Superior Court of Justice

The self-represented plaintiff filed a $3 million claim against the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), alleging the CRA negligently permitted her ex-husband to use her identity to obtain an EFILE number.

The CRA brought a motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff evaded service and failed to attend the hearing.

The court proceeded in her absence, struck the statement of claim in its entirety without leave to amend, finding that the CRA owed no duty of care or fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and that the claims of malfeasance, conspiracy, and other torts lacked material facts.

Costs of $14,500 were awarded to the CRA.

A non-party in an estate litigation matter brought a motion seeking the recusal of the presiding judge, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The non-party argued that the judge breached natural justice by disclosing an ex parte Mareva injunction motion to opposing counsel and dismissing it without reading the materials.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality, noting that the materials were reviewed, written reasons were provided, and the existence of the motion was public information.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in an action for debt collection and breach of trust under the Construction Act.

Due to pandemic-related delays in exchanging records, the parties consented to convert the matter into a two-day summary trial.

The court scheduled the summary trial, directed the parties to a pre-trial conference, and exempted the action from mandatory mediation.

The tenant plaintiffs brought an action to prevent the new landlord from terminating their commercial lease.

The landlord counterclaimed and brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it validly exercised the 'termination for remodelling' clause in the lease.

The tenant argued the landlord acted in bad faith and was estopped from terminating early due to a prior lease renewal.

The court found the landlord properly invoked the termination clause, as the proposed demolition and remodelling would render the tenant's continued possession impracticable.

The court found no evidence of bad faith or promissory estoppel.

The action was dismissed and the counterclaim allowed.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike out claims for damages for conspiracy made in the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendant argued that the Competition Act precludes conspiracy allegations relating to price maintenance, that directing minds cannot conspire with their corporation, that the principle of merger precludes the claims, and that special damages were not properly pleaded.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the law on price maintenance conspiracy is unsettled, the directing minds' alleged conduct was tortious in itself, the principle of merger applies at trial rather than the pleadings stage, and pleading the same special damages for both substantive wrongs and conspiracy is sufficient.

The defendant, having been successful in the underlying action regarding its right to rebroadcast a 1984 interview, sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued the defendant should be deprived of costs due to morally offensive conduct in rebroadcasting the program, which posed a safety risk to the plaintiff.

The court found no morally offensive behaviour, noting the defendant acted responsibly by removing the interview once alerted to the plaintiff's concerns.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $9,042.04, holding that sympathy for the plaintiff's situation is not a basis to refuse costs.

The accused, charged with major drug trafficking offences, applied to vary his strict bail conditions to change his residential surety and permit him to operate a liquidation business.

The court found that while there was a material change in circumstances regarding the current surety, the proposed replacement surety was not equipped to properly supervise the accused.

The court also found no material change of circumstances justifying the accused's return to work, noting that his proposed liquidation business posed an unacceptable risk of re-offending given his history of bail breaches and the nature of the charges.

The application to vary bail was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to strike the defendants’ civil jury notice in a motor vehicle personal injury action, arguing that pandemic-related suspension of jury trials created unacceptable delay and prejudice.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed the request to strike the jury notice, holding that the moving party had not met the substantial onus of showing that justice would be better served by a judge-alone trial.

The court found the evidentiary record deficient on both sides, noted that civil jury trials in Toronto had an anticipated resumption date rather than an indefinite suspension, and accepted that a wait-and-see approach was appropriate in the circumstances.

The dismissal was without prejudice to a future renewed motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause significant delay if the matter proceeded before a jury.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide cogent evidence of prejudice or that the delay in the Toronto Region would be significant once the suspension of civil jury trials was lifted.

The court held that justice to the parties would not be better served by striking the jury notice.

The defendants filed a request under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's 120-page statement of claim, arguing the issues had already been litigated before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The court declined to dismiss the proceeding under Rule 2.1, finding that the res judicata argument required referencing extrinsic evidence, which is inappropriate for a Rule 2.1 request unless the conclusion is plain and obvious.

