SCC 1998

Novopharm held a compulsory licence for the patented medicine nizatidine, owned by Eli Lilly.

Novopharm and Apotex entered into a supply agreement whereby Novopharm would obtain the medicine and supply it to Apotex.

Eli Lilly sought to terminate Novopharm's licence, arguing the agreement constituted an impermissible sublicence, and sought prohibition orders against the issuance of Notices of Compliance to both Novopharm and Apotex.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the supply agreement did not constitute a sublicence, as it did not grant Apotex the independent right to exercise Novopharm's licensed rights.

The Court also held that Apotex's proposed reformulation of the bulk medicine into final-dosage form would not infringe Eli Lilly's patents.

The appeals by Novopharm and Apotex were allowed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based largely on circumstantial evidence, including post-offence conduct such as flight and concealment.

The trial judge delivered jury instructions in segments throughout the trial and provided written transcripts to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard specifically to the post-offence conduct, and that the piecemeal jury charge format was a reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the final evaluation of guilt, not to individual pieces of evidence, and that while the format of the jury charge was unorthodox and risky, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

Following the murder, they fled the jurisdiction, committed two bank robberies, violated parole, fled from police, and attempted to dispose of the murder weapon.

At trial, they argued this post-offence conduct was explained by the robberies and parole violations, and thus had no probative value regarding the murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the appellants denied any involvement in the murder, their identity was in issue, and the post-offence conduct was relevant and properly left to the jury.

The Court further held that the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to the ultimate verdict, not to individual items of circumstantial evidence such as post-offence conduct.

The appellant was brutally tortured by two police officers and threatened with death.

Suffering from severe post-traumatic stress and fear, he did not bring a civil action against the officers and their employer municipality until six years later.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the psychological fear caused by the officers' fault made it absolutely impossible in fact for the appellant to act, thereby suspending the six-month prescription period.

The Court found the officers liable for civil fault and the municipality vicariously liable, awarding compensatory and exemplary damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a rehearing and amended its previous reasons for judgment and order in this appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the matter returned to the Convention Refugee Determination Division for redetermination of the applicant's refugee claim in a manner consistent with the decision, noting that the respondent may choose to proceed with its powers under ss. 19 and 53 of the Immigration Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, which was substituted by the Court of Appeal after setting aside his acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in finding the victim gave valid consent while under the effect of drugs consumed unknowingly.

The Court added that the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was inapplicable because the appellant had not taken reasonable steps to ascertain that the victim was consenting.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a dissent in the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought a motion to strike paragraphs of the appellant's factum because they did not deal with the legal issues raised in the dissent.

The Court granted the motion, noting that the appellant had not sought leave to appeal on the other matters raised in the factum despite being informed that leave would be required.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought applications to quash two appeals purportedly brought as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applications were based on recent amendments to the Criminal Code that eliminated the right to appeal without leave where an acquittal is overturned by a court of appeal and a new trial ordered.

The appellants argued their right to appeal had accrued before the amendments came into force.

The Court held that the right to appeal as of right is only acquired when the court of appeal renders its judgment.

Since the conditions precedent were not fulfilled before the amendments took effect, the appeals were quashed.

The appeal concerned whether status Indians in New Brunswick had to pay provincial sales tax on goods purchased off reserve but intended for use on reserve.

The majority held that s. 87 of the Indian Act protects only property physically situated on a reserve, or exceptionally property whose paramount location is on a reserve, at the time the tax attaches.

The court characterized the New Brunswick scheme, in the context of retail sales, as a sales tax triggered at the point of sale rather than a true consumption tax.

Because the goods were purchased off reserve and the tax attached there, the statutory exemption did not apply and the provincial legislation was not rendered inoperative.

The aboriginal accused was charged with robbery and sought to challenge potential jurors for cause based on widespread racial prejudice against aboriginal people in the community.

The trial judge dismissed the application, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, holding that evidence of widespread racial prejudice in the community establishes a realistic potential for partiality, entitling the accused to challenge prospective jurors for cause under section 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant employee's hours of work were gradually reduced when her department was reorganized and combined with another.

While her hours were reduced, junior staff from the other department were assigned tasks normally performed by her department.

A labour arbitration board allowed her grievance, finding the reduction in hours amounted to a constructive layoff in breach of the collective agreement.

The Court of Queen's Bench dismissed the employer's application for judicial review, but the Court of Appeal allowed it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitration board's decision was not patently unreasonable, as a significant reduction in hours where a particular employee is singled out may amount to a constructive layoff.

The appellants challenged a Court of Appeal decision setting aside an arbitration award that had characterized a drastic reduction in scheduled hours, despite largely unchanged actual hours through call-ins, as a constructive layoff.

The Supreme Court majority held that the applicable standard of review was patent unreasonableness because the arbitration board was interpreting a collective agreement within its specialized jurisdiction under a near-privative clause.

The majority concluded that layoff in labour law requires a denial or cessation of work, and that the board patently unreasonably expanded the concept by treating scheduling changes without an actual reduction in hours as a layoff.

The majority further held that the board imposed a remedy not rationally connected to the breach alleged under the collective agreement.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent that would have restored the arbitration award.

The applicants sought an order staying the disposition of a Manitoba farm by the respondent, a Crown agent, pending the disposition of their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent argued that provincial legislation barred injunctive relief against the Crown.

The Court held that provincial legislation cannot control the relief granted by the Supreme Court under its own Act.

Applying section 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act, the Court granted the requested interim relief to prevent the respondent from selling the property, which would have negated the effect of a potential successful appeal.

The appellant claimed Convention refugee status but was granted permanent residence.

He was later convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic and sentenced to eight years in prison.

He renewed his refugee claim, but the Immigration and Refugee Board excluded him under Article 1F(c) of the Convention, finding him guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for the Board's decision on this question of law is correctness.

The Court concluded that drug trafficking, while a serious crime, does not constitute a serious, sustained, and systemic violation of fundamental human rights amounting to persecution, and therefore does not fall within the Article 1F(c) exclusion.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in narcotics.

His motion for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment was dismissed at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, ordering a new trial limited solely to the issue of entrapment due to the Crown's failure to disclose a police informant's notes.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to order a limited new trial.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code, a court of appeal has the power to order a new trial limited to the issue of entrapment because entrapment is a distinct proceeding that does not affect the underlying finding of guilt.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence and raise the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for the first time.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence and ordered a new trial limited to the issue of NCRMD.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court held that the fresh evidence was properly admitted despite failing the due diligence requirement, as it was in the interests of justice.

The Court also held that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to order a new trial when the NCRMD defence is raised for the first time on appeal.

However, the Court of Appeal erred in limiting the new trial to the NCRMD issue, as this would restrict the accused's right to control his defence and offend the presumption of innocence.

A full new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal due to errors in the trial judge's instructions on intent and intoxication, but ordered a new trial limited to the issue of whether the appellant was guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code to restrict the scope of a new trial before a jury, and ordered a full new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, which had dismissed its appeal from a trial judge's order staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the courts below that the delay violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Court dismissed the appeal, expressing substantial agreement with the majority reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.