Sandra Elizabeth Duffey

Criminal trial on multiple counts of assault, assault causing bodily harm, and failing to comply with probation orders arising from three alleged incidents of intimate partner violence in 2023.

The Crown invited dismissal of charges relating to the third incident.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility and reliability, finding that her combative demeanour under cross-examination was attributable to the prolonged proceedings, the manner of cross-examination, and her personal circumstances as a young Indigenous woman, rather than reflecting on her truthfulness.

The court found the complainant's core evidence on the remaining two incidents was compelling, internally consistent, and corroborated by CCTV footage, medical records, body-worn camera evidence, and photographic documentation of injuries.

The accused was convicted after trial of aggravated assault and failing to comply with probation.

He stabbed the victim four times in the back on February 9, 2024, at a makeshift shelter near Jane and Finch in Toronto.

The court found a causal link between the accused's schizophrenia and the offence, despite the Crown's submission that the accused's calm demeanor on video surveillance negated any such connection.

The court imposed a three-year sentence, accounting for the accused's mental illness, strong family support, good character when stable, difficult pre-sentence custody conditions, and rehabilitation prospects, while also recognizing the serious and unprovoked nature of the attack and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

This decision concerns an application by Martin Duah for a review of his detention under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the original justice erred in law, failed to provide sufficient reasons, and that there was a material change in circumstances.

The court reviewed the evidence, including new sureties and a revised release plan, but ultimately found the plan insufficient to address secondary ground concerns regarding public safety and supervision.

The application was dismissed and the applicant was ordered detained.

This decision addresses the issue of identity in a stabbing incident where the accused, Dwumo Amankwaah, was charged with attempted murder, assault with a weapon, and failure to comply with probation.

The Crown withdrew the attempted murder charge but sought conviction for aggravated assault as a lesser included offence.

The court carefully analyzed the reliability and credibility of the victim's identification, corroborated by surveillance footage and DNA evidence linking the accused to the crime scene.

The court found the accused guilty of aggravated assault and failure to comply with probation, staying the assault with a weapon charge under the Kienapple principle.

The judgment also clarifies the requirements for lesser included offences in attempted murder charges, particularly regarding aggravated assault.

The accused, Brenda Andrew, pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 against her former employer, Vertechs Design Inc., involving approximately $210,000.

The fraud was committed through unauthorized use of a corporate credit card and manipulation of the payroll system, spanning nearly three years.

Andrew made substantially full restitution.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered Andrew's extensive criminal record for similar dishonesty offences, the breach of trust, the sophistication and duration of the fraud, and the impact on the vulnerable small business.

Despite significant mitigation from the guilty plea and restitution, the court found a conditional sentence inappropriate due to the need for specific and general deterrence, sentencing Andrew to two years less a day in prison and imposing a lifetime prohibition on employment involving financial authority over others.

Matthew McLellan pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for unprovoked knife attacks on two homeless individuals.

The court considered aggravating factors including victim vulnerability, bias against homeless persons, and the violent, impulsive nature of the attacks.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, remorse, and efforts at rehabilitation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, concluding that a custodial sentence was required over a conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 22 months of custody, with a six-month credit for strict bail conditions, resulting in an additional six months to serve, followed by two years of probation.

Omari Rodney was convicted of possession of a loaded 9mm handgun, cocaine, and methamphetamine.

He absconded after conviction but before sentencing.

The court proceeded with sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the nature of the firearm, its defaced serial number, the combination of gun and drugs, the accused's prior weapons and violence history, and the public safety risk.

Mitigating factors included pre-sentence custody conditions and family support, though his rehabilitative prospects were deemed minimal due to absconding and lack of insight.

The court applied the totality principle and sentenced Mr. Rodney to a net term of 5 years and 2 months in jail, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of cash and firearm.

The applicant, Brenda Andrew, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of her right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 43 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan.

The court identified nine months of "defence delay" attributable to the applicant's repeated requests for time to retain counsel and to raise restitution funds for a failed resolution agreement.

This reduced the net delay for Jordan purposes to 34 months.

The Crown argued that the remaining delay beyond the ceiling was due to the COVID-19 pandemic backlog, an "exceptional circumstance." The court found that approximately ten months of the delay in setting the trial date was attributable to the pandemic backlog, bringing the net delay to 24 months, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

Omari Rodney was charged with drug and firearm offences after fleeing police and discarding a loaded handgun.

