that there was an understanding that the respondent had a 24-hour cooling-off period to withdraw from a deal, and that the respondent failed to communicate this understanding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the evidence was too tentative to support a legally enforceable cooling-off provision, and that even if such a provision existed, the appellants failed to demonstrate that withdrawal was communicated within the 24-hour period.

The appellants' damages claim was found to be speculative.

The plaintiff commenced 48 separate actions (38 in Superior Court, 10 in Small Claims Court) relating to various loan transactions, primarily alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against its former lawyers.

The defendant lawyers brought a motion to consolidate the actions.

The court ordered that 37 of the Superior Court actions be consolidated into a single action to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and reduce costs.

The 10 Small Claims Court actions were also consolidated and ordered to be transferred and tried together with the Superior Court action.

All actions were ordered to be case managed.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging he was wrongfully ejected from a concert at the request of the moving defendant due to racial discrimination, and subsequently assaulted by security staff.

The moving defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action against him, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction as the claim was based solely on an infringement of the Human Rights Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that there is no independent tort of discrimination and the Human Rights Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.

The defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel, alleging a conflict of interest because the counsel briefly acted for third parties in the same action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the plaintiff's lawyers received confidential information from the defendant, that the defendant was ever their client, or that the third parties supported the motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff due to the unsupported allegations of professional misconduct.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order enforcing its declaration and rules against the respondents, who were leasing their unit on a short-term basis through platforms like Airbnb.

The respondents argued that the application should be stayed for failure to mediate/arbitrate, that other owners needed notice, and that the rules did not prohibit their activities.

The court found that the respondents had waived the arbitration requirement, that notice to other owners was unnecessary, and that the short-term rentals violated the 'single-family dwelling' restriction in the declaration.

The court ordered the respondents to comply with the declaration and rules.

The applicant insurer (LawPRO) sought a declaration that the respondent insurer (Lloyd's) was obliged to contribute to the costs of defending their common insured.

The respondent argued the application was untimely under the Limitations Act and that its policy was excess, not primary.

The court found Lloyd's policy to be in an excess position and that the case was not analogous to situations where equitable contribution applies between primary and excess insurers (e.g., Broadhurst).

The application was dismissed as premature, though the court also ruled that the claim was not statute-barred under the Limitations Act, as the claim had not yet been "discovered" given the ongoing litigation against the insured.

The defendants, TSV Holdings Ltd. and Azure Health Care Ltd., brought a motion to prevent the plaintiffs, Cimtel Inc. and Wireless Resident Nurse Alert Technology Inc., from examining Clayton Astles, CEO of Azure, for discovery.

Astles was previously president of Austco Canada, a subsidiary, and was involved in the events leading to the litigation.

The court applied the factors from Farris v. Staubach to determine if the plaintiff's choice of examiner should be interfered with.

The court found Astles had sufficient knowledge and direct involvement, and that substituting another representative would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The motion was dismissed, upholding the plaintiffs' right to examine Astles.