28 total
Applicant awarded $5,000 in costs following successful family law application and reasonable offer to settle.
The applicant sought costs following a successful family law application.
The court considered the applicant's success and her genuine attempts to resolve the matter through an offer to settle.
Applying Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $5,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable forthwith by the respondent.
Applicant granted sole custody, child support based on imputed income, equalization, and a restraining order in uncontested trial.
The applicant sought sole custody, child support, equalization, and a restraining order in an uncontested trial after the respondent failed to file an answer or provide financial disclosure.
The court granted the applicant sole custody of the parties' special needs child, with no access to the respondent.
Income was imputed to the respondent at $50,000 for child support purposes, and he was ordered to pay table support and 75% of section 7 expenses.
The court also ordered an equalization payment of $11,625 to the applicant and issued a restraining order against the respondent due to his past abusive behaviour and threats.
The court dismissed a motion to transfer a child protection proceeding to a native children's aid society because the society lacked jurisdiction under its ministerial designation.
The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.
The child subject to the proceeding (H.S.) was identified as non-status and not an Indian or native child under the Child and Family Services Act.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to provide services in this case.
The court held that jurisdictional compliance with the Minister's designation cannot be overridden by efficiency or duplication of services arguments, and that the court has authority to determine whether a society has jurisdiction to be the applicant in a child protection proceeding.
The court granted a motion to transfer a child protection proceeding to a newly designated native children's aid society after confirming its jurisdiction.
This decision addresses a motion by Children's Aid Society of Algoma (Algoma CAS) seeking to substitute Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services (Nogdawindamin CAS) as the applicant in child protection proceedings.
The motion arises from the recent designation of Nogdawindamin, a native agency, as a children's aid society effective April 1, 2017.
The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which contains both geographical and personal jurisdictional components, as well as conditions restricting certain functions pending consultation and coordination with other First Nations communities.
The court determined that the children and mother in this case, as registered or eligible members of Batchewana First Nation, fall within Nogdawindamin CAS's jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of its designation.
The motion was granted, and the proceeding was transferred to Nogdawindamin CAS with ancillary orders for change of solicitors and amendment of the title of the proceeding.
The court determined temporary care and custody placements for five children, refusing a consent return for the youngest.
This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.
The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.
The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.
The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.
The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.
Interim mobility motion granted allowing mother to relocate child due to concerns over father's severe alcohol-related incident.
The applicant father and respondent mother brought competing motions regarding the mother's request to relocate their child to Sudbury.
The mother had moved to Sudbury for better economic opportunities and to live with her new partner.
The court considered the father's history of a severe drinking and driving incident, which raised concerns about his sobriety and the child's safety in his care.
Finding no such risks with the mother's plan, the court granted interim custody to the mother and permitted the child's relocation to Sudbury, with access to the father.
No costs were awarded as the court questioned the urgency of the mother's initial move.
The court granted a temporary care and custody order with society supervision, imposing reasonable conditions while rejecting overly intrusive ones.
A motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma seeking a temporary care and custody order under section 51(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act.
The society sought to place three children in the care of their mother subject to society supervision and numerous terms and conditions.
The mother opposed the motion and sought an order under section 51(2)(a) with no supervision or conditions.
The father of the youngest child supported the society's position.
The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of alcohol abuse, domestic discord, violence, questionable caregiver arrangements, and inadequate supervision.
The court granted the society's motion but modified several proposed conditions, finding some to be unreasonable or overly intrusive for a temporary order.
The court dismissed the application for child support, finding the 16-year-old applicant had voluntarily withdrawn from parental control.
The applicants sought child support from the respondent parents for E.G., who was 18 years old at the time of trial and had been living with Janet McGonegal since March 2011 when she was 16.
The applicants sought retroactive child support from April 1, 2011, ongoing child support, and coverage of extraordinary expenses for E.G.'s continued education.
The respondents argued that E.G. had voluntarily withdrawn from their parental control at age 16 and therefore were not obligated to provide support under section 31(2) of the Family Law Act.
The court found that E.G. had withdrawn from parental control voluntarily and that the withdrawal was not involuntary.
The application was dismissed in its entirety.