Shadrach R. McCooeye

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act for a psychosexual assessment of the respondent father, A.L.-S., due to his history of sexual assault convictions and concerns about risk to the child.

The maternal grandmother supported the motion, while the father opposed it, arguing it was unnecessary, invasive, and infringed his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society failed to demonstrate the assessment was "necessary" as required by section 98, noting that the father's criminal record was already before the court and his insight could be tested via cross-examination.

The court also expressed uncertainty about the assessment's methodology, particularly the reliance solely on phallometric testing, and its relevance given the existing evidence.

The father (P.W.) appealed a trial judge's decision finding his children in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and placing them in the mother's custody with supervised access for the father.

The father argued the trial judge erred in applying the Act, misapprehended evidence, and erred in judicial notice and risk assessment.

The Children's Aid Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the trial judge's flexible approach to evidence and findings.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of need for protection and the disposition, upholding the flexible approach to evidence in child protection cases and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings and assessment of the children's best interests.

The father brought a motion to change final orders regarding decision-making, parenting time, and child support.

He sought decision-making authority, primary residence, and a retroactive reduction in child support.

The mother opposed the changes.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a complete breakdown in communication between the parents, but determined it was in the children's best interests for the mother to retain decision-making authority and primary residence.

The court ordered the parties to use OurFamilyWizard for all communication.

The court adjusted ongoing child support based on the father's current income but declined to order a retroactive reduction for previous years due to his delay in seeking relief.

The parties were also ordered to proportionately share extraordinary extracurricular expenses.

The applicant society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer brought motions to allow counsel, parties, and witnesses to attend an upcoming child protection trial remotely via Zoom due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing that witnesses whose credibility was in issue should testify in person.

The court granted the motions, finding that the pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying remote testimony, provided that the audio and video quality did not jeopardize the fairness of the hearing.

A hybrid hearing was ordered subject to specific pre-conditions.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion to suspend the respondent father's in-person access to their child during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The child suffers from hypotonia (floppy baby syndrome) with respiratory issues and other underlying conditions.

The mother sought to suspend all in-person access until deemed safe by a medical professional.

The court found that while COVID-19 constituted a material change in circumstances, it was insufficient on its own to justify suspension of the existing access order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that appropriate compliance with public health directives could mitigate risk.

Access was permitted to recommence after April 24, 2020, subject to specified safety precautions.

This appeal concerned the determination of a child's Indigenous background under section 90 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The motions judge had found the child to be a First Nations person based on the father's self-identification and his maternal grandfather's identification.

The appellant, Batchewana First Nation, argued that this evidence was insufficient and that a simple statement of self-identification could not establish band affiliation for the purposes of the Act.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the motions judge erred in law by relying solely on self-identification without a sufficient evidentiary foundation connecting the child to the community, and made a palpable and overriding error by overstating the evidence regarding the lack of contradiction.

The appeal was granted, and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to strike affidavit evidence filed by the Children's Aid Society on a summary judgment motion.

The father argued that under recent appellate jurisprudence, the court was required to automatically vet and excise non-trial-worthy evidence before responding parties filed their materials.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the responsibility remains on the parties to file trial-worthy evidence and to raise specific objections via a motion to strike, rather than imposing an automatic initial vetting process on the court.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

This is a ruling on a voir dire held in a summary judgment motion in a child protection application.

The Children's Aid Society sought findings that two children were in need of protection, an order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised paternal access.

The voir dire addressed the admissibility of two letters from Office of the Children's Lawyer counsel containing the views and wishes of the children.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to determine which statements were admissible, requiring that statements describe the contemporaneous emotional state of the children without describing the cause of that state.

The applicant society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three First Nations children (ages 13, 10, and 7) following their apprehension by warrant due to domestic violence in the home.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion.

The court applied the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, determining that reasonable grounds existed to believe the children were at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a non-removal order.

The court considered placement with the maternal grandfather as a relative under the statutory preference for kinship placements and found it to be in the children's best interests, subject to conditions including the removal of adult siblings from the grandfather's home.

This is a motion by the respondent father to vary an interim access order in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The father sought to increase his access to his 13-year-old daughter, A., from five hours every second Sunday to weekly access.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the variation, arguing the father had not demonstrated material change in circumstances and that the child's stability and therapeutic needs required maintaining the status quo.

The court found that significant changes in circumstances had occurred since the original order was made, including the father's active participation in the case, improved family support, employment prospects, and the child's expressed wishes to spend more time with her father.

