Environmental Law - SCJ

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a proposed class action for settlement purposes regarding Volkswagen's installation of a 'defeat device' in certain diesel vehicles.

The court found that the requirements under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act were met, including an identifiable class and common issues.

The court also determined it had jurisdiction to certify a national class, noting the efficiency and comity of doing so.

The motion for certification, along with the approval of an unprecedentedly comprehensive notice plan, was granted.

The plaintiffs purchased a property that had been previously owned and remediated by the defendant, Chrysler.

The plaintiffs sued Chrysler for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, alleging inadequate remediation and reliance on public statements made by Chrysler about the clean-up.

Chrysler moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that caveat emptor applied, Chrysler owed no duty of care to a subsequent purchaser, and there was no special relationship or reasonable reliance to support a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The Town of Georgina brought a motion for an interim restraining order to prevent the respondents from dumping fill on a former pit property without a permit under the Town's Site Alteration By-law.

The respondents argued they were importing fill to rehabilitate the land pursuant to a site plan under the Aggregate Resources Act.

The court granted the interim restraining order, finding a serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm to the respondents if delayed, and that the balance of convenience favoured the Town and the province, as the corporate owner of the land had been dissolved and the property was vested in the Crown.

The plaintiff commenced an action in 1989 alleging the defendants dumped coal tar waste that migrated onto its property.

After 25 years of litigation, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the initial 14 years of delay were excusable due to collaborative settlement efforts, the plaintiff's failure to advance the litigation after 2003 was inordinate and inexcusable.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, as it had not preserved the evidence of key witnesses who had since passed away.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs purchased lots in an industrial subdivision and sued the municipality for negligent misrepresentation, alleging they relied on a letter from the building director indicating building permits would be available.

The plaintiffs claimed the letter failed to disclose that the Ministry of the Environment required a section 45 approval before permits could issue.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the letter was not misleading and that the plaintiffs failed to read the subdivision agreement, which explicitly stated the requirement for environmental approval.

The court also held that the action was statute-barred as the plaintiffs ought to have discovered the material facts more than six years before commencing the lawsuit.

The plaintiff municipality brought a motion for an interlocutory mandatory order requiring the defendants to remove a berm constructed on their property adjacent to a municipal road.

The municipality argued the berm caused flooding in the road's drainage ditches, creating safety hazards and potential damage to the pavement structure, and blocked water flow to a provincially significant wetland.

The defendants claimed the flooding was caused by the municipality's own ditch maintenance work.

The court preferred the municipality's expert evidence, finding the berm caused the flooding and was located within the wetland setback in breach of conservation regulations.

The court held that the municipal ditch formed part of the 'highway' under the Municipal Act, 2001, and granted a statutory injunction and an injunction for public nuisance, ordering the defendants to remove the berm.

Suncor Energy Products Inc. brought an application to quash several municipal by-laws passed by the Town of Plympton-Wyoming that restricted the development of a wind farm project.

The court found that By-Law 50 of 2012 was invalid for vagueness and uncertainty, and conflicted with provincial legislation regarding renewable energy approvals.

The court also quashed portions of By-Law 6 of 2012 relating to building permit fees and security deposits, and portions of By-Law 75 of 2012 imposing development charges for wind turbines, finding them ultra vires.

The court declared that the Town's zoning by-laws passed under the Planning Act did not apply to the renewable energy undertaking.

The plaintiffs, engaged in the hazardous waste disposal business, were investigated by Environment Canada, resulting in the execution of two search warrants and the laying of charges.

The plaintiffs commenced multiple Small Claims Court actions against the Crown defendants and various officials, alleging improper conduct during the investigations and searches.

These actions were transferred to the Superior Court and consolidated.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to divide the action into four separate claims and to add new causes of action, including negligence, Charter breaches, misfeasance in public office, and malicious prosecution, as well as new parties.

The defendants opposed the amendments, arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend, finding that the original pleadings contained sufficient material facts to support the alternative theories of liability, while granting the defendants leave to raise limitation period defences in respect of certain claims.

