SCJ 2019

The court heard two motions concerning the sale of the former matrimonial residence and adjustments to spousal support.

The respondent also sought to sell a jointly held Florida property and two Ontario properties.

The court found the respondent primarily at fault for the delay in selling the matrimonial home and ordered the applicant to purchase the respondent's interest in it under specific terms.

Interim spousal support was varied, with the respondent's income assessed at $200,000 and the applicant's at $20,000, resulting in a monthly payment of $3,675.

The non-depletion order was varied to permit the respondent to sell other properties, subject to conditions preventing asset dissipation.

The court declined jurisdiction over the sale of the Florida property and ordered the applicant to provide an accounting of chattels sold.

The accused brought pre-trial applications alleging racial profiling by police, breach of his right to counsel, and seeking to quash a search warrant for his vehicle.

The accused also sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine the affiant, finding no reasonable likelihood it would assist in challenging the warrant.

The court rejected the accused's evidence entirely, finding the police officer recognized the accused from a recent shooting investigation and did not engage in racial profiling when running his license plate.

The court found the accused was properly provided his right to counsel and that the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the two children were in need of protection and an order for extended society care.

The mother consented to statutory findings but opposed the protection and disposition orders.

The court granted summary judgment on the protection issue, finding the children in need of protection due to the mother's paranoid personality disorder, frequent moves, and use of physical discipline.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the final disposition, as the mother had recently made significant efforts to improve her parenting and engage in counselling.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a police officer on leave serving as union president, was suspended and barred from police facilities following criminal charges.

He sued, alleging interference with his union duties.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute arose either under the collective agreement or the disciplinary regime of the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction and the action was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for armed robbery and immediately requested to speak to his lawyer.

The police failed to facilitate his right to counsel for over three hours, despite having easy access to the lawyer's contact information.

During a search of the accused's vehicle incident to arrest, police located a firearm.

The accused brought an application to exclude the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel due to police negligence and excluded the firearm, concluding its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The plaintiff, a retired insurance producer, brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that both 'assigned' and 'developed' clients should be included in the calculation of his deferred compensation pool under his employment contract.

The defendant employer argued that only 'developed' clients were included.

The court found no ambiguity in the employment contract, concluding that the clear language of the agreement allocated only 'new customers' (developed clients) to the deferred compensation pool.

The plaintiff's motion and claim were dismissed.

The plaintiff subcontractor supplied lumber for the construction of the defendant's home but was not paid.

The plaintiff dealt with an individual named 'Peter' representing the contractor, which was a shell company.

The court found that the defendant homeowner was 'Peter' and the controlling mind of the contractor.

The court held that funds drawn from the defendant's personal account and represented in a bank draft constituted monies received by the contractor, creating a trust under section 8 of the Construction Act.

The defendant was found personally liable for breach of trust under section 13 of the Act and ordered to pay the outstanding invoices.

The applicant church suffered a fire loss and submitted a claim to its insurer.

The insurer obtained quotes for repair, and the applicant hired a quantity surveyor to critique the insurer's scope of work.

The insurer refused to cover the surveyor's fees, arguing the policy only covered professionals 'required by the Insurer'.

The court found the policy language ambiguous and applied general rules of contract construction.

The court held that the policy covered professional fees incurred by the insured to obtain particulars of the loss, as those particulars were required by the insurer.

The application was allowed and the insurer was ordered to pay the surveyor's fees.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against her former corporate employers and their sole director for wrongful dismissal.

The court found the two corporations were common employers and awarded the plaintiff eight months' reasonable notice, unpaid wages, and vacation pay.

The court also awarded $30,000 in aggravated damages and $25,000 in punitive damages due to the defendants' bad faith conduct, which included failing to pay wages and unilaterally attempting to recharacterize her employment as an independent contractor relationship.

The sole director was held personally liable for the entire judgment under the statutory oppression remedy.

The Representative Plaintiffs in a certified class action sought leave to dismiss the action due to a lack of reasonable prospect of success after an expert report undermined their case.

The Defendants did not oppose the dismissal but sought substantial partial indemnity costs for a withdrawn summary judgment motion and for defending the class action.

The Class Proceedings Fund, responsible for adverse costs, argued the Defendants' costs claim was excessive.