The court directed the defendants to bring a formal motion on notice.

The applicant sought bail pending his appeal of a sexual assault conviction and a 15-month sentence.

While the applicant met the criteria for showing the appeal was not frivolous and that he would surrender into custody, the court found his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court noted the applicant's recent diagnoses of severe mental health issues and subsequent charges for attempted murder and assault while on bail.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed, but the court ordered the appeal hearing to be expedited.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, which was commenced nearly 16 years after the allegedly negligent jaw surgery.

The plaintiffs argued the 15-year ultimate limitation period should be tolled under section 15(4) of the Limitations Act, 2002, claiming the mother lacked capacity to commence a proceeding and that the defendants wilfully concealed medical records.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide persuasive medical or psychological evidence of incapacity and failed to establish any wilful concealment by the defendants.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The respondent filed a motion regarding a prior endorsement that dealt with the applicant's motion to sever the divorce from other issues.

The respondent had not initially responded to the applicant's motion but now sought to contest it and requested more time to obtain counsel.

The respondent failed to specify the orders sought in his motion.

The court dismissed the motion as unfounded, noting that a motion failing to specify the orders sought constitutes a waste of time or an abuse of process under Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules, and that the court has the right to rule on the merits of a motion without obtaining a response from the opposing party.

Following a successful motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the self-represented plaintiff made unfounded allegations, his conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible or scandalous behaviour required for an elevated costs award.

The court awarded the defendants their costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Following the dismissal of the applicant tenant's application for court approval of a lease assignment, the respondent landlord sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The underlying application had been dismissed without prejudice to being re-opened, but the issue became moot when the proposed new tenants withdrew.

The court declined to award costs to the landlord, finding that the dismissal was not a vindication of the landlord's legal position and that the litigation conduct of both parties was driven by mistrust.

No order as to costs was made.

The plaintiff brought a motion for directions following a successful appeal of an arbitration, seeking to proceed expeditiously after losing confidence in the arbitrator.

All parties agreed to adjourn the motion pending an evaluation from Tarion regarding the return of deposits.

The court agreed it was in the interests of justice to adjourn the matter to August 5, 2021.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs argued that the indefinite suspension of civil jury trials in Thunder Bay due to the COVID-19 pandemic would cause severe prejudice, including the erosion of damages due to inflation and statutory deductibles.

The defendant urged a 'wait and see' approach.

The court granted the motion, finding that the local conditions and the indefinite delay of jury trials in the Northwest Region caused real prejudice that outweighed the defendant's right to a jury trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to declare the transfer of a property from the judgment debtor to his spouse as a fraudulent conveyance.

The transfer occurred shortly after a draft judgment of $1.5 million (U.S.) was released against the debtor.

The defendants argued the plaintiff lacked standing, the action was statute-barred, and counterclaimed for slander of title.

The court found the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors, dismissed the defendants' motion to adduce new evidence, dismissed the counterclaim, and granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, including a tracing order to a subsequently purchased property.

The plaintiffs commenced a third separate action in Toronto against neonatal care professionals and a hospital for injuries sustained by a newborn, having already commenced two actions in Brampton for the same injuries arising from a car accident and birthing care.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Toronto action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs should have sought leave to add them to the existing Brampton actions.

The court agreed, finding the separate action was a tactical maneuver to avoid the leave requirement and potential limitation period defences.

The court stayed the Toronto action pending a motion to amend in Brampton, while strongly criticizing the parties for engaging in costly and delaying procedural disputes contrary to the culture shift mandated by Hryniak.

The parties separated following a violent altercation resulting in criminal charges against the applicant father.

On this motion, both parties sought orders regarding parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support for their 21-month-old child.

The court granted the respondent mother sole decision-making responsibility and extended a no-contact order due to the history of family violence.

The court removed the supervision requirement for the father's parenting time and gradually increased his daytime visits, but denied overnight visits pending evidence of stability.

The father was also ordered to pay child support based on his reported income, subject to further financial disclosure.