Sopinka

The appellant, a journalist, sought access to audio and video tapes that had been admitted as exhibits in a criminal trial resulting in a murder conviction.

The conviction was later overturned on appeal because the tapes were found to have been obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights and were ruled inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the privacy interests of the acquitted person outweighed the public right of access to exhibits judicially determined to be inadmissible against him.

The appellant shot and killed a man after a drunken altercation.

He was arrested for a 'shooting incident' and advised of his right to counsel, which he waived, giving a statement to the police.

The police did not inform him that the victim had died until after the statement was taken.

The appellant argued his statement should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because his s. 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest was violated, vitiating his s. 10(b) waiver.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 10(a) was violated, the appellant had sufficient awareness of his jeopardy to validly waive his right to counsel, as he must have known he likely killed the victim.

The Court also found the statement's admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for rape and indecent assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct under section 142(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The respondent's late sister consulted the appellant doctor about a breast lump.

The doctor performed a biopsy, found cancer, but failed to inform the patient or arrange follow-up care.

Years later, the patient died of generalized cancer.

The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the application of the 'loss of chance' theory to medical malpractice in Quebec civil law, holding that traditional rules of causation apply.

However, the Court found the doctor liable for the patient's psychological suffering and diminished quality of life caused by the failure to inform and follow up, awarding $17,500 in damages.

The appellant union sought a declaration that teachers working in a federal penitentiary through a private contractor were government employees and members of the existing bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes.

The majority held that, applying the pragmatic and functional approach, Parliament did not intend to confer jurisdiction on the labour board to determine that persons not appointed within the statutory public service scheme were employees of the Public Service.

The statutory regime created distinct labour relations structures for public servants and other federal workers, leaving no room for a de facto category of public servant.

The board therefore committed reviewable jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.

A dissent would have held the issue fell within the board's labour relations expertise and that its decision was not patently unreasonable.

Two midwives were charged with criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm after a child died in the birth canal during a home birth.

At trial, they were convicted of causing death but acquitted of causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding a foetus is not a 'person' under the Criminal Code, but substituted a conviction for causing bodily harm despite the Crown not appealing the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the acquittal for causing death, confirming a foetus is not a 'person' under the Code, and overturned the substituted conviction, ruling the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to substitute a conviction without a Crown appeal.

The appellant was convicted of murder.

Prior to trial, there was media publicity regarding the search for the victim's body and the backgrounds of both the victim and the accused.

At trial, the appellant sought to challenge each prospective juror for cause based on potential partiality arising from this pre-trial publicity.

The trial judge refused the general challenge, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the right to challenge for cause is fundamental to a fair trial, there must be a realistic potential for partiality before the challenge can proceed.

The pre-trial publicity in this case did not meet that threshold.

The Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal from the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal reported at (1990), 75 C.R. (3d) 238.

The appellant was approached by an undercover police officer in a 'buy-and-bust' operation in an area known for drug trafficking.

The officer had no reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity but persisted until the appellant agreed to sell a small amount of cannabis resin.

The trial judge found entrapment through random virtue-testing and stayed the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the officer was engaged in a bona fide inquiry directed at a specific location where drug-related crimes were reasonably suspected, and thus did not engage in random virtue-testing.

The Court also held it lacked jurisdiction to enter convictions in place of a new trial absent a cross-appeal by the Crown.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

At trial, evidence was led of three separate conspiracies, but the appellants were only involved in one (Phase II).

The appellants argued that the indictment charged a broader conspiracy encompassing all phases, and since they were not involved in Phase I, they should be acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the indictment adequately specified the time and locations relevant to the Phase II conspiracy, giving the appellants reasonable notice of the charge.

The Crown proved the conspiracy charged, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to quash municipal loan by-laws and recover special taxes paid on the basis that affected owners had not received legally sufficient notices convening electors.

