SCC 1997

The appellant provided funds to a director of the respondent company to invest in the company.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, based on the trial judge's findings, the appellant was entitled to the protection of the indoor management rule under section 19 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The respondent was therefore bound by its director's representations.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment restored.

The appellant appealed against sentences involving the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the unusual circumstances of the case distinguished it from previous jurisprudence, and agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

The accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the designation, finding the trial judge failed to consider the gravity of the predicate offences in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 753(b) of the Criminal Code, a trial judge need not focus on the objective seriousness of a predicate offence to justify a dangerous offender designation, provided the offender's past conduct demonstrates a present likelihood of inflicting future harm.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The respondent was a client of the appellant, a real estate broker.

The appellant negotiated to purchase a commercial building on behalf of the respondent.

The vendor rejected the offer and made a counteroffer.

The appellant rejected the counteroffer but signed it back.

The vendor advised the appellant of the amount it would accept.

Instead of conveying this information to the respondent, the appellant arranged for his wife to purchase the property, which was then transferred to the appellant and his wife.

The respondent sued for breach of fiduciary duty and sought a constructive trust over the property, abandoning his claim for damages because the property's market value had decreased.

The trial judge found a breach of duty but refused a constructive trust because there was no unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the property conveyed to the respondent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a constructive trust can be imposed for a breach of fiduciary duty even without unjust enrichment, based on good conscience, to ensure fiduciaries remain faithful.

The appellants, shareholders in two corporations that went into receivership, brought an action against the respondent auditors alleging negligent misrepresentation in the preparation of the corporations' audit reports.

The appellants claimed they relied on these reports to make further investments and to monitor their existing shareholdings.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Anns/Kamloops test and held that while a prima facie duty of care existed, it was negated by policy considerations regarding indeterminate liability.

The audit reports were prepared to assist shareholders collectively in overseeing management, not for individual investment decisions.

Furthermore, the Court held that claims regarding the devaluation of existing shares due to an inability to oversee management properly belonged to the corporation under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle and should have been brought as a derivative action.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Indian band sought a declaration that a permit granting a right-of-way for an electric power transmission line across its reserve was void.

The permit, issued under s. 28(2) of the Indian Act, was granted for 'such period of time as the right-of-way is required'.

The band argued that this indefinite period amounted to a permanent alienation requiring a formal surrender under s. 37 of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the permit was validly issued under s. 28(2), as the duration of the easement, while indeterminate, was bounded by an ascertainable event (when the line is no longer required) and did not constitute a grant in perpetuity.

The Crown applied for a rehearing on the issue of whether there should be a transition period for the operation of the Court's prior judgment requiring a warrant to effect an arrest in a dwelling.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the application and stayed the operation of that aspect of the judgment for six months from May 22, 1997, with national effect, though it did not apply to the disposition of the present case.

The appellant challenged a murder conviction arising from a warrantless police entry into his dwelling, subsequent detention, questioning, seizure of clothing, later warrant search, and fingerprinting.

The majority held that the officers lacked both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest before entering and that, absent hot pursuit or other exceptional circumstances, police must obtain prior judicial authorization to enter a dwelling to make an arrest.

The court further held that the appellant’s right to counsel was breached from the moment of detention because he was not properly informed or given a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel before questioning.

Applying the Collins and Stillman frameworks, the majority excluded the impugned statements, fingerprints, and real evidence, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Alberta regarding convictions for both robbery and aggravated assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the charge of aggravated assault was an included offence in the robbery charge.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the Court held that the two charges arose out of the same delict, and therefore multiple convictions could not be entered.

The trial judgment was restored.

The applicant sought a stay of an Ontario Court of Appeal order pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was made directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Court dismissed the application for a stay, noting that under recent amendments, such applications should generally be made first to the court appealed from unless there are special circumstances.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the applicant renewing the stay application before the Court of Appeal.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that the respondent insureds were entitled to recover replacement costs under a property insurance policy.

The insureds' hotel was destroyed by fire, and they signed a contract for reconstruction before selling the property to a third party on the condition that the hotel would be rebuilt according to the contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the insureds had satisfied the policy requirement to effect replacement.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed a Crown appeal from an acquittal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge stated a conclusion before the trial was completed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal's reasons for ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for misappropriation of money held under direction, arguing that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to overturn his acquittal, that the mens rea for the offence was not established, that s. 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code violated s. 7 of the Charter, and that he was entitled to be sentenced by the original trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the issue was a question of law, intentional misappropriation without mistake suffices for mens rea, the Charter was not violated, and sentencing by a new judge was permissible.

The appellant agency sought an order to detain a pregnant woman who was addicted to glue sniffing in a health centre for treatment until the birth of her child, to prevent harm to the unborn child.

The superior court judge granted the order under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, but it was set aside on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the agency's appeal, holding that neither the law of tort nor the parens patriae jurisdiction recognizes an unborn child as a legal person possessing rights.

The Court concluded that extending the law to permit the detention of a pregnant woman to protect her fetus would involve major policy changes and complex ramifications that are best left to the legislature.

The appellant municipality appealed a judgment invalidating a residence requirement imposed on permanent municipal employees and ordering the respondent’s reinstatement and damages.

A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the requirement unjustifiably infringed the respondent’s right to privacy under s. 5 of the Quebec Charter, while one set of reasons also held that municipalities are subject to the Canadian Charter and that the requirement violated s. 7 liberty.

The Court held that the decision where to establish one’s home is a fundamentally personal choice protected from unjustified interference and that the municipality’s objectives were insufficient or disproportionate.

The respondent’s cross-appeal seeking additional interim damages was also dismissed because the damages were not properly quantified and the Court of Appeal committed no reversible procedural error.

The appellant insurance companies used an agent to collect premiums.

The agent deposited the premiums into a general bank account with the respondent bank.

The bank subsequently transferred funds from this account to the agent's parent company's account to reduce an overdraft, leaving the agent unable to remit the premiums to the appellants.

The appellants sued the bank for breach of trust.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was liable as a constructive trustee under the 'knowing receipt' head of liability, as it received trust property for its own benefit and had constructive knowledge of the breach of trust.

The appellant, a beneficiary of an estate, sued the respondent bank seeking a declaration that a guarantee given to the bank by an estate company was invalid.

The guarantee was authorized by the appellant's uncle, who held a power of attorney for the appellant and was a co-executor.

The bank required the guarantee to secure a loan to the uncle's personal company.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the bank was not liable for knowing assistance because it lacked actual knowledge of the breach of trust, relying on a legal opinion letter.

The majority also held that the bank was not liable for knowing receipt, as it acted reasonably in the circumstances and had no duty to inquire further or require the appellant to obtain independent legal advice.

The appellant was induced to leave secure employment and worked for the respondent for 14 years before being summarily discharged without explanation.

The employer maintained allegations of cause until the start of the trial.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sued for wrongful dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an undischarged bankrupt can maintain an action for wrongful dismissal because damages in lieu of notice constitute exempt 'salary, wages or other remuneration' under the Bankruptcy Act.

The Court also held that while there is no separate tort of 'bad faith discharge', employers have an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal.

Breach of this obligation, as occurred here, justifies an extension of the reasonable notice period.

The trial judge's award of 24 months' notice was restored.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which had overturned a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the delay was not occasioned by a scarcity of judicial resources and did not warrant a stay.

The appellant appealed as of right from a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from his acquittal for possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking.

The sole issue was the admissibility of a telephone conversation between an unidentified person and a police officer arranging a drug delivery.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the conversation was not hearsay because it was tendered as a statement of intention or to establish the transaction, rather than for the truth of its contents.

The Court confirmed the order for a new trial.