In a complex construction lien and environmental remediation dispute, the parties brought cross-motions to compel answers to questions refused during examinations for discovery.

The owner sought answers from the remediation contractor regarding its prior experience and sampling protocols.

The contractor sought information and documents from the owner regarding the historical environmental condition of the property and its 1981 purchase agreement.

Applying the relevance test informed by proportionality, the court ordered the contractor to answer questions about its experience and subcontractor control, and ordered the owner to produce historical environmental information and the 1981 purchase documents, as they were relevant to the allegations of negligence and failure to mitigate.

The applicant purchaser sought to void a commercial real estate transaction and recover $5.913 million from the respondent vendor, claiming the vendor failed to provide a copy of an environmental Director's Order prior to closing as required by s. 197 of the Environmental Protection Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding on a balance of probabilities that the vendor did provide the order.

Alternatively, the court held that the applicant was estopped from voiding the transaction because its solicitors had represented to the vendor prior to closing that they had no outstanding concerns regarding the receipt of the order.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding it liable in nuisance, trespass, and negligence for noise and odour emanating from its temporary asphalt plant.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of liability in nuisance, concluding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the severity of the interference or the character of the neighbourhood.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to qualify an expert witness employed by an environmental advocacy group, finding her employment did not automatically disqualify her.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding trespass and negligence, finding that noise and odour are indirect intrusions that do not constitute trespass, and that the respondents suffered no personal injury or property damage compensable in negligence.

The damages award of $14,700 was upheld.

Following a successful application to declare a municipal by-law invalid, the applicant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of an offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The respondent argued each party should bear its own costs due to the public interest nature of the case.

The court awarded costs to the applicant, finding the public interest exception did not apply.

However, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 because the applicant's offer contained terms beyond the scope of the litigation.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $74,006.60, adjusting the claimed rates to 60% of substantial indemnity rates.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to strike the plaintiff's claims in strict liability, negligence, and nuisance arising from environmental contamination.

The strict liability claim was struck on consent.

The court held that the plaintiff's claims for damages other than property devaluation were statute-barred because the limitation period resumed when the class action abandoned those claims in 2002.

However, the claim for property devaluation was not statute-barred as the limitation period remained suspended until the plaintiff was excluded from the class in 2009.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the remaining claims.

ERM brought motions to consolidate four related actions arising from environmental contamination and a remediation agreement, and to strike the property owners' claims for contribution, indemnity, and nuisance.

The court dismissed the motion to consolidate, finding that the actions should be tried together to avoid prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to separate counsel and to prevent circumvention of limitation periods.

The court also dismissed the motions to strike, holding that the claims for contribution and indemnity were not premature given ongoing Ministry of the Environment involvement, and that it was not plain and obvious the nuisance claims would fail.

The defendant commercial tenant brought a Rule 21 motion to determine a question of law, arguing that the commercial lease agreement allocated the risk of loss from an oil spill to the plaintiff landlord, thereby barring claims in negligence and contract.

The court reviewed the lease provisions and the Supreme Court of Canada trilogy on the allocation of risk in commercial leases.

The court found no clear language in the lease absolving the tenant of liability for its own negligence, nor any evidence the tenant paid increased insurance premiums.

The motion was dismissed, with the court also declining to dismiss the motion solely on the basis of the defendant's delay in bringing it.

The applicant municipality sought a permanent injunction under section 440 of the Municipal Act, 2001 to restrain the respondent from operating an outdoor wood-burning furnace, alleging it contravened a by-law prohibiting emissions that unreasonably interfere with the normal enjoyment of property.

Neighbours complained of thick smoke infiltrating their homes and preventing outdoor activities.

Applying nuisance law principles, the court balanced the severity of the interference against the utility of the furnace.

The court found the smoke constituted an unreasonable interference during the warmer months and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the operation of the furnace between April 1 and October 15 annually.