Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCJ

The applicant sought appointment as succeeding estate trustee of her late father's estate.

The applicant had previously challenged the validity of her father's will and codicil in a separate proceeding, which was settled in March 2023 with the applicant receiving the entire residue of the estate.

The applicant now sought to be appointed estate trustee to pursue a negligence claim against the lawyer who drafted the will to recover her personal legal fees incurred in the prior proceeding.

The court denied the application, finding that appointing the applicant would create a conflict of interest, that reopening the settled prior proceeding would constitute an abuse of process, and that a serious limitations issue existed under the Trustee Act.

This action arose from a townhouse development project where Sundance Development Corporation (construction manager) and Islington Chauncey Residences Corp. (developer) disputed their services agreement.

Sundance claimed unpaid fees and for materials, asserting Islington repudiated the contract.

Islington counterclaimed for excess construction management costs and damages due to Sundance's alleged negligent management.

The court found that Islington did not repudiate the contract and that Sundance breached the agreement by unilaterally withdrawing services and demanding payments not yet due.

Sundance's claims and lien were dismissed.

Islington's counterclaim was partially granted for replacement construction management costs, steel column rectification, and sprinkler head changes due to Sundance's negligence, resulting in a net judgment in Islington's favour.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant homeowner for unpaid invoices relating to the demolition and reconstruction of a house.

The parties had no written contract and disagreed on whether the arrangement was a fixed-price or cost-plus agreement.

The court found there was no meeting of the minds on price, and therefore no binding contract existed.

The plaintiff's claim was assessed on the basis of quantum meruit.

The court awarded the plaintiff compensation for unpaid labour and some expenses, but denied claims for storage, tool rentals, and markup on materials sourced directly by the defendant.

The defendant's counterclaim for overpayment and delay was dismissed, but a set-off was allowed for the cost of repairing defective pocket doors.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion in a class action against the Federal Government regarding the use of prolonged administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries.

The court found that the Federal Government breached the class members' rights under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter by placing them in administrative segregation for more than 15 days, and that these breaches were not saved by section 1.

The court also found the Federal Government liable for systemic negligence.

The court awarded $20 million in aggregate Charter damages for vindication, deterrence, and compensation, to be distributed equally among the class members, while dismissing the claim for class-wide punitive damages.

The plaintiff sought costs of $5,379.80 on a partial indemnity scale following a motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals.

The defendant argued no costs should be awarded due to divided success, as the plaintiff only obtained orders for 10 of the 27 undertakings and refusals argued.

The court found that while success was divided, the motion was necessary to compel compliance and the defendant had taken an improper position regarding access to its records.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $2,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff, Susan Eks, sued the defendant, Kerri Tadeu, for malicious prosecution, harassment, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and negligent infliction of psychiatric damage, stemming from Tadeu's actions following Eks's criminal conviction for arson and mischief against Tadeu's home.

Tadeu counterclaimed for intentional infliction of mental distress, negligence, nuisance, intimidation, and interference with enjoyment of property, and sought an injunction.

The court dismissed Eks's claim for malicious prosecution, finding Tadeu had reasonable and probable cause and lacked malice in seeking a peace bond.

The harassment claim failed due to a recent Court of Appeal decision.

While Tadeu's conduct of removing and searching Eks's garbage was deemed "flagrant and outrageous," Eks failed to prove it was calculated to cause harm.

Tadeu's counterclaim for intentional infliction of mental suffering also failed as Eks's return to Apollo Terrace was not "flagrant and outrageous" or calculated to harm, and Tadeu did not prove new psychological injury.

All other counterclaims were not made out.

Both the action and counterclaim were dismissed.

The corporate plaintiff by counterclaim alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and inducing breach of contract against the defendants to the counterclaim, arising from refinancing efforts on a residential property and a guarantee signed by one of the defendants.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the necessary elements for both torts, particularly regarding false representation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, and intent to procure a breach of contract.

The counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Hilary Salmon, sued her former lawyer, Jonathan Keslassy, and his firm, Garfin Zeidenberg LLP, for solicitor's negligence.

Salmon alleged that Keslassy provided incorrect advice regarding the limitation period for a potential defamation lawsuit against the Toronto Star.

The court assessed the credibility of both Salmon and Keslassy concerning a pivotal phone call, finding Keslassy's testimony more credible and reliable.

The court concluded that Keslassy had provided the correct limitation period advice (six weeks for notice, three months to commence action).

Consequently, Salmon failed to prove solicitor's negligence.

The court also hypothetically considered the merits of the defamation claim, finding the article likely defamatory but that the defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest would have succeeded, leading to only nominal damages.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought an action in defamation against the defendant, a former union member, for publishing numerous derogatory posts and videos online.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and the defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that an anti-SLAPP motion can be heard concurrently with a summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the posts defamatory and malicious, and awarded a permanent injunction and costs.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff in a defamation action, relying on Rule 56.01(a) due to the plaintiff's ordinary residence outside Ontario.

The court found the plaintiff to be impecunious, demonstrating his financial inability to post security, and that his claim was not plainly devoid of merit.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs, current and former female police officers, sought to certify a class action against the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board and Association for systemic gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment.

The defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that labour arbitrators and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario had exclusive jurisdiction.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction, as the claims arose from the employment relationship governed by a collective agreement and the Police Services Act, which provide a comprehensive dispute resolution scheme.

Furthermore, the court determined that even if it had jurisdiction, the claims did not disclose a viable cause of action under common law, as human rights legislation precludes independent civil actions for discrimination and sexual harassment.

The applicants sought a declaration of exclusive use over a right-of-way (ROW) connected to their property and permanent injunctions against the Ontario Heritage Trust (OHT) and Nicola Ross.

The OHT, as the servient tenement owner, permitted public access to the ROW, which also served as access to the Bruce Trail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the easement did not grant exclusive use to the applicants and that there was no substantial interference with their rights.

The court also found the applicants lacked "clean hands" due to misleading evidence and dismissed the injunction claim against Ms. Ross, noting her statements were consistent with OHT's position and not made with malice.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages for injuries sustained from a trip and fall on a city-owned sidewalk.

The parties settled on damages quantum, leaving liability as the sole issue.

The court applied a two-step analysis under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001, first assessing if the sidewalk was in a reasonable state of repair, considering its character and location.

The court found the sidewalk's discontinuity (11-19 mm, 16 mm at the point of fall) was within the City's adopted Provincial Minimum Maintenance Standards (20 mm maximum) for a small residential street, thus meeting a reasonable standard of repair.

The plaintiff failed to prove the City's non-repair.

Although the action was dismissed, the court also found the plaintiff 20% contributorily negligent for not paying reasonable attention to the sidewalk.

The defendants brought a refusals motion to compel the plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Tuovi, to answer questions during cross-examination on his affidavit.

The questions related to the internal workings, formation, and strategic decisions of a consortium of class counsel prosecuting multi-jurisdictional class actions against the defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the questions were irrelevant to the underlying motion to stay the Ontario action and that, even if raised in the affidavit, the court had discretion not to compel answers to irrelevant questions, particularly those delving into privileged internal communications of the consortium.

The plaintiff, Sharon Mary Irvine, suffered a wrist fracture after falling on the defendants' property.

The fall occurred while she was attempting to step onto a rear porch with an unusually high step, exacerbated by the presence of the defendants' unrestrained pit bull, Tazzie, which was required to be leashed and muzzled under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The court found the defendants negligent under the Occupiers' Liability Act for the unsafe step height and for breaching the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

However, the plaintiff was found contributorily negligent (35%) because the high step was plain and obvious, it was daylight, and she had other options for entry or assistance.

Liability was apportioned 65% to the defendants and 35% to the plaintiff, with damages agreed at $31,500.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging entitlement to a survivor’s pension following the death of her separated spouse.

The court considered the Pension Benefits Act provisions governing mandatory joint and survivor pensions and the effect of spouses living separate and apart at the relevant time.

It held that because the spouses were separated when the first pension payment became due, the statutory requirement for a joint and survivor pension did not apply and the guardian of property was entitled to elect a single life annuity for the member’s benefit.

No duty of care was owed by the Public Guardian and Trustee to the separated spouse, and the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The statement of claim was struck, but leave was granted to deliver a fresh claim against the pension administrator only if based on a possible mandatory plan provision requiring a joint and survivor annuity.

Parties disputed the debts owed by a foundation in connection with funds held from the sale of a building.

The court determined the specific creditors and amounts owing, including debts related to a second mortgage, institutional loans, and private advances.

The court directed that the purchaser of the property could appear within seven days to show cause why the identified debts should not be paid immediately from trust funds held by a law firm or the court registrar.

Absent such notice, the trustee or registrar was ordered to distribute the specified amounts to the named creditors, with any remaining balance payable to the foundation.

Following an earlier refusal to schedule the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the court directed the parties to develop a trial preparation plan.

The parties submitted a proposed plan addressing production, examinations for discovery, undertakings, interlocutory motions, witness evidence, mediation, and trial management.

The court issued detailed case management directions establishing timelines for documentary production, discoveries, undertakings, and mediation, and provided guidance on the conduct of witness evidence and trial scheduling.

The decision also required the parties to schedule discovery-related motions and a further case conference to determine time limits for the anticipated two-week trial.

The applicant sought an interim injunction and relief from forfeiture arising from the cancellation of billboard licence agreements on railway lands.

The respondents terminated the licences and demanded removal of approximately 240 billboard structures and payment of alleged rental arrears.

The court applied the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions and found that although a serious issue existed regarding the parties’ conduct and contractual interpretation, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm because any loss could be compensated by damages.

The balance of convenience did not favour either party.

Interim equitable relief was therefore inappropriate in what was fundamentally a monetary dispute.

The moving party insurer sought an order requiring the corporate plaintiff to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a potential costs award.

The evidence established that the plaintiff corporation was impecunious and had significant writs of execution registered against it.

The moving party further argued that the plaintiff’s lawyers, acting under a deferred fee arrangement and standing to benefit from any recovery, should be required to post security as creditors of the plaintiff.

The court held that although creditors may in some circumstances be required to post security, solicitors acting under deferred fee arrangements are not analogous to creditors or shareholders with control over litigation.

Ordering lawyers to post security would create a significant disincentive to such retainers and undermine access to justice.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed.