SCC 1997

The appellants brought a motion seeking a declaration that the appropriate scale of costs referred to in the court's reasons should be solicitor-and-client costs.

The court found that the action arose from the expropriation of an interest in land.

Under sections 35 and 52 of the Nova Scotia Expropriation Act, the appellants were entitled to solicitor-and-client costs throughout the proceedings.

The motion was granted.

The moving party brought a motion to abridge time and expedite the hearing of its appeal.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that while the Court could accommodate the parties and Attorneys General, it could not abridge the time granted under Rule 18(2) for unknown potential interveners to apply for intervener status.

The Court emphasized its unwillingness to deny potential litigants their right to seek intervener status in an important matter.

In a state-initiated civil enforcement action under the federal egg marketing supply-management regime, the respondents challenged the constitutionality of the scheme under the Charter.

The majority held that corporate defendants had standing to raise Charter invalidity through an extension of the Big M Drug Mart exception where coercive civil proceedings were brought by a state organ pursuant to a regulatory scheme.

On the merits, the majority held the scheme did not violate mobility rights under s. 6 because the primary basis of the quota allocation system was historical production patterns, not residence, and the respondents failed to prove practical prejudice relative to comparable new producers in destination provinces.

The majority also rejected the freedom of association claim, holding s. 2(d) protects the associational aspect of activity, not commercial activity itself.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing there were errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding planning and deliberation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming there were errors in the charge, the evidence of planning and deliberation was so overwhelming that the result would inevitably have been the same.

The Court applied the curative proviso under section 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following the death of his severely disabled daughter by carbon monoxide poisoning.

He appealed on the basis that his Charter rights under ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated during his arrest and interrogation, arguing he was arbitrarily detained, not properly informed of his jeopardy, and not provided a toll-free number for duty counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Charter arguments, finding a lawful de facto arrest, adequate understanding of jeopardy, and sufficient information regarding local duty counsel.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial due to fresh evidence revealing that Crown counsel and the RCMP had improperly administered a questionnaire to prospective jurors, constituting a flagrant abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that overturned a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge had ordered the stay due to a 20-month delay between the issuance of an arrest warrant and the actual arrest, finding a breach of the right to be informed of the specific offence without unreasonable delay under section 11(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no proof of prejudice to the accused.

In an addendum, the Chief Justice noted that an infringement of section 11(a) could potentially be established based on economic prejudice, rather than solely on prejudice to the right to a fair trial.

The appellant brought a civil action against the respondent, a psychiatrist who sexually assaulted her when she was a patient.

The respondent sought production of the clinical notes and records of the appellant's subsequent treating psychiatrist.

The Supreme Court of Canada recognized a partial privilege for psychiatric records in civil cases, applying the Wigmore criteria.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeal's order requiring limited disclosure of the records subject to stringent conditions protecting the appellant's privacy.

Criminal appeal concerning destruction by a third-party sexual assault crisis centre of counselling notes made during the complainant’s initial disclosure before charges were laid.

The majority held that where destroyed material met the disclosure or production threshold, the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 was breached without any additional requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage.

Applying both the Stinchcombe and O’Connor frameworks, the Court found the notes were likely relevant to credibility and cross-examination and would have been producible.

A stay of proceedings was restored because the deliberate destruction of the only independent contemporaneous written account caused irremediable prejudice and continuing the prosecution would damage the integrity of the justice system.

The province of Nova Scotia expropriated land that bisected the appellants' farm for a highway.

The Crown orally agreed to provide the landowner with an interest in land permitting access across the highway, and subsequently built and maintained access ramps for 27 years.

The Crown later denied the existence of this interest, relying on a statutory requirement that such permissions be in writing.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the doctrine of part performance prevented the Crown from relying on the writing requirement, as the Crown's actions in building and maintaining the ramps fulfilled the purpose of the statute.

The appellants were entitled to compensation for the expropriation of their equitable interest.

The appellant land developer suffered financial losses due to a two-year delay by the respondent transit authority in determining the precise location and acreage required for a new transit station on the appellant's land.

The municipality withheld development approvals during this period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the damages resulting from the delay were the natural and reasonable consequences of the expropriation and were compensable as disturbance damages under the Expropriations Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act is a remedial statute that must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to adequately compensate those whose lands are taken.

The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans authorized the issuance of offshore lobster licences to the appellant but later revoked the authorization before the licences were issued, citing government policy and lobbying by inshore fishermen.

The appellant sued the Crown in negligence for economic loss incurred in preparing its vessels.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under section 7 of the Fisheries Act, the Minister's power to authorize the issuance of a licence is a continuing power, allowing revocation at any time prior to actual issuance.

Consequently, the Minister acted within his statutory authority and was not liable in negligence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal that had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution was not an abuse of process because it was initiated after an independent investigation, rather than to advance a civil interest to recover a debt.

The Court also agreed that there was no violation of the appellant's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed as of right from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from convictions for several sexual offences.

The issue was whether the trial judge erred in exercising discretion regarding the severance of counts in the indictment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an appellate court should only interfere with such discretion if the trial judge acted unjudicially or the ruling resulted in an injustice, neither of which occurred here.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the appeal did not raise a question of law alone.

As a result, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it was quashed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Cumming J.A. The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored the trial judge's order staying the court action in favour of arbitration.

The appellant was awarded costs in both courts.

The appellant appealed a stay of proceedings order rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal proprio motu, which set aside his conviction for armed robbery but deprived him of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence could not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of a municipal surtax on non-residential buildings imposed by the City of Montreal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the surtax is a direct tax raised for provincial purposes within the meaning of s. 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that the taxes fall into the category of true land taxes.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown did not call the victim of the assault to testify, relying instead on other witnesses and forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the Crown had a duty to call the victim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, ruling that the Crown has broad discretion in deciding which witnesses to call, including the victim, and is not required to call all material witnesses absent an abuse of process.

The plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic during a rugby match and sued the provincial rugby union and a coach.

During the jury trial, two witnesses made references suggesting the defendants were insured.

The trial judge discharged the jury due to potential prejudice, and the plaintiffs elected to continue by judge alone, ultimately losing the action.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the jury should not have been discharged.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, overruling its previous decision in *Theakston* which required automatic discharge when insurance is mentioned.

The Court held that discharging a jury is a matter of the trial judge's discretion based on whether incurable prejudice has occurred, and found the trial judge properly exercised this discretion.

The appellant city hired a temporary employee through a personnel agency.

The respondent union sought to have the employee included in its bargaining unit, arguing the city was the real employer.

The Labour Court found that the city was the real employer based on its control over the employee's working conditions and day-to-day work.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Labour Court's decision was not patently unreasonable, affirming that a comprehensive approach considering multiple factors is appropriate for identifying the real employer in a tripartite relationship.