SCC 1998

These appeals arose from two Ontario boating accidents involving deaths and serious injuries, and required the Court to determine the scope of Canadian maritime law, the constitutional applicability of provincial statutes in maritime negligence actions, and the proper limitation period for fatal accident claims.

The Court held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Court over dependants’ maritime fatal accident claims under the Canada Shipping Act.

It established a four-part framework for assessing whether provincial statutes may apply in maritime negligence cases, emphasizing the core federal nature and required uniformity of maritime negligence law.

The Court judicially reformed Canadian maritime law to permit claims for loss of guidance, care and companionship and survival claims by estates, but held siblings could not qualify as dependants.

It further held that maritime collision claims were governed by the two-year limitation period in s. 572(1) of the Canada Shipping Act, and dismissed the appeals and cross-appeals with costs.

A junior high school student was suspected of selling drugs on school property.

The vice-principal, in the passive presence of an RCMP officer, searched the student and found marijuana.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the student's appeal, holding that while the Charter applies to school authorities, a modified standard of reasonableness applies to searches of students by teachers or principals.

The Court found the vice-principal was not acting as a police agent, the search was reasonable, and the student was not detained within the meaning of section 10(b).

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder involving two women killed in similar circumstances.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence and DNA evidence from hair samples the appellant had voluntarily provided during the investigation of the first murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the criminal standard of proof to the similar fact evidence, and that the use of his hair samples in the second investigation violated his Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a jury may consider similar fact evidence if they conclude on a balance of probabilities that the same person committed the acts, and that the unconditional consent to provide hair samples extinguished any expectation of privacy.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions requiring defence counsel to address the jury before the Crown where the defence called evidence.

In a second degree murder appeal involving expert evidence on whether the deceased died by suicide or strangulation, the appellant argued that the order of addresses infringed the rights to make full answer and defence and to a fair trial after the Crown relied on an inference not addressed in the defence closing.

The majority held that ss. 651(3) and (4) do not violate ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter because the accused answers the evidence and the Crown’s theory of the case, not the Crown’s final rhetoric, and the order of address is not shown to confer an inherent advantage.

The Court further held that trial judges may cure improper closings through jury instructions and, in the clearest cases of unfairness, may allow a limited reply.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal regarding the validity of an automobile insurance policy.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the trial judge and the dissenting appellate judge.

The Court held that the insurance policy was valid and binding in law, had not been transferred or cancelled, and that there was no novation releasing the insurer from its obligations.

The appellant commenced a class action against the respondent gas utility, alleging that its five percent late payment penalty constituted interest at a criminal rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The motions judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, finding that the penalty was not an interest charge and that its payment was a voluntary act by the customer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the late payment penalty is a charge payable for the advancing of credit under an agreement or arrangement, and therefore constitutes 'interest' under s. 347.

The Court also held that the payment of the penalty is not a voluntary act that would preclude the application of the criminal interest rate provision.

Additionally, the Court set aside a personal costs award against the appellant, as he had received financial support from the Class Proceedings Fund.

The appellant obtained a mortgage loan from the respondent trust company to finance a construction project.

The loan agreement required substantial fees and bonuses, and the term was for 11 months, but the loan was not repaid for more than three years.

The appellant challenged the validity of the loan, claiming the trust company received payments of interest at a criminal rate contrary to s. 347(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the effective annual rate of interest should be calculated over the period during which credit was actually outstanding, not the contractual term.

Calculated on this basis, the interest payments did not constitute a criminal rate, and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaking and entering, but sentencing was delayed for 17 months primarily due to the prolonged illness and eventual resignation of the trial judge.

The new trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding the delay violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while s. 11(b) applies to sentencing, the delay in this case was not unreasonable because the period of judicial illness constituted inherent delay rather than Crown delay.

The accused pleaded guilty to indecent assault.

Sentencing was delayed indefinitely due to the trial judge's illness, and the judge eventually resigned.

A new judge was assigned, but the accused successfully applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing the 22-month delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while s. 11(b) does apply to the sentencing phase, the delay in this case was not unreasonable because the period of the judge's illness constituted inherent time requirements rather than Crown delay.

The appellants challenged a municipal resolution passed by the City of Sarnia authorizing a judicial inquiry into certain land transactions involving the former Town of Clearwater.

The appellants argued that the resolution was vague, lacked particularity, and was a colourable attempt to conduct a substitute police investigation, thereby infringing the federal criminal law power.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the resolution was validly enacted under s. 100(1) of the Municipal Act, as it was directed at matters of municipal good governance and public business.

The Court also upheld the quashing of summonses issued to city officials, finding that the subjective intent of individual councillors was irrelevant to the validity of the resolution.

The Alberta Provincial Judges' Association brought a motion for directions asking the Supreme Court of Canada to rule on whether its previous decision in Provincial Court Judges (No. 1) required the Province of Alberta to pay the reasonable expenses of the judiciary incurred in participating in the judicial compensation commission process.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that the issue of representational costs did not arise from the implementation of its previous judgments.

The Court noted that while the participation of judges in the commission process is not constitutionally required, the approach to the payment of costs should be fair, equitable, and reasonable.