The Court held that the notices were indeed insufficient and that the resulting illegality was serious enough to support a direct action in nullity under art. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

However, the remedy remained discretionary, and except in cases of total absence of jurisdiction, such proceedings must be brought within a reasonable time notwithstanding the thirty-year prescription period.

Given the appellant's knowledge of the taxes, repeated payment without protest, and lengthy unexplained delay after the work was completed and bonds issued, the Superior Court properly dismissed the action.

The Crown brought a motion for an order of reversal of judgment under s. 70 of the Supreme Court Act, consenting to a new trial.

The appellant resisted the motion, as he sought an acquittal based on fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 70 applies to criminal appeals, it cannot be used to force a consent order on an unwilling appellant unless the disposition gives the appellant all the relief that would be available if completely successful.

Since the appellant could potentially be acquitted if completely successful, the Crown's unilateral consent to a new trial was insufficient.

The motion was dismissed.

The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) applied to intervene in an appeal concerning the legal remedies available to a woman who engaged in sexual intercourse with a doctor in exchange for drugs to which she was addicted.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that LEAF would add nothing new and that the Charter should not be raised for the first time at the Supreme Court.

Sopinka J. granted the application, finding that LEAF could present a different perspective and that the appropriateness of raising the Charter should be decided on the appeal itself.

The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) applied to intervene in an appeal concerning whether incest is a separate tort not subject to the Limitations Act, or alternatively, whether the doctrine of reasonable discoverability applies.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that LEAF intended to raise the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an interpretive tool for the first time on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the application, finding that LEAF had a sufficient interest and would bring a special perspective to the appeal.

The Court left the determination of whether the Charter argument would cause prejudice to the respondent to be decided by the panel hearing the appeal.

The respondent bank extended credit to the appellant company, secured by merchandise.

Upon default, the bank took possession of the merchandise but, unable to find a buyer, gratuitously abandoned it to a third-party lessor.

The bank sued for the balance of the loan, and the appellant cross-demanded for the value of the abandoned goods.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank breached its duty of good faith under the Bank Act by abandoning the property without notifying the debtor or restoring the status quo.

The appeal was allowed, and the bank was ordered to pay the value of the goods as damages.

The appellant insurance company appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding a fire loss claim.

Coverage had been denied on the basis that the respondent insured failed to disclose the cancellation of an earlier policy for non-payment of premium and serious insurance fraud.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons at the Court of Appeal, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the insured's action.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that overturned his acquittals for criminal negligence causing death and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence relating to the manner in which the appellant was operating his vehicle prior to the collision.

The Crown appealed a judgment setting aside a murder conviction and substituting a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The Supreme Court held that the court below erred by treating the first branch of s. 16(2) of the Criminal Code as extending to moral wrongfulness and by invoking s. 7 of the Charter to re-interpret that branch contrary to existing authority.

However, applying the majority reasoning in Chaulk, the Court concluded the accused's delusional state rendered him incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong under the second branch of s. 16(2).

The appellate substitution of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under s. 686(1)(d) was therefore upheld and the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The respondents were prevented by airport officials from distributing political pamphlets and recruiting members at a federal airport.

The appeal concerned whether the airport regulations and related governmental action infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and, if so, whether the restriction was justified under s. 1.

The Court held that political expression in non-security areas of an airport engaged Charter protection and that the blanket prohibition on solicitation and advertising infringed that freedom.

The restriction was not saved under s. 1, with members of the Court variously emphasizing overbreadth, vagueness, lack of a sufficient objective, and the impropriety of relying on government property rights alone to suppress expression.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a highway patrol officer.

At trial, he admitted to the killing but raised the defence of insanity.

The Crown adduced evidence that the appellant was a suspect in a New York murder to explain his flight, and Crown counsel made highly prejudicial remarks about a defence psychiatric expert during the address to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the presumption of sanity in s. 16(4) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is saved by s. 1.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's failure to comment on Crown counsel's prejudicial remarks in the jury charge constituted an error of law that could not be cured by the proviso.