Superior Court of Justice

The appellant Fund appealed an Arbitrator's decision finding that a taxi company's SPF 6 insurance policy was not a 'motor vehicle liability policy' under the Insurance Act, and therefore did not include Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs).

The court found that while the Arbitrator erred in law by concluding that a corporation is not a 'person' under the Act, the Arbitrator made no palpable and overriding error in determining that the taxis were not driven by employees, agents, or on behalf of the taxi company.

The court upheld the finding that an SPF 6 commercial general liability endorsement is not a motor vehicle liability policy intended to carry SABs.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion for summary judgment.

At a case conference, the parties agreed not to proceed with the summary judgment motion at this time and consented to a timetable for mediation, documentary discovery, and oral discovery.

The court established the timetable and remained seized of any scheduling issues, noting it was too early to determine if a streamlined trial procedure would be appropriate.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action moved to strike the jury notice because pandemic-related public health restrictions made it unlikely a civil jury trial could proceed as scheduled in June 2021.

The defendant opposed, preferring to adjourn the trial until a jury was available.

The court noted that local conditions in Kingston meant no civil jury trials would be held in 2021, and an adjournment would delay the trial until at least April 2022, causing prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering that if the case is called during the June 2021 sittings, it will proceed without a jury, but if it must be adjourned due to lack of judicial resources, the jury notice may be restored if a jury trial is available at the rescheduled date.

The applicant sought to schedule a date for the hearing of an Application claiming $120,000 in damages for repair costs to trucks and loss of income.

The applicant argued the matter could proceed under Rule 14.05(3)(h) as there were unlikely to be material facts in dispute.

The court declined to schedule the Application, holding that a proceeding to recover damages arising out of negligence or breach of contract should be brought by Action, not Application.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence medical examination with a neurologist in Toronto.

The plaintiff opposed the location, providing uncontroverted medical evidence from her treating physician and psychologist that she could not tolerate car travel longer than 30 minutes due to her injuries from a skid steer accident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while defendants have a prima facie right to choose their medical expert, this right is not unfettered when it compromises the plaintiff's well-being.

The defendants were granted leave to arrange an examination within a 30-minute drive of the plaintiff's residence.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on two defaulted loans totaling $1,000,000 made to the corporate defendant and guaranteed by the individual defendant.

The defendants argued that a $300,000 payment made to the plaintiff's sole director was a partial repayment of the loans, while the plaintiff claimed it was a separate personal loan.

The court granted summary judgment but found that the $300,000 payment constituted a pre-payment on the principal of the loans, reducing the judgment amount accordingly.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to answer questions refused or taken under advisement during examinations for discovery in a $20 million road construction dispute.

The central issue in the action is responsibility for excess rock excavation.

The court dismissed most of the defendants' requests, finding that questions about a 1994 litigation between the parties were irrelevant and that the plaintiffs' answers regarding their blasting subcontractor were sufficient and proportionate.

The plaintiffs were ordered to provide a written answer regarding how they would have bid the job differently only if their expert report provided sufficient data to do so.

The applicant husband sought a declaration that the parties' 2009 marriage contract was valid.

The respondent wife challenged its validity, alleging duress, inadequate financial disclosure, and unconscionability.

At trial, the wife chose not to cross-examine the husband or his former lawyer on the issues of duress or unconscionability, violating the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The court found that the wife failed to establish grounds to set aside the contract under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, noting that she had independent legal advice, the contract listed the husband's corporate interests, and she did not pursue further disclosure at the time.

The marriage contract was declared valid.

The defendant 2613497 Ontario Inc. moved under Rule 37.14 to set aside a Mareva injunction and discharge Certificates of Pending Litigation, arguing the original order was obtained without notice and without full and fair disclosure.

The court found that the defendant's lawyers of record had participated in case conferences and filed responding materials for the original motion, establishing that the defendant had notice.

