Sheila Colleen Handler

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The plaintiffs, former employees of an automobile dealership, sued police and others for damages after a criminal investigation led to the dealership's closure and their job loss.

The defendants moved for an order striking out the plaintiffs’ Statements of Claim.

The court dismissed the negligent investigation claim, finding no private law duty of care owed by police to employees of a suspect.

It granted leave to amend for civil conspiracy and misfeasance in public office claims, but struck other intentional tort claims without leave.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.

The police defendants brought two motions: one to exclude the public from the court hearing pursuant to s. 135(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and another to seal the file pursuant to s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Both motions were dismissed.

The court noted that the defendants could seek public exclusion on a hearing-by-hearing basis to address concerns over the release of personal and identifying information of complainants and minor witnesses.

Material for a future summary judgment motion (Rule 20) may be sealed upon filing, subject to the motion judge's discretion.

Costs were reserved.

The applicant, a former foster parent, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by two Children's Aid Societies.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to address the timeliness of the application.

The Tribunal found that the allegations involved two distinct sets of events that did not constitute a series of incidents, and both were filed beyond the one-year statutory time limit.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable, good faith explanation for the delay, noting she did not exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights.

The application was dismissed for delay.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability against the respondent Children's Aid Society.

The applicant alleged that the adoptive parents of her biological children refused to communicate with her due to her disability, and that the respondent's worker relayed this discriminatory message.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal noted that the respondent had no control over the adoptive parents' wishes and that the applicant's questions regarding open adoption and access rights were matters for a court, not the Tribunal.

The appellant, a 16-year-old, was rendered paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality's monitoring of the park was reasonable and the danger of falling from a tree was obvious.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming there is no duty to warn of such an obvious and self-evident danger.

The Court also dismissed the appeal regarding costs awarded against the Family Law Act claimants, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's discretion.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing a motion for a defence neuropsychological examination in a motor vehicle accident action.

The underlying motion had been brought after the action was set down for trial and after several other defence medical examinations had already been conducted.

The court considered the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the proposed appeal raised arguable issues regarding the need for leave after an action is placed on a trial list and whether an additional medical examination should have been permitted, the court found the issues lacked general importance and largely reflected litigation strategy and delay by the defendant.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The plaintiff sought leave to file a statement of claim after failing to do so within the 30‑day period following issuance of a notice of action.

The underlying action alleged damages for wrongful arrest, prosecution, and incarceration arising from charges that resulted in an acquittal.

The court held that issuing the notice of action within the limitation period tolled the limitation period and that the failure to file the statement of claim in time was an irregularity caused by solicitor inadvertence.

Applying the test from Nugent v. Cook, the court found the delay resulted from inadvertence and caused no prejudice to the defendant.

Leave was granted to issue the statement of claim and extend time for service.

A teenage plaintiff became paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The plaintiffs alleged the municipality breached its duties under the Occupier’s Liability Act by failing to monitor the park, trim or remove the tree, or prohibit tree climbing.

The court held that the municipality’s inspection and maintenance practices were reasonable and that the risk of injury from climbing the tree was not reasonably foreseeable given the absence of prior complaints or incidents.

The court rejected arguments that the municipality should have altered or removed the tree or enacted prohibitions on climbing.

The action was dismissed, although the court stated that if liability had been established the plaintiff’s contributory negligence would have been assessed at 67 percent.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding that two individuals were not covered under renewal insurance policies from 2009 through 2011.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the individuals no longer met the definition of insured because they had been terminated as foster parents in 2008.

Furthermore, under the claims-made policy, no proceedings were commenced against them after the effective date of the renewal policies.

The plaintiffs sued various provincial and municipal officials for negligent investigation, malfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches after the plaintiff Hilary Payne was charged with arson by negligence following a fire at a student rental property.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against one defendant (an engineer-in-training) and the Charter claims under ss. 8, 11(d), and 11(g).

However, the court dismissed the balance of the summary judgment motions, finding that the novel issues of duty of care, standard of care, causation, and statutory immunity required a full trial to resolve conflicting evidence and assess credibility.

Two applications sought interpretation of an insurance policy issued to a Children’s Aid Society concerning legal expense coverage for foster parents charged with Criminal Code offences.

The applicants argued that the $500,000 aggregate limit applied per policy year, allowing stacking across successive policy periods in which defence costs were incurred.

The insurer argued that the legal expense rider was a claims‑made policy triggered only in the policy period when the criminal proceedings commenced and that coverage was limited to a single $500,000 aggregate limit.

The court held that the wording of the rider allowed aggregate limits to accumulate across policy periods but concluded that the foster parents ceased to qualify as “insureds” after their termination.

As a result, recovery remained limited to the $500,000 aggregate available under the 2008–2009 policy.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 30.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking production of a statement prepared by a property manager shortly after a motor vehicle accident on a commercial parking lot.

The statement had been created following the accident after the property manager contacted the insurer and an adjuster and anticipated litigation.

The court held that litigation privilege attached because the dominant purpose of the investigation and statement was to prepare for potential litigation and assist the employer’s defence.

The court further held that privilege was not waived when the witness reviewed the statement prior to her examination for discovery.

The motion for production was therefore dismissed.

The appellants sued a police detective and others for misfeasance in public office, relying in their statement of claim on testimony the detective gave at a coroner's inquest.

The motions judge struck the paragraphs referencing the inquest testimony under Rule 25.11, finding the testimony protected by s. 42(1) of the Coroners Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of paragraphs that explicitly relied on the testimony to establish civil liability, but allowed the appeal regarding one paragraph that did not expressly refer to the testimony, finding it was not a 'clearest case' for striking at the pleadings stage.