The court granted leave to dismiss the action and awarded the Defendants $300,000 in total partial indemnity costs, significantly less than the $750,025.31 sought by the Defendants but more than the $65,000 proposed by the Fund.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of an unidentified vehicle's involvement in a motorcycle accident to trigger coverage under either the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage Endorsement or the standard O.A.P. 1 minimum limits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial on both coverage bases.

It held that physical evidence (motorcycle damage and a leg laceration) could constitute "other material evidence" under OPCF 44R, leaving its corroborative weight for a jury.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's credibility, despite some inconsistencies in statements, was not suitable for determination on a written record, thus precluding summary judgment under O.A.P. 1.

The moving defendants sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against them regarding a three-vehicle intersection collision.

The collision occurred when a northbound driver made a left turn in front of a southbound driver (the moving defendant), causing a collision that subsequently struck the plaintiff's stopped vehicle.

The court found partial summary judgment appropriate and used its fact-finding powers to determine liability.

The court apportioned 90% liability to the left-turning driver and 10% liability to the moving defendant for failing to slow down when approaching the intersection with an obstructed view.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, breach of confidence, conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment arising from the defendant allegedly sharing the plaintiff's confidential pricing information with a competing bidder.

The court dismissed the motion to strike for most claims, finding they met the low threshold of disclosing a 'germ or scintilla' of a cause of action.

However, the court struck the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, as the pleading failed to allege an unlawful act against a third party, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend.

This endorsement addresses costs for two motions heard on October 22, 2019.

The Regional Municipality of Peel and Bi-Views Building Service Ltd. sought costs, while the plaintiff Aparna Sanwalka also claimed costs.

The court found Peel and Bi-View to be the more successful parties, particularly regarding the dismissal of Ms. Sanwalka's motion for examination for discovery accommodations and the necessity of Peel's motion to advance the action.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis to Peel ($2,500) and Bi-View ($750), payable by Aparna Sanwalka.

The defendant Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought $500,000 from the co-defendants for their alleged failure to respond to an application before the HRTO.

The court found that the notice of application lacked clarity, particularity, and a legal basis, failing to plead a cause of action against any of the defendants.

The court concluded the application was frivolous and vexatious and dismissed it.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a complainant who briefly worked for him.

The complainant alleged she was sexually assaulted at a nightclub, at a condo, and later at the accused's home, claiming she was highly intoxicated and 'blacked out' during parts of the events.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's testimony, noting physical impossibilities in her descriptions, selective memory, and actions inconsistent with her stated lack of romantic interest in the accused.

Applying the W.(D.) principles to the defence evidence, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the sexual assaults occurred beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and attempting to obstruct justice arising from an alleged non-consensual sexual encounter and an interrupted 911 call.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence as contradictory, illogical, and implausible, but held that disbelief of the accused did not relieve the Crown of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.

Although the court accepted much of the complainant’s evidence and found it likely that a sexual assault occurred, it identified material inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and improbabilities going to the core events inside the apartment.

Those concerns left the court with a reasonable doubt on both counts, resulting in acquittals.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment and confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued that the 28-day delay between the signing of the Community Treatment Plan and the issuance of the CTO breached the Mental Health Act.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's finding that the renewal was made in conformity with the Act, concluding there was no undue delay given the administrative processes involved.

The mother sought permission to move the primary residence of the parties' eight-year-old child to Michigan to live with her fiancé.

The father opposed the move and brought a motion to change the existing parenting schedule to expand his parenting time and adjust child support.

The mother also sought a declaration that the father is a vexatious litigant.

The court found that the proposed move constituted a material change in circumstances but concluded that relocating to Michigan was not in the child's best interests, as it would disrupt the child's strong bonds with the father and extended family in Ontario.

The court dismissed the mother's request to relocate, dismissed the vexatious litigant claim, and adjusted the parenting schedule and section 7 expenses.

The plaintiff, Schindler Elevator Corporation, moved for the production of fully unredacted minutes of settlement between the defendants (WBP) and a third party (Yuanda).

WBP had produced a partially redacted version, claiming settlement privilege over the financial terms.

The court found that while the specific settlement amounts should remain privileged, other redacted information relevant to the apportionment of delay and quantification of damages must be disclosed to ensure procedural fairness at the upcoming trial.

The court ordered WBP to produce a further version of the minutes with only the specific settlement amounts and payment dates redacted.