The defence argued that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated, seeking exclusion of the evidence.

The court found that Rodney was not psychologically detained before he fled and discarded the gun, and that his subsequent arrest for firearm possession was lawful.

The search incident to arrest was also deemed lawful.

Even if Charter violations occurred, the court determined the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the offences and the public interest in a trial on the merits.

Rodney was found guilty of all charges.

This was a judge-alone criminal trial for sexual assault.

The complainant alleged that the accused sexually assaulted her after she had initially consented to some sexual activity but later withdrew consent due to intoxication and feeling pressured.

The court assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the accused, finding the complainant's testimony credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies, and the accused's testimony unreliable due to numerous contradictions and evasiveness.

The court found that the complainant's consent was revoked following a shower, and subsequent sexual acts occurred under duress and without voluntary consent.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

Mark Holland was convicted of sexual assault from 2008.

The sentencing was significantly delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought 16 months imprisonment, while the defence sought "time served" or a conditional sentence.

The court addressed the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which precludes conditional sentences for sexual assault prosecuted by indictment.

The judge found this section to infringe ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and declared it of no force or effect, following R. v. R.S. and R. v. Sharma.

Considering aggravating and mitigating factors, including the extraordinary delay, the court imposed an eight-month conditional sentence, to be served in the community, along with other standard orders (DNA, SOIRA, weapons prohibition).

The defendant, Jade Thelwel, pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching court orders that prohibited her from communicating or posting online about two individuals, Luke Halstead and Andrei Korottchenko.

These breaches occurred after a sustained online campaign of vilification against the victims, which continued even after police investigations found no basis for her allegations and despite prior release conditions.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence requested an absolute discharge.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the serious impact on victims and the willful breach of court orders, alongside mitigating factors such as the defendant's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, engagement in counselling, and promising career.

The court ultimately granted a conditional discharge, imposing two years of probation with no contact orders and 50 hours of community service, balancing the principles of deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, and finding it in the public interest given the circumstances.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that late disclosure by the Crown prevented him from re-electing a judge-alone trial, thereby causing delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the primary reason for the trial not proceeding was the suspension of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court also found that the applicant failed to prove that the late disclosure was the sole reason for not re-electing, noting other factors like the complainant's COVID-19 symptoms.

The defendant was charged with assault following a physical altercation with a teenage girl on a downtown Toronto street.

The defendant had directed offensive words at the girl and two of her friends, both of whom were wearing hijabs.

The Crown alleged the defendant initiated both the verbal and physical confrontation.

The defendant claimed the physical altercation was a consensual fight that began when the complainant punched him first.

The court found that while the defendant's credibility was questionable, his evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to who first applied force.

The court concluded the incident constituted a consensual fight rather than an assault and acquitted the defendant.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges were impaired driving and "Over 80." The gross delay from the laying of the Information on July 18, 2016 to the projected conclusion of trial on November 6, 2018 was 27 months and 20 days.

After deducting defence delay and delay attributable to exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 22.25 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court by 4.25 months.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and granted the application, staying the charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after his vehicle went into a ditch on a rural road.

The trial addressed three key issues: whether the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle; whether police had lawful grounds to make demands under section 254 of the Criminal Code; and whether breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the defendant was in care or control, the police had lawful grounds for their demands, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no section 8 or 9 violation, as the officer reasonably believed the approved screening device was functioning properly.

However, the court found a section 10(b) violation when police refused to permit the accused to contact a third party to obtain a lawyer's name and contact information.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath samples, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a RIDE programme stop.

Three issues emerged at trial: whether the defendant's section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by an improper breath demand; whether the defendant's section 10(a) Charter right to be informed of the charge was breached; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer failed to follow mandatory protocols established by the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the reliability of the approved screening device, specifically failing to eliminate the possibility of false positives from sugary foods and beverages and failing to conduct required self-tests.

The court concluded that the officer's reliance on the screening test result was unreasonable, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 Charter right.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy, resulting in a verdict of not guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown called two police witnesses: the arresting officer and a qualified technician who conducted breath analysis.

The defendant testified and introduced photographic evidence regarding her vehicle's colour.

The defendant conceded the excess blood alcohol concentration charge but contested the impaired operation charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol concentration but acquitted her of the impaired operation charge, finding insufficient evidence that her ability to operate the vehicle was impaired despite her elevated blood alcohol level.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.