As the motion was not made without notice, Rule 37.14 did not apply, and the court dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against a defendant driver who failed to defend an action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The co-defendant insurer opposed the motion, arguing that liability for the accident remained a live issue in the ongoing claim against it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the evidentiary record insufficient to determine liability and noting that granting partial default judgment could lead to inconsistent findings of fact at trial.

The defendant estate moved for summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident claim, arguing that the deceased owner could not have been driving the offending vehicle and had not consented to anyone else possessing it.

The plaintiff's insurer opposed the motion, presenting hearsay evidence that the owner's son had previously driven the car and may have had implied consent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a trial was necessary to assess the credibility of witnesses and determine whether the driver had possession of the vehicle with the owner's consent.

The mother brought a motion to adjourn the family law trial for a year, citing a disability and arguing the court had a duty to accommodate her under human rights legislation.

The father opposed the lengthy adjournment and brought a motion to unseal an incomplete Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) report.

The court found the mother's medical evidence insufficient to justify a year-long adjournment and noted her failure to specify required accommodations.

However, the court adjourned the trial to the fall sittings due to overall lack of trial readiness.

The father's unsealing motion was adjourned, the mother's request for child counsel was dismissed, and the father's request for police enforcement of parenting time was dismissed without prejudice.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement following a violent, random attack on a stranger in a public place.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 8 to 10 years, while the defence sought 4 years, citing the accused's Indigenous background and Gladue factors.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors of the unprovoked, prolonged attack against the mitigating factors of the accused's guilty plea, remorse, and Indigenous background.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the MCI and Zebu Defendants for breach of contract regarding unpaid construction invoices.

The defendants had been noted in default and were deemed to admit the allegations in the statement of claim under s. 54(4) of the Construction Act.

The court found the evidence corroborated the claim and granted default judgment in the amount of $116,382.46.

Following precedent, the court determined it must issue a report rather than a judgment, as the motion took place within a reference.

Substantial indemnity costs of $7,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the children to the matrimonial home and primary care after the respondent mother unilaterally left with them to a shelter.

The mother raised concerns regarding the father's anger and verbal abuse.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding it imprudent to order the children's return on an inadequate factual record.

The court ordered that the father's parenting time remain supervised pending further investigation by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80.

He argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his lost evidence application regarding unrecorded 911 calls, finding the roadside screening demand was made 'forthwith', and concluding his right to counsel was not breached despite a delay in implementation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings that the 911 recordings never existed, the brief delay in the breath demand was justified by the officer managing the collision scene alone, and privacy for a phone call to counsel could not be provided until arrival at the police station.

The Crown applied for a ruling on a voir dire that the accused's formal statement to the police was voluntary and admissible at trial.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to meet its burden because it did not call every police officer who had contact with the accused at the police station.

The court found that there is no rule requiring the Crown to call every officer, and based on the evidence presented, the statement was given freely and voluntarily.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to amend their Amended Notice of Application to add Sentry Insurance Company, Teva Canada Limited, and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA as respondents.

The proposed respondents consented to the relief sought.

The court granted the motion on consent, with the application against the newly added parties to be adjourned to a later date.

The accused was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a strip search at the police station.

The accused brought an application to exclude the cocaine seized from his residence, arguing the strip search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the police failed to follow the Golden framework and their own policies, conducting the search in a non-private area and leaving the accused completely naked.

The court concluded this was a serious breach of s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding that the deliberate and cavalier police conduct outweighed the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The applicants and respondent owned adjacent rowhouses.

The applicants' front veranda and a portion of their rear wall encroached onto the respondent's property.

The applicants sought a declaration of possessory title by adverse possession, relying on statutory declarations from the respondent's predecessor in title acknowledging the encroachments and her exclusion from the land between 1975 and 1990.

The court found that the physical layout and the predecessor's acquiescence satisfied the test for adverse possession before the land was converted to the Land Titles system.

The applicants' claim was granted and the respondent's cross-application for removal of the structures was dismissed.