Sidney N. Lederman

The applicants and respondents formed an incorporated partnership to acquire and develop a hotel and adjacent lands.

The applicants alleged that the respondent unilaterally altered the corporation's capital structure to give himself absolute voting control, engaged in self-dealing, and funneled corporate funds to personal accounts.

The court found the respondent's conduct constituted oppression under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

Given the complete breakdown of trust and lack of alternative remedies, the court ordered the winding up of the corporation and appointed a liquidator.

The Lawyers (Evan L. Tingley and Baldwin Sennecke Halman LLP) were successful in their motion to strike out the Statement of Claim and dismiss the action against them.

They sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale ($7,412.33) or, alternatively, partial indemnity ($5,244.12).

The court found the plaintiff's allegations of breach of trust against the Lawyers lacked factual foundation and were vexatious.

However, considering the plaintiff was represented by an agent, not counsel, and the agent had a good faith basis for some allegations, substantial indemnity costs were deemed inappropriate.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $4,000, all inclusive, payable by the plaintiff within 30 days.

The Lawyers' request for personal costs against the plaintiff's agent, J. Brad Maher, for prejudicing or delaying the action was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of significant prejudice or delay.

The plaintiffs, Mi5 Print & Digital Communications Inc. and 2214264 Ontario Inc., sought an interlocutory injunction against their former key employee, Craig Larmer, and other defendants for breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of confidential information, and solicitation of clients.

Larmer, a Vice-President, abruptly resigned and diverted Mi5's clients to his wife's reactivated business, LCS Imaging, and other defendants (Pyxalis Inc., Ronald Morgan, Barrie Williams, and Marvin Foy Marketing Incorporated).

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions, finding a strong prima facie case against Larmer due to his fiduciary role and clandestine pre-resignation activities.

The Pyxalis defendants were found to have knowingly assisted Larmer.

The court also found irreparable harm due to the difficulty in quantifying loss of goodwill and damaged client relationships, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction to restore fairness.

An interim interlocutory injunction was granted for one year, restraining the defendants from engaging in new activities with the specified clients, subject to existing contracts, and requiring strict accounting.

The applicant, a student with disabilities, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision that found the school board failed to accommodate him but denied his claim for special damages covering private school tuition.

The Divisional Court held that while it was reasonable to deny tuition costs for subsequent years because the parent removed the student from the public system without giving the board a further chance to accommodate, it was unreasonable to deny tuition costs for the remainder of the Grade 9 year when the board had completely failed to provide support.

The application was granted in part and remitted to the Tribunal to assess special damages for the Grade 9 year.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying thirty-two natural gas gate station properties as Industrial Property Class rather than Commercial Property Class.

The Board found that adding a legally required odorant to natural gas constituted 'processing' because it changed the product's character and made it more marketable.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable that a legal requirement to add an odorant to permit the gas to be legally sold renders the gas more marketable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought to set aside a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court who had dismissed her appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment regarding an unpaid loan.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, holding that under the Courts of Justice Act, a single judge's decision on a Small Claims Court appeal is a decision of the Divisional Court, and any further appeal lies only to the Court of Appeal with leave.

Section 21(5) of the Act, which allows a panel to set aside a single judge's decision, applies only to motions, not appeals.

The applicant sought judicial review of a procedural ruling made by its Discipline Committee mid-hearing.

The Committee had ruled that the applicant must comply with the notice and consent requirements of s. 35 of the Mental Health Act before tendering psychiatric records as evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing administrative proceeding.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion for leave to commence a derivative action under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motions judge found the motion was statute-barred because it was brought after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge correctly applied the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the CIBC trilogy, which established that a nunc pro tunc order is not available when a motion for leave is filed after the limitation period has expired.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision declaring them to be a single employer bound by a collective agreement and liable for damages.

The applicants argued procedural unfairness and challenged the Board's earlier certification and grievance decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it to be an improper collateral attack on previous Board decisions.

The Court held that the Board's procedures were fair and its calculation of damages, based on established principles for breaches of union security provisions in the construction industry, was reasonable.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a settlement and consent dismissal order.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act because the order appealed from was not for the payment of money, and the original claim was for $100,000, which exceeded the monetary limit.

The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim ruling by the Discipline Committee of the Association of Ontario Land Surveyors, which had deferred a decision on a motion to dismiss charges until the end of the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature.

The court emphasized its reluctance to fragment administrative proceedings and noted that the tribunal had the jurisdiction to control its own process and defer its decision until a full evidentiary record was available.

The 74-year-old plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action after 31 years of service with the defendant construction company.

The defendant claimed the plaintiff had voluntarily retired in 2010 and was only working on an as-needed basis.