The court granted the variation, increasing access to weekly visits while maintaining supervision and conditions appropriate to the child's best interests.

This is a ruling on a motion brought by the respondent father in a status review proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The father sought an order that his 13-year-old daughter have interim access to him, framed as the child being the access holder rather than the father.

The court ruled that the motion claim was improperly before the court because the father had not made a corresponding claim in his Answer for a final order, had not complied with statutory notice requirements, and was not bringing the motion under the proper procedural framework.

The court found that while the father has standing to bring such applications under the statute, he must do so in compliance with the applicable statutory and procedural requirements.

A child protection matter involving two children where the Children's Aid Society sought conditions restricting contact between the children and SM, the mother's new partner, due to concerns about domestic violence, substance abuse, and non-compliance with a voluntary safety agreement.

The court granted a temporary order for care and custody with conditions under section 94(2)(b) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, allowing the children to remain with the mother subject to supervision and specific terms.

The decision addresses significant procedural issues regarding short notice in child protection proceedings and the distinction between direct applications and traditional apprehensions.

This is a child protection matter involving a motion to strike evidence filed by the respondent father in a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society.

The society sought deemed custody to the mother and restricted access to the father of two children, ages 7 and 6.

The father moved to strike affidavit material and documentary evidence that he contended would not be admissible at trial, relying on guidance from the Kawartha decision.

The court addressed procedural issues including late-filed motions, the scope of the motion to strike, and the proper application of evidentiary rules on summary judgment motions in child protection cases.

This is a temporary care and custody hearing in a child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

The society sought placement of five children with their mother subject to society supervision and twelve conditions for twelve months.

The mother opposed the motion and sought placement with no supervision or conditions, alternatively with less restrictive conditions.

The court considered the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and the principles governing temporary care and custody orders.

The court found that the father of the two youngest children posed minimal risk given his current circumstances, including house arrest and criminal charges.

The court granted temporary care and custody to the mother for three of the children without supervision or conditions, granted limited supervision and conditions for the two youngest children, and made no order regarding one child pending further evidence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a parenting capacity assessment under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The central issue was what documentation should be provided to the assessor prior to conducting the assessment.

The father's counsel argued that providing extensive background materials would create confirmatory bias, while the Society contended that such information was necessary for a meaningful assessment.

The court held that while not all affidavit materials need be automatically provided in advance, the assessor must have discretion to request any information deemed necessary to properly answer the assessment questions.

The court ordered that a brief factual summary, discussions with child protection workers, and any further materials requested by the assessor be provided.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to determine whether a child born in 2018 is a First Nations child and, if so, whether the child identifies with the Batchewana First Nation.

The motion also sought orders to add the Batchewana First Nation as a party respondent and to transfer conduct of the proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services.

The court found that the child is a First Nations child based on the father's self-identification as an Aboriginal person with Batchewana First Nation heritage and his maternal grandfather's Aboriginal ancestry.

The court granted the motion, adding Batchewana First Nation as a respondent party and substituting Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services as the applicant.

This is a decision under section 90(2)(b) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) regarding the identification of a child's First Nations status and band affiliation in a Status Review Application.

The child, age 6, was previously identified under the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) as not being an Indian or native child.

The court determined that the child is a First Nations child based on the mother's identification of the child as such, and identified the child's band as Michipicoten Band based on the mother's indication that the child identifies with that band through maternal family ties.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma for production of records from the Sault Ste.

Marie Police Service, Ontario Provincial Police, and Ministry of Community Safety and Corrections regarding the respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The mother did not oppose production; the father opposed.

The court granted production from the Sault Ste.

Marie Police Service for the period following a prior production order, finding the relevance test under section 130 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act was met.

The court declined to order production from the other two record holders due to insufficient evidence of relevance.

In a child protection status review proceeding, the court determined whether a four-year-old child should be placed in temporary care and custody with a non-parent third party (the father's ex-girlfriend) or with the Children's Aid Society in foster care.

The father had breached multiple conditions of a supervision order, including being intoxicated while caring for the child.

The court rejected placement with the paternal grandmother due to jurisdictional concerns (she resided in Michigan), rejected placement with the mother due to her unsuitability as a caregiver, and ultimately ordered placement with the ex-girlfriend subject to a supervision order by the society.

The court emphasized the statutory preference for kinship placements over society care and the importance of maintaining the child's connections with significant persons in his life.