The court found no evidence of retirement and concluded the plaintiff was terminated without cause in October 2012.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded 20 months' pay in lieu of notice, finding the plaintiff was not required to mitigate by accepting a demeaning demotion to a flagman position.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment alleging wrongful dismissal and breach of contract, arguing her employment was for a fixed term of one year.

The defendant contended it was an indefinite term.

The court found the employment contract, comprising an email and an attached agreement, clearly established a one-year fixed term.

Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the unexpired term without mitigation.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The applicant, a former business seller, sought relief against the respondents for fraudulent conveyance and oppression.

The original purchaser (216) defaulted on payments, leading to a default judgment against it.

Subsequently, the principal of 216, through his wife (Hee Kyung Shin), incorporated a new company (222) which took over the business and assets from 216 without consideration, while 216 was stripped of value.

The court found several "badges of fraud" surrounding the transfer of the business, indicating an intent to defraud creditors.

The court also determined that the actions of the officers and directors of 216 and 222 were oppressive and unfairly prejudiced the applicant as a creditor.

Prodensa, a Mexican corporation and defendant by counterclaim, moved to stay the counterclaim against it, arguing lack of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, or the existence of an arbitration agreement.

The counterclaim, brought by Ontario-based Advantage, alleged torts of fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion related to equipment and funds in Mexico, stemming from a "shelter services" arrangement.

The court found jurisdiction simpliciter based on the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, which was deemed to have occurred in Ontario where the false information was received and relied upon.

Additionally, the court found a contract (Memorandum of Understanding) connected with the dispute was made in Ontario.

The court dismissed the forum non conveniens argument, emphasizing the inter-relatedness of the counterclaim with the main action and the risk of conflicting judgments.

Finally, it was determined that no valid arbitration agreement governed the parties' relationship.

The motion was dismissed.

This case concerned the validity of a will dated May 21, 2012, which significantly altered the deceased's estate plan from a prior 1999 will.

The applicant, named executor in the new will, sought to propound it.

The respondent, sole beneficiary of the 1999 will, opposed, alleging suspicious circumstances, lack of testamentary capacity, and lack of knowledge and approval.

The court found numerous suspicious circumstances, including the deceased's questionable mental capacity at the time, the absence of a capacity assessment, and the radical change in beneficiaries without clear rationale.

The applicant failed to discharge the burden of proving testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval.

Consequently, the May 21, 2012 will was not admitted to probate, and the application was dismissed.

Following a successful summary judgment motion, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants challenged the plaintiff's bill of costs, arguing for a reduction and a split between partial and substantial indemnity scales, particularly for the pre-summary judgment stages.

The court, considering the defendants' serious misconduct and scurrilous attack on the plaintiff's reputation, awarded substantial indemnity costs throughout the proceeding.

However, the total amount was reduced from the plaintiff's requested $109,122.98 to $90,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the media defendants.

The applicant, having been successful in a prior application concerning solicitor's fees, sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent solicitor acknowledged the applicant's entitlement to costs but disputed the quantum, arguing the matter was uncomplicated and counsel's hours excessive.

The court agreed the matter was not complex and found the solicitor's interpretation of the retainer agreement regarding fees to be unconscionable.

Considering the principles of proportionality and that counsel's hours were somewhat excessive, the court awarded costs of $38,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes on an elevated scale, to be paid by the respondent within 30 days.

The defendants, Pfizer, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike various claims in the plaintiff Apotex Inc.'s Amended Statement of Claim.

Apotex sought relief for being kept out of the market by Pfizer's invalid patent for Viagra, asserting statutory claims under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, Statutes of Monopolies, and Trade-marks Act, and common law claims for unjust enrichment, nuisance, Ashby v. White, and conspiracy.

The court struck the claims under s. 8 of the PMNOC Regulations and the independent cause of action based on Ashby v. White, finding that the statutory conditions for PMNOC damages were not met and Ashby v. White is a principle, not a cause of action.

However, the court dismissed Pfizer's motion to strike the claims under the Trade-marks Act, unjust enrichment, nuisance, and conspiracy, rejecting the 'complete code theory' as insufficiently settled for a preliminary stage motion and finding the pleadings for these claims to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, Hercules Moulded Products Inc., and the defendant, Stewart Title Guaranty Company, brought cross-motions for summary judgment regarding coverage under a commercial title insurance policy.

Hercules sought to recover losses related to a municipal by-law violation (dirty yard), development agreements, and an alleged building encroachment on two properties.

Stewart Title sought summary dismissal, arguing no coverage or applicable exclusions.

The court found no coverage for the by-law violation due to the work order being issued post-policy and the plaintiff's failure to disclose known issues.

It also found no actual loss demonstrated from the development agreements or the alleged encroachment, and that exclusions applied due to the plaintiff's knowledge and failure to provide timely notice.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and Stewart Title's motion for summary dismissal was granted.